Threadbare Morality and The New World in
Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice*

Samina Ashfaq, Nasir Jamal Khattak

College of Home Economics, University of Peshawar, Pakistan
Department of English & Applied Linguistics, University of Peshawar, Pakistan

_____

Abstract

Jane Austen's attitude towards morality has always been a debatable topic for those who consider morality as an integral part of religion. Though the daughter of a clergyman, she never discusses religion in her novels which is why she remains popular to this day. Austen, a keen observer of her society, can see that times change with new ideologies, inventions and contact with others at universal level because of modern means of communications. She knows that acceptance and respect for the opinions of others can lead to greater understanding and world peace. Her art of creating a microcosm which she calls "little bit (two inches wide) of ivory" [1] conveys the message through the stories of few families. This paper is an attempt to search how she tries to harmonize the characters of her novel belonging to different classes and social groups, by making them realize that if they keep on sticking to their old worn-out beliefs, they will never be able to bridge the gap with the others and taste the fruits of wholesome relationships.

Keywords: Society, values, threadbare morality, change, self-realization, harmony

_____

Introduction

Though often regarded a secular author due to the absence of religion from her novels, "Austen's novels critique the faults of the human personality and the flaws of human institutions including marriage, society, and the church. . . . as she sees [them] reflected in the human relationships (Griffin, 2002). As such, "Jane Austen

was able to combine the stuff of the novel . . . with the matter of the sermon" in a very seamless manner (Giuffre, 1980:17). Essentially a Georgian (1714-1830), Jane Austen's vision is also Georgian, a time when the state and the church still co-existed in an organic unity (Giffin, 2002). However, her world view or her concept of order for that matter is a living, dynamic order, not static imposed by the society and the church (Jackson, 2000).According to Rodham:

> Austen's novels critique the faults of the human personality and the flaws of human institutions including marriage, society, and the church. She conducts this critique as a devout believer within the established church who accepts mainstream Anglican "truth" as she sees it reflected in the human relationships (Rodham, 2013).

This paper contends that Austen's world and ours, though three centuries apart, offer similarities in the dynamics of society and reactions of the people living then and now regarding their attitude to morality. There are still some who prefer to adhere to the old social order and worn-out beliefs, thinking that the new social order is based on corrupt thinking. They find a sort of shield in religion posing to be more righteous than others and deliberately turning a blind eye to the challenges of the new world. They fail to realize that this will create problems of compatibility and understanding with the rest of the world because observance of religious practices does not mean that the person is morally elevated. Austen reveals the shallow beliefs of such people through her characters and the way they are ignored by the others because their shallowness is obvious to the others. Their tragedy is that they fail to see their own self and hence remain unconscious of their own weaknesses. As a result they end up alienating themselves from others. Such characters live like lonely souls within the world and have no friends. In their efforts to pose distinct and be morally superior to others they openly criticize the others and marginalize them for their mistakes.

Threadbare Morality in Pride and Prejudice

In Austen's *Pride and Prejudice*[2] we are first introduced to the phrase "threadbare morality" (56) through a description of Mary's fixation with the texts of writers who love to moralize without practising that which they teach. This inculcates in her a habit of philosophizing things unnecessarily.[3] Though Jane Austen comments on Mary's preoccupation with "deep study of thorough bass and human nature", yet she is not judgmental in her remarks. Mary Bennet lives in an almost isolated cocoon, life couched comfortably in her moral philosophy, while her sisters involve themselves in active participation in the events around them. They enjoy their social life and gossip about the affairs of the "regiment" and the activities of their

neighbours. Mary's occasional moral pronouncements are not taken seriously by the Bennets while she is seemingly self-satisfied in her own limited world, occasionally showing her resentment and bitterness towards the others. Disregarding the others she gravely disapproves of their manners, yet, all her objections are mere hollow words, not taken seriously by her family members. This makes her almost a stranger in her own household.

Though Mr. Collins and Mary are quite similar in their ethical views and pedantic disposition yet not even once do we hear a conversation between them. Mary holds him in great reverence but she considers him "by no means so clever as herself", still she thinks that he can be improved to become "a very agreeable partner" (119) which reveals their vanity. Contrary to her expectations, she is totally ignored by Mr. Collins when it comes to marriage. No friendship exists between the two though "Mr. Collins had only to change from Jane to Elizabeth — and it was soon done — done while Mrs. Bennet was stirring fire" (66). Yet after Elizabeth's refusal, he does opt for Mary though, both holding similar views on 'right' and 'wrong'.

Struck in self-righteousness, they become self-centred and pretentious. Both are deficient in understanding human frailties and having a sympathetic view of the weaknesses of the others. Mr. Collins luckily finds a potential fulfilment of his cherished ideals in the person of Charlotte Lucas, who possesses a realistic approach to life and has enough patience to endure his high claims. She manages to handle his eccentricities well for she possesses self-control. Her marriage to Collins is a conscious contract of relationship; so, all that Elizabeth could detect of Charlotte's consciousness is a "faint blush" which does not last long. To rescue her familial sanctity, she gives many silent sacrifices. Miss Farrell comments that "Austen's blushes seem sometime to work as natural and involuntary signals of embarrassment, vexation, anger or love. Jane Bennet, for example, blushes at the warmth of her inner feelings for Bingley though she verbally denies their strength" (128). These blushes indicate the sensibility of the characters and the realization of their own weaknesses and limitations when they fail to openly express their feelings. At times this becomes a gesture of self-degradation.

Compromises upon compromises have to be made so as to be a part of the community. People fail to understand the implication of evil deeds and dire effects of levity are not made public rather they are tabooed by the so called social morality. For this reason, Wickham's earlier sexual exploitations as well as his later immoral acts communicated to Elizabeth by Darcy remain a secret; though Elizabeth thinks about making them public yet she fears that it "will ruin forever" while there is a

chance of his "re-establish[ment]". Though no social reproof follows yet Elizabeth is afraid that socially rejection will make him "desperate" (312).

Contrary to this we hear Mary and Collins; the 'religious characters', openly criticizing Lydia's elopement and passing judgments on her, that she is "naturally bad" advising Mr. Bennet to "leave her to reap the fruits of her own heinous offence" (278). Religion hence becomes a social persona that refuses to show any relaxation or sympathy with the victimized. Here Austen seems to differentiate between religion and morality as two different ideals. If Lydia had been aware of the full impact of her elopement would she have agreed? For her it's a "joke".

Mary's morality is confined to books and sermons and she remains or tries to remain oblivious of the reaction of society considering her own self as an epitome of virtue. Like many others she confuses religion with morality. Mary's vanity is confined to criticizing others; which she mistakes for moralizing; a marked disregard for the others. Collins and Mary are stuck in their personas marked by a sense of their own worthiness; she of an indifferent preacher and Collins, in his hollow shaming civility.

> Collins' show of humility before those who are rich makes him lose his self-respect as the general belief and behaviour of the common men and women as well as the nobility of that time reflected that "status is value-laden" (Duckworth, 117). [4]

Furthermore Mr. Collins' letter of introduction to the Bennets reveals the superficiality of his conviction. The words that he uses to convey his regard for them are hollow and meaningless. They lack depth and sincerity. He had been to a college for a formal religious education and from there he has learned rhetoric of ceremonial language. His conversation is fashioned for the high ups and not for the commonality. He pathetically exposes the limitations of the religious beliefs of his time.

The way Mr. Collins sermons on proper behaviour seems to circumscribe the parameters of punishment and reward in religion but no social mobility. Such speeches stress people to abstain from sins and immoral conduct for fear of punishment and not because these are socially harmful. The characters are not made aware of the consequences that they might suffer due to immorality in their daily life: that it would harm their relationships and mar their characters, alienating them from their fellow human beings. People are not acquainted with facts but kept in ambiguities from across-the-border realities. That is why the moment the

common men and women are out of the church they forget all the lessons of good ethics and beliefs. They immediately indulge in the scheduled activities of day to day life for that is what they seem to understand.

Collins is a church functionary; hence a self-proclaimed religious man. He never aims at values that provide eternal happiness. He never talks of the advantages of a sound mind and inner peace. As a church functionary he is expected to have a good influence at least on his cousins but no intimacy exists. He keeps a certain distance with all of them and his superficial modesty is very revealing. Even a harmless girl like Jane fails to befriend him. He is dissatisfied at the way his cousins act and when Lydia interrupted him while he is reading a passage from Fordyce's Sermons after rejecting a novel he expresses his displeasure, 'I have often observed how little young ladies are interested by books of a serious stamp, though written solely for their benefit. It amazes me, I confess; — for certainly, there can be nothing so advantageous to them as instruction' (64).

Quite ironically, he never dwells on these "advantages" neither does he state the benefit of "instruction" which further reveals his self-importance and flimsy morals that are vague abstraction. His sermons are not original rather they are the extracts from someone else's writings. They are ineffective and boring because they lack persuasion being impractical. As he himself does not practice that which he preaches so all that he states fall on deaf ears.

Though there are characters in the novel that are morally superior to others yet we do not meet "moral saints"[5] in Austen's novels. She lightly cross-sections Collins and in this way she exposes the evil practices of her society that were subtly harming the minds of the people by keeping them ignorant. She hence proves a harbinger of practical and personal salvation and becomes an instrument of augury for her society. She seem to dread the threat that religion might become if people do not become conscious of what the likes of Collins and the institutions that they represent whom Jung calls "educational monstrosities"[6] would do, because the tool that they have make them more dangerous than ignorant people. The reader is led to recognize that ill feelings or misunderstandings are mostly the cause of strife among the members of society so they must be duly recognized and hence redressed.

There are no strict moral statements in the novel[7]. Even the emotional state of the characters does not cross the limits of decency to which Miss Charlotte Bronte objects in her criticism of Jane Austen. The arguments between the characters, no matter how heated they may become, never cross the limits of propriety and

decency. The reason might be the refinement of Austen's immediate family, and her characters bear a stamp of it.

Elizabeth and Darcy both suffer tumultuously within, and the reader is made to feel their suffering with grace and equanimity out any strong language — and here is positioned the art of Miss Austen. She adds grace even to her suffering characters. Even Mr. Collins does not show a violent reaction after being refused by Elizabeth. He accepts her refusal though with a heavy heart, yet no violent scene is created, and the matter of his marriage resolves very quietly and quite reasonably. It is only Mrs. Bennet that we see making a fuss because when she is "discontented, she fancied herself nervous" (3). Mrs. Bennet's philosophy, if she is supposed to have any is that "those who do not complain are never pitied" (108).

The protagonists in the novel are conscious of the worth and value of moral "goodness" hence those who do not prefer wealth and status over contentment achieve contentment. Wickham is doomed to suffer dissatisfaction and Charlotte Lucas is condemned to live with her "blush" (148), for the choice they made is consciously done. They have staked their moral obligation over physical comforts without realizing the consequences. Substantially they lose human values and bruise themselves ethically as they have degraded themselves to achieve comfort at the expense of peace of mind. Materialistically expedient, they become spiritually bankrupt. They have been led by the demands of the society without daring to come into conflict with its unreasonable expectations. Mooneyham believes that "the central conflict in each novel is between the hero and heroine; their moral, intellectual and linguistic opposition defines the progress of education and growth" (ix). But it is not always so, for it is not only the hero or heroine that are in a state of conflict rather the whole functional world and its people that contribute to social progression are at variance, so they go through the process of education for social realization. An individual's realization is but a step towards higher social awareness. It's a moment that triggers a movement towards truth. They make erroneous judgments and experience the repercussions but it is through these experiences that they become capable of rectifying their wrong conceptions. Elizabeth might have lost Darcy for good if she has not realized that her assumptions were based on prejudice so unreasonable.

Austen never blames the people of the wrongs that they are led to commit hence her tool of making them realize their errors is irony and humour. She softly laughs with her characters whose follies and foibles were the raw material of her novels.[8] 'In P & P, the fallible characters are victims of their educational environment too. Even the people belonging to the same class differ in their behaviour. The stark

difference can be seen in the Bennet girls and the Bingley sisters. They know how to read and write, and would compliment writers on the art of writing and reading. Their foremost consideration is making additions to their "family library" in order to add to the "beauties" (34) of their houses, and not because they want to improve their mind.

Bingley wishes he had as big a library as Mr. Darcy's though he never expresses his desire of reading the books that he would collect. This is shown in his mental deficiency. The reason can be traced in his lack of interest in reading books. Though Bingley's sisters are educated but they are deficient in true spirit of education and as a result they become snobbish. They are not taught how to make use of the knowledge that they have acquired in "one of the first private seminaries in town" (12) for too much stress was made on manners rather than practice. For them education means superficial accomplishments like "through knowledge of music, singing, drawing dancing and modern languages" (35, 36). Though experts in the art of social rhetoric they fail to value matters of heart. The children of Mr. Bertram, in *Mansfield Park*[9] , also fail to come up to their father's expectations though he tries his best to provide them the best of education, and he later regrets:

> Here had been grievous mismanagement; . . . He feared that principle, active principle, had been wanting; that they had never been properly taught to govern their inclinations and tempers, by that sense of duty which can alone suffice. They had been instructed theoretically in their religion, but never required to bring it into daily practice (MP, 477).

We note that the older generation fails to set fine models. They do not help their children in adjusting with the modern requirements and progression of society which is constantly going through a change. They are so involved in their own pursuits and their worn out beliefs that they forget that the first and foremost duty of a parent is the improvement of mental capabilities of their children and to help them adjust with the changing world. They are to prepare their offspring to meet the challenges of life. Their tragedy is that they lack balance and moderation in themselves. Though we cannot generalize from this laxity on their behalf but it does help the reader to detect and understand their fault. Mr. Bennet shares the total neglect of his daughters' education with Mr. Bertram in MP, while Mrs. Bennet's constant reference to wealth in marriage as only source of achieving happiness spoils her younger daughters' concepts of a good life. They fail to acquire clear concepts of social ethics. Miss Austen does not criticize or blame the parties involved openly because she disclaims being knowledgeable about ethics

and morality, which is why we do not find moral extracts in her novels regarding good behaviour or ethics.

Conclusion

To say that Austen's novels deal superficially with the ethics[10] is debatable, for she wrote as a member of the society in which she lived and was fully aware of the superficiality of their moral condition. She teaches her characters, through their own actions, lessons of virtue and vice without sermonizing. She has unlimited sympathy even for characters like Collins and Mary for she considers them the product of their environment and so her treatment of such characters remind one of what Hazlitt says in his essay on Jeremy Bentham that "In ascertaining the rules of moral conduct, we must have regard not merely to the nature of the object, but to the capacity of the agent, and to his fitness for apprehending or attaining it" (7).

Her praise for a substantial character is obvious in the way she portrays that character. There are no angels nor demons but simple men and women who do not know themselves. They have to know themselves before they could claim of knowing the others. Her characters reveal themselves through their actions and dialogues and the reader finds them in a deep moral muddle. They struggle to get out of it without openly revolting against their society's set norms, but their tragedy is that they cannot afford to live outside it, for then, it will be the bitterest of punishment imaginable and Austen knew it. Even her evil characters are human beings with human weaknesses.

In *Pride and Prejudice*, Jane Austen succeeds, as Guiffre (1980:29) remarks, in 'imbuing the fable with a moral in such a superlatively decorous way that nowhere the narrative is felt to be oppressively coloured by the author's ethical concerns.'

Notes

---

[1] Letter to J. Edward Austen, then aged 18, December 16, 1816; *Letters to her Sister Cassandra and Others*, Collected and ed. by Chapman. R.W. (London: Oxford at the Clarondon Press 1932. Letter 134), Pp. 468-69.

[2] All subsequent references to this novel *Pride and Prejudice* are indicated by the letters, P & P for the sake of brevity. Jane Austen, *Pride and Prejudice* (London: David Campbell Ltd. 1991).

[3] Miss Austens own involvement in the issue makes her use the phrase threadbare morality as she describes Marys obsession of quoting moral extracts with no reason and so without any effect.

[4] The term appears in Alistair Duckworth, *The Improvement of the State: A Study of Jane Austens Novels* Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1971)

[5] The term was used by Susan Wolf in her article *Moral Saints* in *The Journal of Philosophy* > Vol. 79, No. 8 (Aug., 1982), pp. 419-439 Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org

[6] Jung believes that giving the duty of education to those who themselves are ignorant can be very harmful. In his work *The Development of Personality,* he states that that no one can train the personality unless he has it himself　(Jung, 171).

[7] Austen refrains from severely criticizing the weaknesses of her characters. It is through the use of irony that she makes the reader discern the nature of her real intent. Collins with all his faults remains a human being with pluses and minuses. This speaks of her mastery and excellence for she manages to retain decency.

[8] D.W. Harding*, Critics on Jane Austen*, ed. ONeill. Judith (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1970), pp. 17-18.

[9] All references to the novel *Mansfield Park* will henceforth be written as MP for the sake of brevity. Jane Austen, *Mansfield Park* David Campbell Ltd. London. 1992.

[10]　The term ethics comes from the Greek word Ethos, means　character. [It] is the systematic study of the nature of value concepts, good , bad , ought , right , wrong , etc., and of the general principles which justify us in applying them to anything, also called　moral philosophy . Britannica, 725

References

Duckworth, A. (1971). *The Improvement of the State: A Study of Jane Austen's Novels* Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press

Austen, J. (1992). *Mansfield Park* London; David Campbell Ltd.

Austen, J. (1991). *Pride and Prejudice* London: David Campbell Ltd.

Giffin, M. (2002). "Jane Austen and Religion: Salvation and Society in Georgian England." *Persuasions On-Line*, 23/1. (A Publication of the Jane Austen Society of North America).

Giuffre, G. (1980). "The Ethical Mode of *Pride and Prejudice*." *Sydney Studies in English* 6, 17-29. Online

Harding, D.W., (1970). *Critics on Jane Austen*, ed. O'Neill. Judith London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.

Hazlitt, W. (1970). *The Spirit of the Age* London: Oxford University Press

Jackson, K. (2000). "The Dilemma of Emma: Moral, Ethical, and Spiritual Values" *Persuasions On-Line,* 21/2 (Summer 2000).

Mooneyham, L. G.(1988) *Romance, Language and Education in Jane Austen's Novels* London: Macmillan Press

Rodham, T. (2013). "Reading Jane Austen as a moral philosopher." *Philosophy Now*, Issue 94 (January/February),

Wolf, S. (1982) *Moral Saints* in *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 79, No. 8.

Virginia Woolf's *To The Lighthouse*: Lily Briscoe's Archetypal Behaviour

Humaira Aslam

Jinnah College for Women, University of Peshawar, Pakistan

Abstract

The archetype is a psychosomatic concept that links body, psyche, instinct and image. Jung asserts that images evoke the aim of the instincts, implying that they deserve equal significance. Archetypes are recognized in outer behaviours, namely those that cluster around basic and universal experiences of life, like motherhood, birth, death and separation. They are also part of the human psyche and are observable to inner or psychic life such as anima, shadow, persona and so forth. Archetypal patterns are realized in the personality and are capable of infinite variations depending upon individual expression. To give archetypal expression to something is to interact consciously with the collective unconscious; i.e., to interact with the historic image in such a way as to give opportunities to the play of intrinsic opposing forces. In order to prevent psychic disproportions conscious and unconscious states are harmonious in a balanced person. Dissolution of the compromise between the conscious and the unconscious renders the opposition even more intense and results in psychic disequilibrium. When this tension becomes intolerable, a solution must be discovered and the only viable relief is a reconciliation of the two at a different and more satisfactory level. Thus, Lily Briscoe sees a harmony in Mrs. Ramsay that she would like to achieve but remains unable to until she realizes and overcomes the shortcomings in her personality. She achieves that harmony in her painting only when she imbibes the spirit of Mrs. Ramsay, after much thought over her strict feministic stance.

Keywords: Archetypes, conscious mind, unconscious, archetypal behaviour, conflict, disequilibrium and individuation.

Introduction

This paper is a study of the Jungian concept of individuation; i.e., of a person becoming himself or whole. It is a key concept in the Jungian psychology to the theories regarding personality development, as such it is linked to the Archetypes, Self and Ego. When a conflicting situation arises, the corresponding archetype is there in the unconscious, having a numinous quality it will attract contents of consciousness, which make it perceptible and capable of conscious realization. Thus, harmony for Lily Briscoe takes the form of Mrs. Ramsay, who represents the Great Mother. Individuation also emphasizes the synthesis of conscious and unconscious elements, self-experience and realization. Individuation aims at divesting the Self from the false faces of the Persona. After going through the process of individuation one is not isolated, rather it gathers the world round one.

Lily Briscoe's Archetypal Behaviour

> The psyche "is, in fact, the only immediate experience we can have and the *sine quo non* of the subjective reality of the world. The symbols it creates are always grounded in the unconscious archetype, but their manifest forms are moulded by the ideas acquired by the conscious mind… " (Jacobi, 1999:74)

The novel begins with an influx of various characters, and all the characters appear to be in search of some completeness in their lives, which is possible only when there is a regular communication between the conscious and the unconscious. Therefore, from the beginning we get the idea that the unconscious repressed desires of man play a significant part in his life; and will somehow find its way out, in his behaviour. When these unconscious desires come in open conflict with consciousness, then there is a quest for trying to understand one's problem, and this brings about the process of individuation. Jacobi (1999) defines archetypes as "factors and motifs that arrange the psychic elements into certain images, characterized as archetypal, but in such a way that they *can be recognized only from the effects they produce.* They exist preconsciously, and presumably form the structural dominants of the psyche in general" (31). However, she warns that "one must constantly bear in mind that what we call 'archetype' is irrepresentable, but that it has effects, which enable us to visualize it, namely, the archetypal images" (35).

As such, Lily Briscoe, one of the characters in *To the Lighthouse*, feels dissatisfied with herself and her work as an artist. She is constantly in search of something that she lacks. The lack from the unconscious mind, when it impresses itself on the

conscious mind, takes the image of Mrs. Ramsay, the main character of the novel. For Lily, she is a symbol of fulfilment.

Thus for Lily, Mrs. Ramsay takes the form of the archetypal image of the "Great Mother" a personification of the feminine principle, with its fundamental capacity to nourish or devour. It also corresponds to Mother Nature. Therefore, it has positive and negative aspects. For Lily, it has taken the form in the positive aspect, which involves the creative aspect of the Great mother (Edinger, 2008:14).

Mrs. Ramsay is portrayed as a person who creates a harmonious atmosphere for all around her. She does this in her own womanly way, without being radical or contradictory especially to Mr. Ramsay or any of the male or female characters around her. She interacts with them in such a way, that she is never at loggerheads with any of the characters. Thus in her presence, the picture is always harmonious and most of the characters, mainly Lily Briscoe, view her as a redeeming angel. This is evident from the dinner scene in which Mrs. Ramsay manages to hold all the different characters together:

> Raising her eyebrows at the discrepancy…Nothing seemed to have merged. They all sat separate. And the whole of the effort of merging and flowing and creating rested on her…and so, giving herself the little shake that one gives a watch that has stopped, the old familiar pulse began beating . . . (TTL, 126)[1]

Mrs Ramsay starts talking to Mr. Bankes and Lily watches her conduct, the whole business of creating a harmonious picture:

> How old she looks, how worn she looks, Lily thought, and how remote. Then when she turned to William Bankes smiling, it was as if the ship had turned and the sun has struck its sails again . . . (TTL, 127)

Lily as an artist has a great desire to paint a harmonious picture. After she receives taunting remarks from Mr. Tansley, when he says, "'women can't paint, women can't write…'" (TTL, 75), the harmony that Mrs. Ramsay is able to create attracts her and now she endeavours to paint the essence of Mrs. Ramsay on her canvass. The lack within her own personality, i.e. her own radical feminist ways and ideas, prevent her from imbibing the spirit of Mrs. Ramsay. An archetype is a psychological instinct, when it is 'expressed in conscious psychic material, an

---

[1] The abbreviation TTL is used throughout instead of *To The Lighthouse* (1927).

archetype…become[s] an "image" (Jacobi, 1999: 35). As such, Mrs. Ramsay becomes an archetypal image, who she now idealizes. This shows an archetypal behaviour in Lily.

In Lily's case, it becomes the positive aspect of the archetypal image of the "Great mother" (Edinger, 2008: 6). This is how she views Mrs. Ramsay, hence the sense of fulfilment, harmony and creativity are associated with her. Thus, Mrs. Ramsay inspires in Lily the quest for those qualities, which have endeared her to all around her. The experience at the dinner table has caught hold of Lily Briscoe's mind as according to Whitmont:

> [The] symbolic approach [to life] can mediate as experience of something indefinable, intuitive or imaginative, or a feeling-sense of something that can be known or conveyed in no other way since abstract terms do not suffice everywhere….to most people…the only comprehensible approach to reality lies in defining everything by means of literal, abstract, impersonal conceptualizations… (Whitmont, 1969: 16).

From Lily's approach towards life, it is clear that she is a person who tries to understand things from the literal and rational point of view. Therefore, she fails to understand how Mrs. Ramsay's character works. It is only when she pays heed to the urging of her unconscious mind, that she starts realizing the reality and significance of things around her.

The experience of coming across an archetypal image leaves a strong emotional impact on the individual ego. Such experiences transform the person and alter his views radically (Edinger, 2008:6). Thus after associating with Mrs. Ramsay, Lily starts noticing shortcomings in her personality. She, therefore, wants to be like Mrs. Ramsay as such she develops closeness towards Mrs. Ramsay, when she lays her head against Mrs. Ramsay's knee:

> [S]he knew knowledge and wisdom was stored up in Mrs. Ramsay's heart. How then, she asked herself, did one know one thing or another thing about people, sealed as they were? Only like a bee, drawn by some sweetness or sharpness in the air intangible to touch or taste…for days there hung about her, as after a dream some subtle change is felt in the person one has dreamt of…as she [Mrs. Ramsay] sat on the wicker arm chair in the drawing room window she wore, to Lily's eyes, an august shape; the shape of a dome. (TTL, 79-80)

The conflict in Lily's mind is created the moment Mr. Tansley taunts women for their inability to paint or write. Internally, she yearns for the completion of her picture. Lily is painting the picture of Mrs. Ramsay sitting at the window, and she strives to represent her with a purple triangular shape. However, hard she tries she remains unsatisfied due to the lack of a harmonious effect, which is her desire to achieve.

According to Clay, this conflict cannot be overcome by the conscious mind, which remains caught between the opposites. It requires a symbol or image to point out the necessity of freeing itself of its origins. Therefore, the unconscious mind creates a solution to the conflict, which is usually what the conscious mind longs for. This cannot be done without detaching itself from its origins. Thus, Lily's unconscious mind provides the archetypal image, in the form of Mrs. Ramsay who fascinates Lily and becomes the symbol that Lily's unconscious mind gets hold of. The redeeming effect of Mrs. Ramsay's character exerts its influence on her consciousness; and sustains Lily's endeavours to achieve harmony and thus resolve the conflict situation. This could not have been possible without the intervention of the unconscious mind (Clay, 2000: 7).

As long as Lily tries to imbibe Mrs. Ramsay's spirit in an extraverted manner through physical contact or imitation, her effort remains futile, for she says, "Nothing happened. Nothing! Nothing! as she leant her head against Mrs. Ramsay's knee" (TTL, 79). This was not the answer to the internal conflict in Lily's mind. Lily's rational mind still needed to mature and develop before she could understand how Mrs. Ramsay's effectiveness worked. Lily has not given her emotional and intuitive sides:

> adequate moral value or conscious scrutiny; feelings are regarded as something that can be dispensed with, intuitions are not considered as "real". This is an approach which fails to help us towards the understanding of basic motivation; for ethos, morality and meaningfulness of existence [that] rest basically upon emotional and intuitive foundations. (Whitmont, 1969: 17)

As such, even her behaviour towards Mr. Tansley during the dinner was rather childish when she repeatedly taunts him to take her to the Lighthouse that annoys him. "Oh, Mr. Tansley," she said, "do take me to the Lighthouse with you. I should so love it" (TTL, 130). From Lily's words, it is evident that she only meant to tease him for his remarks against women. Later, she realizes the difference in her attitude and that of Mrs. Ramsay. She sees how Mrs. Ramsay without blaming her, gets Mr. Tansley involved in conversation by the sympathy she shows him and the

importance she gives him. This satisfies his ego and normalizes his temper therefore his retaliation stops:

> Mr. Tansley raised a hammer: swung it high in the air; but realizing, as it descended, that he could not smite that butterfly with that instrument..." (TTL, 138).

Thus, from this experience, Lily gains "[p]sychic maturation" (Whitmont, 1969:129), and she, too, like Mrs. Ramsay asks Mr. Tansley kindly whether he would take her to the Lighthouse. Now, his egotism is relieved and the tension between them relaxes. Only when she sympathetically and intuitively tries to understand Mrs. Ramsay, does she reach the reality about her.

Similarly, Lily gains an insight into the matter of things only when she has shed off her one sided rationality and is able to think sympathetically. When Mr. Ramsay in sheer desperateness (after the death of Mrs. Ramsay) stands by her side in the hope of gaining some sympathy and attention, she fails to provide him any, which becomes a source of regret to her. According to Clay, when a character goes through the process of self-analysis, they embrace their darker side. This causes them shame in their own eyes and that of society, but at least they learn who they really are (Clay, 2000:7). Thus, Lily realizes her darker side; and admits that she had been non-sympathetic and rational to the extent of folly:

> [T]here issued from him such a groan that any other woman in the whole world would have done something, said something -- all except myself' thought Lily, grinding at herself bitterly, who am not a woman, but a peevish, ill tempered, dried-up old maid presumably (TTL, 222).

Later, during this conversation she very spontaneously praises his boots, "What beautiful boots!" (TTL, 225). This little act of sympathy wins his heart and he smiles. Thus, Lily learns how Mrs. Ramsay was able to put things together without sacrificing her individuality.

Now that her intuition starts working and she looks at things with a toned down heart, the mystery of things open up before her. As Mr. Tansley had hurt her femininity, and she knew him as a person who always had "a purple book" (TTL, 149) under his arm, her unconscious mind associated the purple colour with the sting her ego had received from his negative remarks against women. Therefore, Lily tries to represent Mrs. Ramsay, who is a symbol of femininity and fulfilment by a purple triangle, in order to relieve her mind and defy the sting caused to her

femininity. The use of a few geometrical lines and a blur of purple hue resembling a triangle are suggestive:

> What did she wish to indicate by the triangular purple shape, "just there"? . . . Why indeed? – except that if there, in that corner, it was bright, here, in this, she felt the need of darkness. Simple, obvious, commonplace, as it was, Mr Bankes was interested. Mother and child then — objects of universal veneration, and in this case the mother was famous for her beauty — might be reduced, he pondered, to a purple shadow without irreverence. (TTL, 81)

The purple colour and the triangle are not accidental. The purple colour (a combination of red and blue) "unites red's fiery masculinity and blue's cool femininity."[2] And the triangle, a fundamental geometric symbol, is also associated with femininity through "the feminine pubic symbol."[3] The triangle may also be a reference to the cubist movement in art around 1910. Rosenblum (1966) points out that "Cubism proposed that the work of art was itself a reality that represented the very process by which nature is transformed into art." Lily Briscoe's "painterly creation resembles what has been called projection by the psychoanalysts" (53).[4] Further, this process of painting resembles a psychological dialogue with herself, which "may have a therapeutic function in providing vast field for self-knowledge and psychic development" (53).[5]

Hence, when someone sitting at the window gives her the impression of Mrs. Ramsay, her creative faculty starts working and she quickly starts painting; this time with a deep conviction in her own feelings and intuitive powers regarding this experience. Thus, at last she is able to paint what she so long desired:

> With a sudden intensity, as if she saw it clear for a second, she drew a line there, in the centre. It was done; it was finished. Yes, she thought, laying down her brush in extreme fatigue. I have had my vision. (306)

The process of individuation teaches her to satisfy herself, rather than the other. Her psychological dialogue with herself and the painting is over and she achieves individuation and wholeness — like the object of her painting, Mrs Ramsay.

---

[2] http:// www.umich.edu/~umfandsf/symbolismproject/symbolism.html/P/purple.html
[3] http:// www.umich.edu/~umfandsf/symbolismproject/symbolism.html/P/purple.html
[4] http://robertfrystudio.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Kamila_Misiak_MA_thesis.pdf
[5] http://robertfrystudio.com/cms/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Kamila_Misiak_MA_thesis.pdf

References

Briggs, J. (2006). *Reading Virginia Woolf.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Clay, T. (2000) "An Archetypal Analysis of Three Plays by Federico Garcia Lorca. http://www.xula.edu/xulanexus/issue1/Clay.html. Retrieved on 3 Jan 2006.

Edinger, R. E. (2008). Analytical Psychology: Jung. http://www.iloveulove.com/ psychology/jung/analypsych.htm Retrieved on 6 March 2009.

Frobes, S. (2000). "'When Sometimes She Imagined Herself Like Her Mother": The Contrasting Responses of Cam and Mrs. Ramsay to the Role of the Angel in the House' *Studies in the Novel* Vol. 32. Issue: 4.

Jacobi, J. (1999). *Complex/archetype/symbol in the Psychology of C.G. Jung*: New York: Routledge

Rojas, Y. (2009). "Proustian Reminiscence in *To The Lighthouse*" *Studies in the Novel* Vol. 41. Issue: 4.

Rosenblum, Robert Cubism and Twentienth-Century Art, New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1966.

Stewart, J. (2000). "'Need of Distance and Blue": Space, Color, and Creativity in *To The Lighthouse'* *Twentieth Century Literature* Vol. 46. Issue: 1.

Whitmont, C. E. (1969). *The Symbolic Quest.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Woolf, V. (1927) *To the Lighthouse.* London: Grafton Books.

Wurtz, J. F. (2010). "I Have Had My Vision: Empire and the Aesthetic in Woolf's *To The Lighthouse*." *Woolf Studies, Annual* Vol. 16.

Practicing *Hijab* (veil): A Source of Autonomy and Self-esteem for Modern Muslim Women

Waseem Fayyaz, Anila Kamal

Government Gordon College, Rawalpindi, Pakistan

National Institute of Psychology, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan

Abstract

In various periods of history, hijab as a religious symbol has been under criticism by the west and the modernist forces. The disapproval of hijab increased in the aftermath of 9/11. The sections of society that oppose hijab associate this dress code historically with subordination and servility of Muslim women. In the present scenario, immigrant Muslim women in western countries and native Muslim women in the countries where the states control women dress code are specially frustrated in wearing the attire of their choice. However, they have asserted their dress preference against all odds. The present paper argues that hijab is merely a symbol. The oppression linked with it depends on the social and political dynamics of the society in which it is practiced. More than these, it depends on the will and the mental state of the wearer herself. This study develops the thesis that the present Muslim woman, by adopting hijab, is carving public space for herself and this dress serves as an instrument of autonomy and self-esteem for her.

Keywords: hijab; modern Muslim women; religious symbol;

Introduction

Humankind has used dress for various purposes. Among these purposes are modesty, protection, and beautification (Flugel, 1966)[1]. Qur'an has focused on modesty and beautification, though emphasized dress of piety at the same time (7:26). The attire we wear is also strongly connected with identity. It is related with

the sense of one's self (Humphreys & Brown, 2002). Different classes of society wear different dress to mark their status and position in society. Kings and ruling elite have worn heavy and elaborate robes while public clothing has been simple. We use different uniforms to mention our jobs or institutions. People of different cultures wear different dresses. Besides culture and region where we live, dress code is also determined by the faith we espouse. This way dress becomes a symbol of one's religious identity and the modesty associated with it.

Head covering has been usually considered one of the most important identifier of a Muslim woman and has been practiced more or less throughout the Islamic world. *Hijab* in particular (headscarf/face veil along with *abaya,* a long gown, generally in black colour), has been the part of women costume in various Muslim states. However, it gained more popularity in the midst of Islamic movements towards the last quarter of the previous century (El Guindi, 1999).[2] In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 (9/11 henceforth), immigrant Muslim women in western countries had to rethink of their identities. *Hijab* rose as a sign of their religious identity and Muslim solidarity (Murshid, 2005). *Hijab* practice increased in Muslim majority countries as well. At present, debate on *hijab* is continuing in both western societies and various Muslim countries (Murphy, 2006). In the backdrop of this new global scenario of searching identities and facing conflict, the present study is set to explore the phenomenon of *hijab* with respect to space and psyche of the wearer herself. The present paper does not concern with defining *hijab* or explaining it with reference to religious text and other sources nor does it take any position to favour or disfavour it as a religious ordain. In this text, we will be using the terms *hijab*, veil, and headscarf interchangeably.

*Hijab/*Veiling in Retrospect

*Hijab/*veiling has historically been associated with Islam. However, it can be traced to various cultural traditions found in pre-Islamic era and has been in practice in all ages in one way or other. Noble Greek and Roman families would observe it. The social and cultural importance of the headdress in the Christian and Judaic societies was not principally different from Islam. It saved women from undue male attention and dangerous elements (Maududi, 1939/2005).[3] Female body was regarded sacred in that doctors would keep dummies at their clinics so that women could indicate the point of their disease by putting finger on different parts of the dummy. Even by 16th century, male youth would play the female roles in Shakespearean plays. The followers of Christianity adopted such extreme attitudes about women that they considered woman a sign of evil and thus segregated her from entire social fabric (Ali, 2005). This reading of veil embodies two objectives.

First, it was adopted for notifying the higher status of noble families, and second, for oppressing and segregating women.

Beliefs about ugliness surrounding woman body changed gradually and the limitations set on her life were relaxed. In post-renaissance period, women were accepted in social life. But this process had its own evils. In the years to come, they were made to appear as asexualized object. Maududi (1939/2005) believes that the woman was not still liberated and was being still treated as a material object. Western sexuality mutilates woman's integrity and reduces her to a few inches of nude flesh, photographed with no purpose than profit (Mernissi, 1985).

Besides this discussion of draping or dropping clothes, we turn to the status of veiling in non-Muslim societies. In European and Christian cultures, Nuns and royalty still put on some headdress. Victorian era saw women wearing a kind of hat on their heads. Rural women in many parts of Europe don a sort of headgear. In a movie *The Girl with the Pearl Earring*, displays that a 17th century painter catches a glimpse of his model, as she lets her hair down from her headgear. She quickly covers her hair, as if to guard herself from his gaze. Social attitudes about women's covering in west have relaxed now, but not equally dramatically in the Muslim world (Murshid, 2005). Though there has been a great influence of western powers in Muslim countries in many ways.

In the subcontinent, British colonialism led to a debate about *burqa* (a long cloak from head to toe that also covered women's face). It was argued that this type of covering might not be religious or at least not a required part of dress. This debate was initiated without any logical or religious necessity, but only under the sway of a dominant and attractive western civilization. Additionally, the pressure was exacerbated due to inferiority that developed as a result of direct attacks at backwardness of local civilization. Women clad in veil were dehumanized by such labels as "walking tents" (Maududi, 1939/2005: 35-36).

In the same vein, Mernissi (1985) believes that the budding liberty of Moroccan and Arab women in mid 1900s had indeed borrowed many features of western women's mode of life. The first gesture of the liberated Arab woman was to dismiss the veil in favour of western dress. Muslim women could probably claim their right to their bodies as part of the liberation movement. The ever-increasing beauty salons and boutiques in Moroccan cites, for example, could be understood as a predictor of women's attempts to various other rights such as mobility and birth control.

The modernist trends occurred in late nineteenth century in Egypt, Syria, Ottoman Turkey, and other Muslim lands. Restrictions and taboos related to veiling were

questioned and consequently relaxed even in some of those Muslim countries that were not under colonial rule. For example, veiling was discarded first in Kemalist Turkey in the thirties of the twentieth century. Iran followed suit when Reza Shah banned the veil in 1936. Some other Muslim countries also joined this trend. However, veil or head covering still prevailed to some extent in Pakistan and several other Muslim states (Maududi, 1939/2005).

However, this westernization had to see decline at last. History saw an Islamic uprising in last part of 20th century. Still earlier many women had started withdrawing from society as a sign of resistance against ban on veil. In previous decades, many Egyptian women have started putting on headgears in spite of the secular position of their governments. In Turkey, a clear demarcation can be seen in old secular women and their Islamist-oriented daughters (Murphy, 2006). Beginning in the 1970s, Islamic symbols, faith, and practices have earned growing commitment and support. Increased devotion to Islamic codes of social behaviour (e.g. female covering and abstinence from drinking) was witnessed among Muslims (Huntington, 1996).

Hijab in Present Muslim Societies

Colonialism did bring some changes at least in dress code in Muslim countries. In the seventies women in these countries walked the streets wearing western costume. There outfit included skirts below the knee, high heels, sleeves that covered the upper arm in the summer, their hair was usually visible, and they did wear make-up. Their bodies seem to be facing a cultural battle. Their dress carried the capitalist construction of the female body (sexualized and objectified) on one hand and the traditional construction of the body (possession, property, and trustees of the family honour) on the other. This ambivalence was resolved in nineteen eighties by revising their dress from colonial non-veil to the present veil (Mernissi, 1985), though this trend does not characterize the whole womenfolk in these countries. However, women in many countries have adopted this dress code. This veiling class generally belongs to urban lower and middle class. They work as civil servants, school teachers, secretaries, bank employees, and nurses. Others are university students. They are usually young in their twenties and early thirties (Odeh, 1993).

While the *niqab* (face covering) is not practiced strictly in most Muslim countries, the simple headscarf or *chadder* have made a dramatic comeback in recent decades. In 1970s, for instance, headscarf was donned chiefly by rural women in Egypt. These days at least 80 percent of women cover their hair. One negative aspect of Islamic movements, nonetheless, is that certain hardliners try to apply head covering forcefully. For instance, *Hammas* in Palestine was reported to send

unofficial orders to schools that they not allow the girl students without a long traditional gown and headscarf (Hammami, 1990). In recent years, police was seen to enforcing Islamic dress in a Malaysian province (*Dawn,* 2009, Dec 2). Evidence for this type of suppression is small though. On the other hand, attempts to veil off the women are stronger and have been implemented from states themselves.

Although practicing veil has faced a heated debate in western nations after 9/11, it is not a smaller issue in some of the Muslim countries themselves. From Morocco and Tunisia to Turkey and pre-revolution Iran, many Muslim states have at times restricted, in some cases banned, women's veiling. In many of these cases, such restriction stem from the viewpoint that public exhibitions of religious symbols are a political, not a personal act and therefore considered a potential threat to the state (Murphy, 2006). However, this forced practice did not dent deep into the public. Narrating the history of attempts at unveiling women, White (1977) described that such efforts have faced failure; for instance, in Turkey in the beginning of the twentieth century, then in Afghanistan, Iran, and Tunisia, etc. Only a few women put their veils off and they were mostly those who got opportunities to have education and better employment. Covering herself remains a social reality for a common woman of the Muslim world.

The American intervention in Afghanistan in recent years was partially justified as an effort to rescue Afghan women from the clutches of the Taliban. American media and the government both called the Taliban regime as the most atrocious in Afghan history. On the other hand, some Afghan women also challenged Taliban's interpretation of Islam. They thought that Taliban were being sponsored by Saudi Arabia and hence the latter wanted to impose Arab traditional dress. These women preferred to wear the indigenous shuttlecock *burqa* rather than the Arab *hijab*, while many of these women told the Taliban to don Arabian dress themselves. Yet veil was not abandoned by women even after the Taliban had been dethroned. They have been demanding security from the western forces present in their country, only then they will throw their *burqa* (Khattak, 2002)*.* It seems the present Afghan women can stress her free-will in her social rights including the right to her body.

Murphy (2006) emphasizes that covering the head is not covering the brain. Then why the authorities are so upset at this religious symbol. Unveiling is not synonymous with empowerment. Humphreys and Brown (2002) argue that what is in the head is important not what is on the head. Some authorities in these Muslim countries believed that uniform-like veiling challenges the secular foundations of the state. However this check on *hijab* is not solely based on democratic and secular motives. Their political interests and worries of losing power to the Islamic

opposition quarters may be the important determinants of their attempts to corner the *hijab*-wearing women and other religious elements.

Besides political quarters, we need to look into the academic position of the feminist scholarship on this particular issue. The first generation of Muslim feminists believed that veil was a powerful token of female oppression. Consequently, abandoning the veil appeared to be the most visible sign of their disapproval of patriarchy and their assertion of their rights as active participants of the society. In the present milieu, in contrast, young educated women across the class hierarchy are returning to the veil. The present feminist views wearing the veil as a coping strategy that women use to gain or maintain societal esteem and a small yardstick of autonomy in a patriarchal society in which opportunities for autonomy are rare (Mule & Barther, 1992).

From the above descriptions, it comes forth that there are both trends, revolting against the regimes that attempt to impose head covering and at the same time challenging those powers that try to put ban on veil. Women seem to be struggling to make their mark and seek autonomy by warding off that is put on them forcefully. It also surfaces that the headscarf is loaded with different symbolic meanings (Jorgensen, 2008). To Muslims it is a mark of modesty whereas Europeans and liberal feminists both view it as symbol of lower status of women (Murshid, 2005). The construction of veil as a sign of seclusion has been challenged by many scholars. For example, Clark (2007) argues that *hijab* is after all a piece of cloth. It is ultimately a symbol. It oppresses or empowers according to the society, tradition and the wearer herself. He further suggests that this practice has multiple reasons than just political expression. His stance is supported by some other studies. To name some, Cole and Ahmadi (2003) established that women adopt *hijab* under religious obligations and parental expectations. They also wear it as an indicator of Muslim identity and modesty. Jones (2005) asserts that wearing it is however their own choice. Droogsma (2007) and Kopp (2005) in their separate studies found that *hijab* defines Muslim identities, performs a behaviour check/control, resist sexual objectification, affords more respect, preserves intimate relations with family, and provides freedom. From this summary of few empirical findings, we can observe that practicing *hijab* has diverse reasons and multiple functions.

The Veil Debate / Ban and Immigrant Muslim women

Hijab observance is not only limited to the Muslim majority countries but also a familiar sight among the Muslim women living in the countries where they are only a minority (Murshid, 2005). A great debate has surrounded *hijab* and other religious representations in the aftermath of 9/11. Many women have described

facing discrimination on account of wearing *hijab*. They have been removed from flights for security screening, found difficulty gaining employment, have received angry looks and shouts from passers-by on the streets, and the like (Droogsma, 2007; Lueck, 2003).

Bakht (2009) notes that *niqab*-wearing women are not allowed to appear in courts in Canada, Britain, and the United States, especially in cases where the woman has to show her face to be identified. She emphasizes the need to accommodating such women in their multiple roles as lawyers, jury members, witnesses, defendants and the accused. Seckinelgin (2006) opines that when women demand to wear headscarf in these circumstances, they pose a challenge to the state. On the other hand, punitive actions by governments relating to *hijab* threaten the right to education and justice in a democratic system.

The ban in France has led to the exclusion of several Muslim girls and some Sikh boys from public institutions. They have either been moved to private schools or a sort of distance learning courses. Although, Christian crosses, the Jewish skullcaps, Sikh turbans, and the habits of nuns are also unacceptable but they have not had the same effect. Roman Catholic nuns in Germany were furious at a comparison made by the German president of the oppressive headscarf with their habit of covering themselves. It seemed that under the rhetoric of equality, actual target was the Muslim dress code (Murshid, 2005). It is not an attack on dress code only. It is an instance of 'clash of civilizations' (Huntington, 1996), though this thesis was seemingly dismissed by president Obama in his lecture at *Jamia tul Azhar*.

France, where war on *hijab* was the strongest in recent years, later imposed complete ban on face veil / any dress designed to hide the body and face. Those who do not comply would be fined or sent on a course to learn the values of French citizenship. Anyone who urged someone through violence, rough threats, or misuse of authority to cover her face because of her sex would be jailed for a year and fined 15000 Euros. Lawmakers also focused on husbands who force their wives to full veil. Similarly, Belgian parliament put to vote a law banning women from wearing *burqas* in public spaces and fixed a fine or some imprisonment for the offence (*ShirkatGah*, 2010)

We need to look the picture from other side too. The immigrants in Europe and America had also sensed after 9/11 that these were the lands of opportunity. So mixed with fears of discrimination and desire to stay there any how, they started to wear local dressing. Women started to wear trousers and men shaved off their beards. This reality is shown in a bollywood movie *My Name is Khan* (Johar, Khan, Khan, & Johar, 2010), where a psychology teacher removed her scarf at her

workplace. However, when the hero of the movie earns good name for Muslims, the teacher revisits her identity by covering her head again. She pronounces that it is not just her religious symbol; it is part of her existence. Similarly, with the passage of time, Muslims began to return to their symbolic identities. This might have occurred due to two reasons stemming from the same occurrence. This occurrence refers to the discriminatory practices against these Muslims. First reason was their attempt to resist this discrimination, by asserting rather than avoiding their identity. Second, they felt that discrimination was not structural. It was transitory and was not under the law, nor strictly from authorities. It was more from a part of a population. Perhaps having considered this reality and to profiting from the better opportunities, these Pakistanis will remain there (Iqbal, 2003).

Let's turn to scholars' position on this atmosphere of clashes and conflict. Commentators such as El Guindi (1999) advocate veiling practices because of their association with female purity, privacy, and respect, and more specifically, resistance to western commercialism and consumerism. In contrast, some Muslim western theorists oppose the veil as a symbol of oppressive hierarchies and male domination (Humphreys & Brown, 2002). But it is surprising that these liberal feminists do not see ban as an affront to international law, and the right to freedom of expression and practicing religion (Murshid, 2005). On the other hand, feminists like Sadr (2010) complain that major human rights organizations like Amnesty International are fierce upon Belgian and other European governments for prohibiting veiling but they do not issue even a sentence of condemnation against Iran that forcefully binds its women to observe Islamic attire.

Nevertheless, some studies have revealed that the contemporary culture-wars over gender are often pushed by the select few ideologists and front line activists whose views do not completely correspond with the actual standpoints of local women at whom such rhetoric is targeted (Read & Bartkowski, 2000). This situation scares human rights monitors, who do not fail to draw a parallel with the history of European fascism. Barbara John, Germany's retired commissioner for foreigners exclaimed, "This kind of policy against a single religion may be very harmful. This may not be a new Holocaust, but this is how it begins" (as cited in Murshid, 2005:16).

Commentators have argued that if it is unacceptable to force others to wear a headscarf, it is equally condemnable to be forced not to wear one (Murshid, 2005). These actions of the governments collide with the United Nations human rights laws (Clark, 2007). Within the Islamic world, other than Saudi Arabia and Iran, dress code does not fall within the realm of enforceable laws in most Muslim countries. Even in Iran some women are being allowed to drape more attractive form of Islamic dress (Harrison, 2007). It is a matter of great irony that in a free society such as France,

the state should rule on issues of dress (Anderson, 2005; Jones, 2005; Seckinelgin, 2006). But some Muslim nations such as Egypt, Turkey, Morocco, and Tunisia are also following European trends (Anderson, 2005).

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines emphasize that legal prohibitions on discrimination apply to any improper employment action based on one's affiliation or perception of affiliation with a particular religious or ethnic group; physical, linguistic, or cultural traits as well as clothing associated with any such group (Malos, 2010). Ignoring the legal matters, political motives seem to sway the scene. The covered body of Muslim women allowed Western media and political institutions to exaggerate it with layers of symbolism representing foreignness and female oppression (Lueck, 2003). Fully cloaked, these unseen women were ripe for misinterpretation. They became the victim in need of salvage by the democratic values of the United States. After 9/11, they rushed to rescue the veiled women allegedly being dejected by the *Taliban* in Afghanistan. They did not bother to know the standpoint of these women themselves. However, while many Americans believe *hijab* functions to oppress women, veiled women probably possess alternative understandings (Droogsma, 2007). An overview of empirical literature can help these understandings of conditions and functions of practicing *hijab*.

Empirical literature on *Hijab*

Sometimes researchers are criticized in that they tend to assign meaning rather than find the meaning the veil has for women, and that they seldom consult the veiled women themselves so that they could empirically understand how veil functions in their lives. However, such work is not that scarce. In the following lines some studies have been quoted, some of them being descriptive and others are based on interviews with the veiled women.

Hijab seems to resolve the questions of identity. Kopp (2005) reports that while living in America, the question veiling assumes a supreme importance when communal solidarity is threatened. Religious self and group solidarity could be understood as an explanation of increased covering in America. Women even with skirts feel pressures to do what other women in the close community are doing. Here covering is not for shame or for protection, but for a religious recognition to communicate that they are different. Similar was the situation in Medina when the divine message appeared in chapter *Ahzaab* of Qur'an. It told Muslim women to cast their *jalabeeb* (bigger piece of cloth) over their heads, when outdoors, so that they convey their identity to *munafiqins* (hypocrites) and not be maltreated (as cited in Ghamidi, 2009).. If we generalize this ruling, women should veil when their

identity is at risk or they are under the threat of assault. Such conditions may occur in certain non-Muslim societies that discriminate on the basis of religion. Interviews with *hijab*-wearing women in America led Droogsma (2007) and Kopp (2005) to somewhat similar conclusions, where they found that Muslim identity was the most salient function of practicing *hijab*.

This may also be true for those who have been on a short stay in a western country. In a personal interview with the authors, a Pakistani woman reported that when she had been on a short educational trip to a western country, she felt that she should start covering her head. She used to carry a piece of cloth to cover upper part of her body. A male colleague asked her why she carried this piece of cloth. She replied that it was her religious identity. The colleague suggested then that Muslim identity is rather represented by head covering. She felt a bit embarrassed and made up her mind to start using a headgear (anonymous, personal communication, August 27, 2013)[4].

While *hijab* clearly symbolizes a woman's religious affiliation, it also shapes Muslim women's independent identities, often acting as an element of resistance to patriarchal norms and standards (El Guindi, 1999; Droogsma, 2007). In some societies, the choice to wear the veil subverts such rules that attempt to control women's lives. Wearing *hijab* in these countries indicates women's efforts to achieve or maintain esteem within a patriarchal society in which possibilities for autonomy are increasingly limited. In this way, *hijab* becomes a different concept from that of *purdah* (covering head and a sort of segregation from society). While *purdah* has been a source of segregation from men and outer world, *hijab* develops as an instrument of independence, mobility, and participation in public sphere activities. Hence *hijab* appears to offer freedom.

Along these lines, Murphy (2006) found that donning *hijab* provided some women in Egypt a sense of independence from those parents who stressed their girls not to cover heads. This practice also inculcated a sense of morality in them and helped stopping men calling at them in streets. Correspondingly, Jones (2005) noted that Muslim women in France stress their own choice to wear scarf, even to that degree where their parents force them to unveil so that their girls should continue their education. At the same time mothers or other family women may also serve as models for various girls in taking to covering practices. And sometimes this figure may be an external one. For example, after conversion of poetess Kamla Das to Islam, Muslim girls in Kerala (India) began wearing headscarf under her inspiration. In Egypt, middle class parents were surprised to see their daughter having switched to covering their heads under the influence of popular preachers like Amr Khaled (Murphy, 2006).

Besides a separate Muslim identity and independence, *hijab* affords more respect for the wearer. Women receive more respect from both Muslim and non-Muslim men just because they veil. If a *hijab*-wearing woman is walking into a mall, there will be a man with his wife or girlfriend, who will rush to open a door for her and his wife or girlfriend will open the door for herself. These women feel that they are often associated with nuns and religious figures when in public (Droogsma, 2007). Some women often compare themselves to a diamond. Being very precious, they would prefer to keep diamond in a very safe place and only the very intimate (e.g. husband) will be allowed to see it (Kopp, 2005). The authors of present paper have also noted such expressions during their informal discussions with *hijab*-wearing women in Pakistan. They also stressed the respect associated with their dress code. For example, one *niqab*-wearing girl remarked, "Hijab is restoring the lost status and respect of women, which is not otherwise possible in a society with ills and insecurities" (anonymous, personal communication, May 28, 2010). However, *hijab* can also make veiled women a target of disrespect in the post-9/11 world. Indeed, several of the women fairly unmarked earlier, now noted being stared and shouted at after that event. In USA and other European countries, *hijab* practice has caused women being barred from employment opportunities after 9/11 (Forstenlechner & Al-Waqfi, 2010; Ghumman & Jackson, 2010). These discrepancies demonstrate west's changing perceptions of *hijab*. However this has not lowered the spirits of Muslim women and they have consistently shown resilience in this respect.

Religiosity and religious practices have been found to be a major predictor of both physical and psychological health. Practicing *hijab* is one of these practices. Errihani et al. (2008) noted that women often began to wear *hijab* (scarf) after the diagnosis of cancer. Odoms (2008) established that in contrast to using medical standards, views of African-American women about their bodies largely derived from social and family expectations, cultural norms and values, and more importantly, spiritual and religious beliefs. Younger Muslim women wearing non-Western clothing and a head veil were significantly less likely to express drive for thinness or pressure to attain a thin-ideal standard of beauty than women wearing Western dress or younger women wearing non-Western dress without a head veil (Dunkel, Davidson & Qurashi, 2010).

Besides physical health, religious beliefs and practices have been shown to positively influence psychological aspects of health. Wearing *hijab* has been found by women a medium of gaining as well as maintaining societal esteem and autonomy in conservative societies (Mule & Barther, 1992). Women who ardently practice Islamic *hijab* have higher self-esteem and lower depression (Rastmanesh, Gluck, & Shadman, 2009). Furthermore, indices of spirituality and religiousness

are also related to recovery from disease, social inclusion, hope, and personal empowerment (Corrigan, McCorkle, Schell, and Kidder, 2003).

Contrary to above, a certain section of theoretical literature uncovers some negative effects of observing *purdah*. Women living under *purdah* system in Pakistan may become target of tuberculosis, bone deformity, and obesity (Khaddarphosh, 2004; Khan, 1972; White, 1977). Psychologically, such women lack initiative, independence of thought, sense of responsibility, and achievement motivation. Empirical literature from other countries provided evidence alike. For instance, Harrison's (2007) empirical study in Iran led to similar conclusions. The Filipinos married to Iranian men found *hijab* as harmful to physical health (Zahedi, 2010). *Purdah* limits medical treatment opportunities because of insistence on seeing the female physician only (White, 1977). Such restrictions made it necessary for women to discuss many of their ailments only with a woman health provider, and this sometimes compelled a woman to seek health care outside the village (Khan, 1999).

These findings show that observance of a strict religious practice has a protective effect on psychological health. At the same time it has also some ill effects. From this contrasting position on relationship of health and religious practices like veiling, we can note that negative discourse surrounding *hijab* comes more from old theoretical literature. But this is a new world. The situation in the present scenario might be different. Muslim woman is now seeking new avenues of independence. She is not relying on liberalized and secular demands of freedom. She is doing so by adopting symbols of religious identity. One of the most important of these symbols is *hijab*, which seems to provide a vehicle for autonomy, respect, freedom of mobility, and high self-esteem (Kopp, 2005; Mule & Barther, 1992; Rastmanesh et al., 2009).

Conclusion

Besides the review of theoretical and empirical literature around *hijabi*, the authors also had the opportunity to have some informal discussions with some liberal scholars and *hijab*-wearing women in Pakistan. It was noted that some modernists express their reservations on *hijab*. They view *hijab* as a foreign element, a Saudi style dressing. Behind this costume, they smell some conspiracy. They attribute it to some Talibanization and religious radicalization. It might be true that in certain instances, girls in religious schools have been taught the importance of covering and focus has been particularly on Arabian *hijab*. On the other hand, there are many a women who have chosen this dress on their free will. They have first observed its rising popularity, may be through those women who have borrowed

this habit while being in a religious school, and then have adopted it as a sign of their identity, respect, and comfort associated with this outfit.

A few sections of Pakistani society blame women for adopting *hijab* merely as a fashion and that they use attractively decorated *abaya*s and scarfs (see, for example, Hasan, 2013). However, this act of the women might be another expression of their independence of choice. Some blame them for using *hijab* as a cover under which they involve in immoral activities. Such people become oblivious to the fact that such community of women is only a thin minority. On the other hand it should be noted that how much the *hijab*-wearing have struggled to achieve and maintain their identities and existence in society. They faced discrimination, assault, and seclusion (Imran, 2012). They remained steadfast and won for themselves many rights. Saudi women were able to run at athletic turfs of London Olympics after much resistance from opposing camps. Iranian *hijab*-wearing women participated in various sports including hiking. They won education rights in Turkey recently (Murphy, 2006). They climbed up the hierarchy in various organizations. That is a long story of success.

We have inferred in above lines that wearing *hijab* has served women as a medium of respect and honour. When we look into history, it appears that covering practices, regardless of the religious affiliation, have always been a symbol of honour. Historically, women and even men of high order would cover heads (and in some cases veiled their faces) and wear more elaborate dressing. Common man on the other hand remained bare headed; common women would wear only a simple and shorter cloth to cover head or not cover the head at all. This veiling was more practiced while meeting strangers, so that to show distance and state one's identity related to higher ranks (El Guindi, 1999). But what is new in the present state of affairs is that common and lower middle class woman also gained respect. And she gained this honour by adopting relatively new mode of covering, i.e. *hijab* (headscarf/veil along with *abaya*), the trend of which grew enormously in the post 9/11 world.

To add more, she perceived autonomy in switching to *hijab* and consequently achieved it as well. Earlier attitudes related to *purdah* and covering helped to detain the woman indoors. Respect there was, independence was absent though. The present day *hijab* has rather helped her come out, participate in society, and become an economically independent and a self-sufficient person (Mule & Barther, 1992; Jorgensen, 2008). Dressed in *hijab*, she can at once maintain a distance from strangers, be safe from miscreants, and hold her religious identity.

Notes

[1] Flugel finally concludes that dress is more for beautification than modesty or protection from weather. He reasons that body is naturally coarse and ugly, and thus needs clothing to be covered.

[2] El Guindi has been an influential feminist writer of the Muslim world and has closely watched the Islamic movement in Egypt in her ethnography towards the last quarter of the previous century.

[3] Maududi notes that, in the later centuries, obscenity arose in these societies and believes that this factor led to their downfall. Pp 14-30.

[4] The names of the participants of personal interviews/discussions cannot be reported due to the ethical requirement that their privacy and confidentiality be maintained.

References

Ali, A. (2005). *Aurat Quran aur sunnat aur tarikh ke ainay main.* Lahore, Pakistan: Quran Manzil.

Anderson, F. T. (2005). Policing in *purdah. Pakistan Journal of Women Studies: Alam-e-Niswan, 12,* 51-74.

Bakht, N. (2009). Objection, your honor! Accommodating niqab-wearing women in courtrooms. *Islamic Law and Law of the Muslim World,* paper No. 09-60. Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=1336791

Clark, S. (2007). Female subjects of international human rights law: The *hijab* debate and the exotic other female. *Global Change, Peace and Security, 19 (1),* 35-28.

Cole, D., & Ahmadi, S. (2003). Reconsidering campus diversity: An examination of Muslim students experiences. *The Journal of Higher Education, 81(2),* 121-139.

Corrigan, P., McCorkle, B., Schell, B., & Kidder, K. (2003). Religion and spirituality in the lives of people with serious mental illness, *Community Mental Health Journal, 39(6)*

Droogsma, R. A. (2007). Redefining *hijab*: American Muslim womens standpoints on veiling. *Journal of Applied Communication Research, 35 (3),* 294-319.

Dunkel, T. M., Davidson, D., & Qurashi, S. (2010). Body satisfaction and pressure to be thin in younger and older Muslim and non- Muslim women: The role of Western and non-Western dress preferences. *Body Image, 7,* 5665. doi:10.1016/j.bodyim.2009.10.003

Dawn (2009, December 2). An Islamic sharia policeman gives advice to Achenese girls, p. 9.

El Guindi, F. (1999) *Veil: Modesty, privacy, and resistance*. New York: Berg.

Errihani, H., Mrabti, H., Bourtayb, S. et al. (2008). Impact of cancer on Moslem patients in Morocco. *Psychological Oncology, 17,* 98-100. Doi: 10.1002/pon.1200

Flugel, J. C. (1969/1930). *The psychology of clothes*. New York: International Universities Press

Forstenlechner I., & Al-Waqfi, M. A. (2010). A job interview for Mo, but none for Mohammed Religious discrimination against immigrants in Austria and Germany. *Personnel Review, 39,* 767-784. doi: 10.1108/00483481011075602

Ghamidi, J. A. (2009). *Mairaj, aurat ki imamat, aur purdah*. Retrieved December 31, 2009, from http://www.al-mawrid.org/pages/questions_urdu_detail.php?qid= 1116&cid=79

Ghumman, S., & Jackson, L. (2010). The downside of religious attire: The Muslim headscarf and expectations of obtaining employment. *Journal of Organization Behavior, 31,* 4-23. doi: 10.1002/job.601

Hammami, R. (1990). Women, the Hijab and the Intifada Report, *Middle East (164/165),* 24-28, 71-78. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 3012687

Harrison, F (2007, January 2). *Iran police move into fashion business*. A report from BBC News, Tehran. Retrieved from news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ middle_east/6213854.stm

Hasan, S. (2013, September 8). Trendy abayas pushing burqa. *The Dawn*.

Humphreys, M., & Brown, A. D. (2002). Dress and identity: A Turkish case study, *Journal of Management Studies, 39 (7),* 927-952.

Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order*. New York: Touchstone.

Iqbal, S. (2003). An ethnographic study of Pakistanis living in USA with reference to the incidence of September 11. Masters thesis, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan

Imran, S. (2012, September 1). Hijab. *Nawai Waqt.*

Johar, H.Y., Khan, K., Khan, G. & Johar, K. (2010). *My name is Khan*

Jones, E. C. (2005, March 29). *Muslim girls unveil their fear*s. A BBC report. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/ this_world/4352171.stm

Jorgensen, S. K. (2008). *Rhetorical Citizenship. The Role of Rhetoric and Discourse Studies in Public Sphere Issues*. Paper presented at PhD Conference (May 13-18, 2008). Retrieved from http://www.ruc.dk/upload/ application/msword/f51d6748/ Abstract_ Signe_Kjaer_Jorgensen_2.doc

Khaddarposh, M. (2004). *Masud Khaddarposh: Sawanhe hayat.* Lahore, P :Sang-e-Meel.

Khan, A. (1999). Mobility of Women and Access to Health and Family Planning Services in Pakistan. *Reproductive Health Matters, 7, (14),* 39-48. from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3775060

Khan, M. H. (1972). *Purdah and polygamy.* Peshawar, Pakistan: Nashiran-e-Ilm-o-Tariqat.

Khattak, S. G. (2002). Afghan women: Bombed to be liberated? *Middle East Report (222),* 18-23. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1559266

Kopp, H. (2005). Dress and diversity: Muslim women and Islamic dress in an immigrant/minority context. *The Muslim World, 92*, 59-78.

Lueck, T. L. (2003). *To American eyes: Cultural feminist analysis of an alternative representation of Islamic womanhood*. Submitted for presentation consideration to the Commission on the Status of Women. Retrieved from https:// ls2.cmich.edu/ cgibin/ wa?A2=ind0310&L=AEJMC&F=P&P=42225

Maududi, A. A. (1939/2005). *Purdah*. Lahore: Islamic Publications.

Mernissi, F (1985). *Beyond the veil: Male-female dynamics in Muslim society* (Rev. ed.). Westbourne Grove, London: Al Saqi Books.

Mule, P., & Barther, D. (1992). The Return to the Veil: Individual Autonomy vs. Social Esteem. *Sociological Forum, 7,* 323-332. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 684313

Murphy, D. (2006). *From Tunis to Tehran, the great veil debate*. Retrieved from http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1108/p01s04-wome.html

Murshid, T. M. (2005). Islam, *sharia* law, and the role of women in Muslim societies: Myths and perceptions. *Pakistan Journal of Womens Studies: Alam-e-Niswan, 12,* 1-21.

Odeh, L. A. (1993). Post-colonial feminism and the veil: Thinking the difference. *Feminist Review, 43,* 26-37. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/1395067

Odoms, A. (2008). Factors that influence body image representations of black Muslim women. *Social Science & Medicine, 66,* 2573-2584. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed. 2008. 02. 008

Rastmanesh, R., Gluck, M. E., & Shadman, Z. (2009). Comparison of body dissatisfaction and cosmetic rhinoplasty with levels of veil practicing in Islamic women. *Internaltional Journal of Eating Disorders, 42,* 339-345. Doi: 10.1002/eat.20613

Read, J. G., & Bartkowski, J. P. (2000). To veil or not to veil? A case study of identity negotiation among Muslim women in Austin, Texas. *Gender and Society, 14,* 395-417. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/190135

Sadr, S. (June 2010). Everyone is equal but some are just more equal. *Newsheet, XXII (2)*. Lahore, Pakistan: Shirkat Gah.

Seckinelgin, H. (2006). Civil society between the state and society: Turkish women with Muslim headscarves? *Critical Social Policy, 26,* 748-769. Abstract retrieved from http://csp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/26/4/748

Shirkat Gah (2009, December). Hamas imposes dress code for girls in Gaza. *Newssheet, 21* (40), p. 4.

White, E. H. (1977). Purdah. *Journal of Women Studies, 2(1),* 31-42. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3346105

Zahedi, A. (2010). Transnational marriages of Filipinas and Iranian men: Adjustment and social integration. *Women's Studies International Forum, 33,* 7080. doi:10.1016/j.wsif.2009.09.010

Power Relationships and Transitivity Choices in Graham Greene's *Dream of a Strange Land*

Saadia Khan, Rubina Rahman

Department of English, Kohat University of Science & Technology, Kohat, Pakistan
Department of English & Applied Linguistics, University of Peshawar, Pakistan

_____

Abstract

Stylistic analysis of a text uses many tools from linguistic research. Halliday's model of transitivity choices offers one such method of textual investigation. Transitivity choices construct the reality of the text world and its characters. Burton (1996) takes a feminist stance and traces power relationship in Plath's *The Bell Jar* where she establishes female character as a victim in power dynamics. This paper is an attempt to establish the pattern of power relationship in a male oriented domain in Greene's short story *Dream of a Strange Land*. The paper concludes that power relationships are not necessarily gender bound. They are found between humans as a part of their existence.

Keywords: Transitivity Choices, Graham Greene, Systemic Functional Linguistics, Power Relationship

_____

Introduction

The stylistic analysis of a literary text involves a study of the linguistic elements that lend the text its literary quality. The features studied in the traditional stylistic analysis are syntactic, semantic, and lexical choices, foregrounding, morphology, phonology, and graphology. These features are analysed to strengthen both the linguistic and literary understanding of the texts. The point is made clear by Burton '…stylistic analysis is *not* just a question of discussing 'effects' in language and text, but a powerful method for understanding the ways in which all sorts of 'realities' as constructed through language (1996:230).

Halliday (1985) gave a new direction to textual analysis in his systemic functional linguistics (SFL) model. Halliday looks at reality in terms of processes; i.e. events happening: "Our most powerful impression of experience is that it consists of 'goings-on' . . . . All these goings-on are sorted out in the grammar of the clause. . . . The grammatical system by which this is achieved is TRANSITIVITY" (Halliday, 1994:106). He goes on to elaborate: "The transitivity system construes the world of experience into a manageable set of process types" (p. 106). He identifies six different types of processes that build up our perception of reality. These include:

1.   Material processes: of the external world
2.   Mental processes: of the inner experience
3.   Relational processes: of classification and identification
4.   Behavioural processes: of consciousness and psychological states
5.   Verbal processes: of linguistic enactment of symbolic relationships of saying and meaning
6.   Existential process: of recognition of all kinds of phenomena, to exist or to happen (p.107)

In the composition of a text, deliberate and at times intuitive grammatical choices are made by the writers to construct text reality. Berry (1975) quoted in Burton elaborates on these choices as

> In English grammar we make choices between different types of processes, between different types of participant, between different types of circumstance, between different roles for participants and circumstances, between different numbers of participants and circumstances, between different ways of combining processes, participants and circumstances. These choices are known collectively as the transitivity choices. (1996:227)

Deirdre Burton (1996:227) uses transitivity choices to find possible answers to the question, 'who does what to whom?' in her seminal paper *Through glass darkly: through dark glasses On stylistics and political commitment–via a study of a passage from Sylvia's Plath's The Bell Jar.* She establishes the social reality power-relationship in general, and of male dominance in relationship with female in particular, by examining transitivity choices.

Cunanan (2011) has stylistically analyzed Virginia Woolf's *Old Mrs. Grey.* Azar & Yazdchi (2012) analyze the character of "Maria' in James Joyce's *Clay*; Thu Nguyen (2012) applies the transitivity model to Hoa Pham's *Heroic Mother.* All

these researches find that the transitivity analysis allows a new perspective into the text and firmly establishes the realities of the textual and the narrative world.

This paper applies transitivity choices to analyze three short passages from Graham Greene's short story *Dream of a Strange Land*. The passages present the scene of the General's birthday party at the residence of the doctor, the Herr Professor. The doctor, a law-abiding man, refuses to treat a patient of leprosy in private as it is against law. However, the same doctor is forced by the army to hold the party at his place, also an act against law.

The purpose for selecting these passages is to analyze the relationship of power among men. Burton's paper (1996), written in a feminist perspective, suggests that women construct themselves as victims; though, it also states that a text written by a man would be open to a similar sympathetic discussion (1996:229) This paper examines transitivity choices to identify the pattern of power relationship and to find out if these help in understanding the realities of the characters in the selected passages in light of the Burton's statement.

The Text

The text is repeated below with sentences numbered and processes underlined.

(1) At one of the tables, on the right of the croupier, sat the old man whom he had seen pass in the Mercedes. (2) One hand was playing with his moustache, the other with a pile of tokens before him, counting and rearranging them while the ball span and jumped and span, and one foot beat in time to the tune from *The Merry Widow*. (3) A champagne cork from the bar shot diagonally up and struck the chandelier while the croupiers cried again, 'Faites vos jeux, messieurs,' and the stem of a glass went crack in somebody's fingers.

(4) Then the patient saw the Herr Professor standing with his back to the window at the other end of the great room, beyond the second chandelier, and they regarded each other, with the laughter and cries and glitter of light between them.

(5) The Herr Professor could not properly see the patient-only the outline of a face pressed to the exterior of the pane, but the patient could see the Herr Professor very clearly between the tables, in the light of the chandelier. (6) He could even see his expression, the lost look on his face like that of someone who has come to the wrong party. (7) The patient raised his hand, as though to indicate to the other that he was lost too, but of course the Herr Professor could not see the gesture in

the dark. (8) The patient <u>realized</u> quite clearly that, though they had once been well known to each other, it was quite impossible for them to meet, in this house to which they had both <u>strayed</u> by some strange accident. (9) There was no consulting-room here, no file on his case, no desk, no Prometheus, no doctor even to whom he <u>could appeal</u>. (10) 'Faites vos jeux, messieurs,' the croupiers <u>cried</u>, 'faites vos jeux.' (Greene, 1963: 91-92)

Analysis

On reading the passages, we get the impression that the Herr General seems to be in full charge of the situation. The Herr Professor is helpless as he is unable to control the happenings at his home; the patient is also in a state of helplessness for he cannot enter the house of the Herr Professor to meet him. A clause-wise analysis of the passages strengthens these impressions and gives us a better understanding of the characters' realities. The analysis comprises of three steps suggested by Burton (1996):

a) Isolate the processes *per se*, and find which participant (who or what) is 'doing' each process;
b) Find what *sorts* of process they are, and which participant is engaged in which type of process;
c) Find who or what is *affected* by each of these processes. (Burton, 1996:231)

Let us now analyse the text step by step.

Step 1: The processes *per se*

This step helps in identifying the actors and the processes associated with them:

Sentence #	Actor	Process
1a	old man (Herr General)	sat
1b	patient	had seen
2a	Herr General's body part	was playing
2b	Herr General's body part	counting and rearranging
2c	ball	span
2d	ball	jumped

2e	ball	span
2f	Herr General's body part	beat
3a	champagne cork	shot up
3b	champagne cork	struck
3c	croupiers	cried
3d	stem of glass	went crack
4a	patient	saw
4b	they (patient, doctor)	regarded
5a	Herr Professor (doctor)	could not…see
5b	patient's body part	pressed
5c	patient	could see
6a	patient	could . . . see
6b	someone (doctor)	has come
7a	patient	raised
7b	he (patient)	was
7c	Herr Professor (doctor)	could not see
8a	patient	realized
8b	they (patient, doctor)	had…strayed
9	patient	could appeal
10	croupiers	cried

The table above gives us a clear picture of the actors and their actions in the world described in the passages. The Herr General and his birthday party seem to dominate the scene (1a, 2a-3d, 10). The patient as actor comes next (1b, 4a, 4b, 5b-6a, 7a, 7b, 8a-9). The Herr Professor, i.e., the doctor has the minimum number of actions (4b, 5a, 6b, 7c, 8b). A simple counting of the actors and their actions is as follows:

> Herr General (including body parts) as actor: 04
> Objects in the birthday party as actors: 06
> Patient (including body parts) as actor: 09

Herr Professor as actor: 03

Herr Professor and patient as joint actors: 02

Croupiers as actors: 02

Step 2: The *sorts* of process they are

After identifying which participant is doing each process, the next step is to determine what sorts of processes they are so that we may develop a better understanding of the characters' realities established by the text:

1a	old man (Herr General) sat = material-action-intention
1b	patient had seen= mental-internalized-perception
2a	Herr General's body part was playing= material-action-intention
2b	Herr General's body part counting and rearranging= material-action-intention
2c	ball span= material-action-intention
2d	ball jumped= material-action-intention
2e	ball span= material-action-intention
2f	Herr General's body part beat= material-action-intention
3a	champagne cork shot up= material-action-intention
3b	champagne cork struck= material-action-supervention
3c	croupiers cried= material-action-intention
3d	stem of glass went crack= material-action-supervention
4a	patient saw= mental-internalized-perception
4b	they (patient, doctor) regarded = mental-internalized-cognition
5a	Herr Professor (doctor) could not… see= mental-internalized-perception
5b	patient's body part pressed= material-action-supervention
5c	patient could see= mental-internalized-perception
6a	patient could… see= mental-internalized-perception
6b	someone (doctor) has come= material-action-intention

7a	patient raised= material-action-intention
7b	he (patient) was= relational
7c	Herr Professor (doctor) could not see= mental-internalized-perception
8a	patient realized= mental-internalized-cognition
8b	they (patient, doctor) had…strayed= material-action-intention
9	patient could appeal= material-action-intention
10	croupiers cried= material-action-intention

Out of the 26 clauses studied, 14 show the option of material-action-intention process; o6 show mental-internalized-perception process; 02 show mental-internalized-cognition process; 01 shows relational process; 03 show the option of material-action-supervention process. The power-relationships in these passages can better be understood if we relate these processes to the actors thereby determining their active or passive participation in the world around them. The Herr General affects the environment with material-action-intention process in 04 clauses. The ball affects the surroundings by material-action-intention process in 03 clauses. The croupiers, too, influence the party by material-action-intention process in 02 clauses. The champagne cork affects by material-action-intention process in 01 clause, while in another clause it affects by material-action-supervention process. The stem of glass influences the environment by material-action-supervention process in 01 clause. Thus we find the Herr General and the objects in the party commanding the situation with a majority of material-action-intention processes. The patient's presence is felt in 04 mental-internalized-perception process clauses; 02 material-action-intention clauses; 01 mental-internalized-cognition process clause; 01 material-action-supervention and 01 relational clause. The patient seems to have less control on the world around as he is involved mostly in mental-internalized processes. His influence is to be found in two material-action-intention clauses. The Herr Professor has the least power on the environment as he appears in two mental-internalized-perception clauses and in one material-action-intention clause. Both the patient and Herr Professor appear together in two clauses, mental-internalized-cognition and material-action-intention. The analysis in this part shows the Herr General to be the most powerful; the patient to be the least powerful; and the Herr Professor to be helpless in affecting the world.

Step 3: Who or what is *affected* by each of these processes

The analysis in this part establishes who or what is affected by each process:

1a	old man (Herr General) affects 0 by intention process
1b	patient affects 0 by perception process
2a	Herr General's body part affects his other body part by intention process
2b	Herr General's body part affects tokens by intention process
2c	ball affects the environment by intention process
2d	ball affects the environment by intention process
2e	ball affects the environment by intention process
2f	Herr General's body part affects the music by intention process
3a	champagne cork affects the environment by intention process
3b	champagne cork affects the chandelier by supervention process
3c	croupiers affect the environment by intention process
3d	stem of glass affects somebody by supervention process
4a	patient affects the Herr Professor by perception process
4b	they (patient, doctor) affect each other by cognition process
5a	Herr Professor (doctor) affects the patient by perception process
5b	patient's body part affects the pane by supervention process
5c	patient affects the Herr Professor by perception process
6a	patient affects the Herr Professor by perception process
6b	someone (doctor) affects the party by intention process (hypothetical)
7a	patient affects 0 by intention process
7b	he (patient) affects 0 by relational process
7c	Herr Professor (doctor) affects 0 by perception process
8a	patient affects 0 by cognition process
8b	they (patient, doctor) affect 0 by intention process
9	patient affects 0 by intention process (hypothetical)
10	croupiers affect the environment by intention process

The analysis further strengthens the observations made earlier, i.e., the Herr General, the objects at the party and the croupiers affect the environment mostly by intention processes (1a,2a,2b,2c,2d,2e,2f,3a,3c,10) and, to a lesser degree, by supervention processes (3b,3d). It shows that they have the strongest effect on their environment. The patient affects none and Herr Professor by perception process (1b, 4a, 5c, 6a,); none by intention (7a, 9); the pane by supervention (5b); none by relational (7b) and cognition processes (8a). The analysis establishes him to have no power over the world depicted in the passages. The Herr Professor's influence is negligible as he affects the patient and none by perception process (5a, 7c) and affects the party by intention process in a hypothetical sense (6b). Both the patient and Herr Professor influence each other by cognition process (4b) and influence none by intention process (8b).

Conclusion

The transitivity choices in selected passages analysed in this paper construct the realities of Greene's characters in his story and strengthen our impression of their power-relationships. The difference is that Burton follows the feminist perspective in her analysis and tries to find out the reality of the female character in the text, while Graham Greene's passages present male characters and reveal their social reality. The study establishes the reality of power relationship among men-where they are powerful or powerless. The clause-wise analysis of the text brings the patterns of implicit power relationships. Herr Professor is powerful in relation to the patient and Herr General in relation to the Herr doctor. The analysis brings powerful Herr General to the fore, and establishes the Herr Professor and the patient as helpless. The analysis established the social fact that it is not only the women, who are victims in the world, it might as well be men. The difference remains of who is powerful over whom, men over women or men over men. The reality is of the control that one may have over others, physiologically, emotionally, politically, socially and religiously irrespective of the gender.

References

Berry, M. (1975). *Introduction to Systemic Linguistics.* Vol.1. London: Batsford

Burton, D. (1996). Through glass darkly: through dark glasses: On stylistics and political commitment — via a study of a passage from Sylvia's Plath's The Bell Jar. In J. J. Weber (ed.) *The Stylistics Reader: From Roman Jakobson to the Present.* pp. 224-240. London: Arnold Associates

Cunanan, T. B. (2011). Using Transitivity as a Framework in a Stylistic Analysis of Virginia Woolf's *Old Mrs. Grey. Asian EFL Journal.* Vol:54 August pp. 69-79

Greene, G. (1963). Dream of a Strange Land. *A Sense of Reality.* 80-92 Harmondsworth: Penguin Books

Halliday, M. A. K. (1994). *An Introduction to Functional Grammar.* (2nd Ed.) London: Arnold

Nguyen, H. T. (2012). Transitivity Analysis of "Heroic Mother" by Hoa Pham. *International Journal of English Linguistics*, 2/4, 85-100

Yazdchi, N. & Azar, A.S. (2012). A Stylistic Analysis of "Maria" in "Clay": The Character in James Joyce's Short Story. *Journal of Basic and Applied Scientific Research*, 2/2, 1050-1055.

A Minimalist Account of Structural Case Assignment in Pashto Conjoined Subject Constructions

Talat Masood[*], Mujib Rahman

Department of English & Applied Linguistics, University of Peshawar, Pakistan

Abstract

Whereas cross-linguistically the verb of a conjoined subject either agrees with the first of the two conjuncts, called first conjunct agreement (FCA) or with the second conjunct, called second conjunct agreement (SCA) or last conjunct agreement (LCA), Pashto *ao* conjoined subjects are different in the sense that the verb shows agreement neither with the first conjunct nor the last conjunct. Rather, it shows agreement with the joint syntactic and semantic effect of the two conjoined subjects. Morphologically, in the present and future tenses, *ao* conjoined subjects show nominative Cases, while in the past tense they show accusative Cases. We propose, for Pashto *ao* conjoined subjects, following the minimalist idea of agreement in terms of features as responsible for structural Case assignment, that a single agree relation establishes between the conjoined subjects and T in the present and future tenses and between the conjoined subjects and Voice in the past tense. Agreement between T and *ao* conjoined subjects results in assigning nominative Case while agreement between Voice and *ao* conjoined subjects results in assigning accusative Case, as υ in the past tense Pashto constructions, we consider, to be defective in the Chomskian sense (2001). The overall conclusion, for structural Case assignment in Pashto *ao* conjoined subjects constructions, is that the minimalist idea of structural Case assignment as a result of features agreement between a functional head and a nominal hold equally good.

Keywords: minimalist syntax; government and binding; case assignment; Pashto

[*] PhD Scholar, Department of English & Applied Linguistics, University of Peshawar

1. Introduction

Varied morphological forms of nouns and pronouns, with reference to their placement in a sentence, have always attracted grammarians/syntacticians. Thus, as the number of grammars increased, the number of approaches to study case also increased. In the generative enterprise, this interest crystalized in the shape of case theory/module of the government and binding (GB) era. In GB, the concentration was largely on structural Case[1] and Case assignment, the former dealing with the Case of a nominal with reference to its position in a sentence and the later dealing with the agency that is responsible for giving this Case to a nominal. Minimalist program went a step ahead as it tried to find the *why* of Case. With this background in mind, conjoined subjects pose a more challenging situation as here we have two or more than two nouns or pronouns at one place and all these nouns or pronouns need structural Case from a single functional head. Added to this has been the unique nature of Pashto conjoined subjects that are joined by the conjunction *ao* 'and'. Here, the verb neither agrees with the first conjunct nor does it agree with the last conjunct; rather, it agrees with the joint effect of the two conjuncts.

To deal with this situation this paper proposes that the two parts of a conjoined subject act as a single syntactic unit. This postulation has consequences. Instead of each of the two nominals having [uCase] feature, we propose that the two parts of the conjoined subject collectively bear the [uCase] feature. We also propose that both of the two nominals have the same structural Case. In addition, we propose that the two nominals jointly move from spec υP to spec TP as a unit. Taking all these points into consideration, this paper for the first time proposes structures/ derivations for Pashto *ao* conjunction conjoined subject constructions in the three tenses of present, past, and future; as structural Case assignment cannot be dealt with comprehensively unless the derivation/structure of a construction is not established. For structural Case assignment this paper proposes that nominative Case in Pashto conjoined subject sentences is assigned as a result of φ-features agreement between T and the relevant nominal, while accusative Case is assigned as a result of φ-features agreement between the relevant nominal and υ or Voice, depending on the tense of the sentence. In addition, in the morphological component, we propose that agreement for nominative Case assignment in Pashto *ao* conjoined subject constructions between T and the relevant nominal is visible while agreement for accusative Case assignment between υ or Voice and the relevant nominal is invisible.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic and gives a brief idea of the issues that will be discussed in the paper. Section 2 gives a thumbnail sketch of the efforts that were made in the traditional grammar and the generative

enterprise especially the minimalist program with reference to structural Case assignment and conjoined subject constructions. Section 3 gives some idea of conjoined subjects, with more emphasis on *ao* conjoined subjects, and the mechanism that we will adopt to deal with structural Case assignment in Pashto *ao* conjoined subject constructions. Sections 4, 5, and 6 deal with structural Case assignment in Pashto *ao* conjoined subject constructions in the three tenses of present, past and future. Section 7 concludes this paper.

2. Literature Review

In the minimalist era, conjoined subject constructions have attracted a lot of attention. However, this is mostly with reference to agreement, not structural Case assignment. Moreover, their accounts are concentrated on single conjunct agreement, a phenomenon that has been found across many unrelated languages, for example Arabic (Aoun et al. 1994, Al-Balushi, 2011), Slovenian (Marušič, Navins, & Saksida, 2007), Serbo – Croatian (Bošković, 2009, 2010), and Hindi (Benmamoun et al. 2010). Single conjunct agreement may manifest itself either as first conjunct agreement[2] (FCA) or as second or last conjunct agreement[3] (S/LCA). As agreement has direct relation to structural Case in the minimalist program, therefore, their accounts of agreement can also be useful for our purposes.

For the phenomenon of structural Case assignment, we will restrict ourselves to the minimalist program and would do away with the efforts that were made in the GB era. In the minimalist program, different ideas have been propounded to explain structural Case assignment. Some of the important ideas are, firstly, that structural Case assignment is the result of features agreement between a functional head and a nominal (Schьtze (1997), Carstens (2001), Bejar (2003), Tanaka (2005), Chomsky (2000, 2001, 2005, 2006), Alexiadou & Anagnostopoulou (2006), Bobaljik & Branigan (2006), Richardson (2007), Legate (2008), Baker (2008, forthcoming), Baker & Vinokurova (2010). Secondly, structural Case is an uninterpretable tense feature on the relevant DP (Pesetsky & Torrego, 2001). Thirdly, mood and modality are responsible for the assignment of Case (Aygen, 2002). Fourth, that, in one way or another, aspect assigns Case (Itkonen (1976), Ramchand (1997), Arad (1998), Kiparsky (1998), Torrego (1998), Svenonius (2001, 2002b), Kratzer (2004)). Fifth, Case is licensed by location and person (Ritter & Wiltschko, 2009).

So far as structural Case assignment in Pashto conjoined subjects constructions is concerned, we find that neither the traditional nor the generative grammarians/ syntacticians bothered to study structural Case assignment or conjoined subjects either traditionally or generatively. All that we find in different grammar books

about Pashto language are just passing mentions of different Pashto conjunctions in general. They do not dilate, in any way, on the nature of conjoined subjects or their agreement patterns, let alone generative/ minimalist treatment of conjoined subjects constructions or structural Case assignment in them. So all that, we have in Pashto grammar books written in Pashto, Urdu, or English languages, are of no use to us, as far as our present endeavour is concerned.

3. Pashto *Ao* Conjoined Subjects and Structural Case Assignment in Them

The most important and well-known conjunctions in Pashto are, *ao* 'and', *ya* 'or' and *kho* 'but'. There are also some correlating conjunctions. As here we are concerned with double subject or conjoined subject constructions, therefore, we will discuss *ao* conjunction with reference to the present, past, and future tenses. (For the conjunctions *kho* and *ya*, the correlating conjunctions, and the coordinating conjunctions, please see Masood (2014), as these conjunctions are more relevance to multi-clausal constructions in Pashto).

In order to deal with the assignment of Case in *ao* conjoined subject constructions in Pashto, we are adopting a unique and an ambitious technique. Normally, from a generative perspective, the process for assignment of Case should have been that the functional category T assigns nominative Case to the one conjunct, and then to the other conjunct, thus resorting to the mechanism of multiple agree. However, we are adopting a new approach, in which T establishes an agree relation with both the parts of the conjoined subject acting as a syntactic and semantic whole. As a result of this agree relation, the [uφ] of T are valued, not by the individual subject parts but by the subject parts acting as a syntactic whole, and in return nominative Case is assigned to both the parts of the conjoined subject treating it as one DP.

That why we have adopted this approach when there is an alternative available needs attention. Solid grounds exist for adopting this approach. In Pashto, unlike English, the verb does not agree with one or the other of the conjoined subjects, rather, the verb agrees with the joint syntactic and semantic effect of the conjoined subject. To understand this, let us take some Pashto examples in the present tense:

1. *Zə   ao   Saleem   pen   mathawo.*
    I.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM   pen   break.PRS.1PL
    'I and Saleem break the pen/ I and Saleem are breaking the pen.'

Note that both the translations are right depending on the sense that we take of the sentence. However, for ease and economy in derivation we will adopt the former meaning throughout.

2. *Saleem*   *ao*   *Zə*   *pen*   *mathawo.*
   Saleem.NOM   and   I.NOM   pen   break.PRS.1PL
   'Saleem and I break the pen.'

3. *Thə*   *ao*   *Saleem*   *pen*   *mathawai.*
   you.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM   pen   break.PRS.2PL
   'You and Saleem break the pen.'

4. *Saleem*   *ao*   *thə*   *pen*   *mathawai.*
   Saleem.NOM   and   you.NOM   pen   break.2PL
   'Saleem and you break the pen.'

5. *Hagha*   *ao*   *Saleem*   *pen*   *mathawi.*
   he.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM   pen   break.3PL
   'He and Saleem break the pen.'

6. *Saleem*   *ao*   *hagha*   *pen*   *mathawi.*
   Saleem.NOM   and   he.NOM   pen   break.3PL
   'Saleem and he break the pen.'

If looked at the examples above, in examples no. 1 and 2, the verb does not agree with any of conjunct subjects. Rather, the verb agrees with the 1st person plural pronoun which is not present in these sentences. 1st person plural pronoun is semantically equal to the joint effect/meaning of the two conjuncts i.e. 'me and Saleem', in these two particular examples. The second pair of examples, namely, 3 and 4, and the third pair, namely 5 and 6, also show the same situation. Here, in the former pair the verb agrees with the 2nd person plural pronoun which is semantically and logically equal to the joint effect/ meaning of 'you plus Saleem', while in the later pair the verb shows agreement with the 3rd person plural pronoun which is semantically and logically equal to the joint effect/ meaning of 'he plus Saleem'. What this agreement pattern conveys here is the fact that the two conjuncts, in a conjoined subject construction in Pashto, joined by the conjunction *ao* together, do not act as separate entities, rather, they act as a semantic and syntactic whole.

From a minimalist perspective, to decide such issues based on agreement, a post-syntactic phenomenon is similar to putting a cart in front of a horse. However, we are using the agreement pattern only as a lighthouse, and it is an effort to explain differently something that behave differently in similar circumstances, namely, to account for the point that why the verb does not agree with one or the other conjunct of the subject, as it has been doing in other languages.

4. Case Assignment in the Present *Ao* Conjoined Subject Constructions

To show how Case is assigned to conjoined subjects in monoclausal sentences, first we will make a derivation for a sentence, given here as example no.7, followed by different examples making use of Pashto pronouns, so as to substantiate and give empirical weightage to our views/ hypotheses.

7. *Zə*   *ao*   *Saleem*   *pen*   *mathawo.*
    I.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM   pen.ACC   break.PRS.1PL
    'I and Saleem break a/the pen.'

First of all the verb *mathedal/mathawəl*, depending on the difference of opinion regarding the base form of the verb[4], having [V, uD, uD] features merges with the internal argument *pen* having [D, uCase] features, to form VP. This merge results in checking/ deleting the one [uD] of the verb. A small *v* having [uInfl, uɸ] features merges with the VP through Hierarchy of Projection Principle[5] to form *v*'. An agree relation establishes between the internal argument *pen*, acting as a goal here, and *v*, acting as a probe here, in terms of ɸ-features of person, number and gender. Because of this agree relation, the uninterpretable phi-features of *v* are valued as 3SGM, while accusative Case is assigned to the DP *pen*.

To satisfy the other [uD] of the verb, the external argument in the form of 1st person singular pronoun plus *Saleem* having [D, uCase] features merges with the *v*', as a unit, not as separate entities. This merge results in satisfaction/ deletion of the [uD] of the verb and formation of the *v*P. To check/delete the [uInfl] of *v*, an empty functional category T, having [*uD, uɸ, uclause type, present] features merges with the *v*P. Because of this merge, the [uInfl] is valued as present tense. An agree relation establishes between T, a probe, and the conjoined subject working as one syntactic unit, a goal, in terms of ɸ-features. The conjoined subject values the phi-features of T as 3PLM, while nominative Case is assigned to the nominals of the conjoined subject. Because of the nominative Case, the morphological or spell-out form of the 1st person singular pronoun becomes *zə* and the form of *Saleem* remains the same as is the case with other Pashto nouns vis-a-vis Case. As the 3PLM does not get visible on T, rather it along with the tense get visible on either V or *v* or both, therefore, the morphological base form of the verb *mathedal/ mathawəl* changes to *mathawo.*

To satisfy the strong [*uD] of T, the conjoined subject moves from specifier *v*P, to specifier TP; the symbols [*], < > used in the Figures, following Adger (2004) show strength and movement respectively. Another functional category C, empty in this particular case, having [Decl] feature merges with the TP to form CP. Because of

this merge the [uclause type] of T that had projection on TP is checked/satisfied as declarative. Thus, our CP is complete, as is shown in the Figure below:

CP

C[Decl]   TP[~~uclause type~~]

Zə aoSaleem   T'

*v*P[~~uInfl~~]   T[*~~uD~~, ~~uɸ,~~ uclause type, present]

1SG *pronoun ao Saleem* [D, ~~uCase~~]   *v*'[~~uD~~]

NOM]

VP   *v*[uInfl, ~~uɸ~~]

pen [D, ~~uCase~~]   *mathawo*[V, ~~uD~~, uD]
[ACC]

Figure 1: Complete derivation for the conjoined subject construction
zə ao Saleem pen mathawo

The example, we discussed, had a noun i.e. *pen* as its object DP; therefore, we were empirically unable to substantiate the claim that the Case borne by the object DP is accusative. This is due to the often-mentioned fact that mostly pronouns have morphological markings for accusative and nominative Cases in Pashto while nouns mostly do not have such markings. Therefore, towards the conclusion of this section on present tense conjoined subjects, we are giving a few examples where pronouns are used as objects.

8.	*Saleem*	*ao*	*Adil*	*ma*	*takhnawi.*
	Saleem.NOM	and	Adil.NOM	I.ACC	tickle.PRS.3
	'Saleem and Adil tickle me.'				
9.	*Saleem*	*ao*	*Adil*	*moong*	*takhnawi.*
	Saleem.NOM	and	Adil.NOM	we.ACC	tickle.PRS.3
	'Saleem and Adil tickle us.'				
10.	*Saleem*	*ao*	*Adil*	*tha*	*takhnawi.*
	Saleem.NOM	and	Adil.NOM	you.ACC	tickle.PRS.3
	'Saleem and Adil tickle you.'				

11. *Saleem*   *ao*   *Adil*   *thaso*   *takhnawi.*

    Saleem.NOM   and   Adil.NOM   you.plural.ACC   tickle.PRS.3

    'Saleem and Adil tickle you.'

12. *Saleem*   *ao*   *Adil*   *hagha*   *takhnawi.*

    'Saleem and Adil tickle him.'

13. *Saleem*   *ao*   *Adil*   *haghoi*   *takhnawi.*

    Saleem.NOM   and   Adil.NOM   they.ACC   tickle.PRS.3

    'Saleem and Adil tickle them.'

14. *Saleem*   *ao*   *Adil*   *day*   *takhnawi.*

    Saleem.NOM   and   Adil.NOM   he.near.NOM   tickle.PRS.3

    'Saleem and Adil tickle him.'

15. *Saleem*   *ao*   *Adil*   *doi*   *takhnawi.*

    Saleem.NOM   and   Adil.NOM   they.near.ACC   tickle.PRS.3

    Saleem and Adil tickle them.'

16. *Zə*   *ao*   *Saleem*   *tha*   *takhnawo.*

    I.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM   you.ACC   tickle.PRS.1PL

    'I and Saleem tickle you.'

17. *Moong*   *ao*   *Saleem*   *tha*   *takhnawo.*

    we.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM   you.ACC   tickle.PRS.1PL

    'We and Saleem tickle you.'

18. *Thə*   *ao*   *Saleem*   *ma*   *takhnawai*

    you.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM   I.ACC   tickle.PRS.2PL

    'You and Saleem tickle me.'

19. *Thaso*   *ao*   *Saleem*   *ma*   *takhnawai.*

    you.plural.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM   I.ACC   tickle.PRS.2PL

    'You and Saleem tickle me.'

These examples again, like the earlier few paragraphs on agreement, show that the verb agrees with the semantic and logical equivalent of the conjoined subject, not with the subject parts taken as individuals. At the same time, it shows that there is no visible agreement between the verb and the object. Based on the examples and discussion above, we can draw the following paradigm for Case forms for the present tense conjoined/double subject constructions.

Joint Effect of Conjoined Sub	Subject's Case Form	Object's Case Form
3rd Person Plural (distant)	Nominative	Accusative
3rd Person Plural (near)	Nominative	Accusative
2nd Person Plural	Nominative	Accusative
1st Person Plural	Nominative	Accusative

The examples discussed above give empirical weightage to the main hypothesis that in Pashto agreement between T and the relevant nominal results in assigning the nominative Case to that nominal, and that agreement between ʋ or Voice and the relevant nominal results in assigning the accusative Case to that nominal. In addition, they substantiate a sub-hypothesis as well; namely, that in Pashto agreement between T and a nominal resulting in nominative Case is morphologically visible while agreement between ʋ or Voice and a nominal resulting in accusative Case is invisible.

5. Case Assignment in the Past Tense '*ao*' Conjoined Subject Constructions

For the past tense *ao* conjoined subject constructions, we are using the same set of examples that we have used for the present tense, with the only change that past tense has been used instead of the present tense. Let us see what the agreement pattern of the past tense conjoined/double subject constructions look like:

20. *Ma   ao   Saleem   pen   math   kʈo.*
    I.ACC   and   Saleem.ACC   pen.ACC.3SG   break.3SG   do.PST.3SG
    'I and Saleem broke the pen.'

21. *Saleem   ao   ma   pen   math   kʈo.*
    Saleem.ACC and   I.ACC   pen.NOM.3SG   break.3SG   do.PST.3SG
    'Saleem and I broke the pen.'

22. *Tha   ao   Saleem   pen   math   kʈo.*
    you.ACC   and   Saleem.ACC   pen.NOM.3SG   break.3SG   do.PST.3SG
    'You and Saleem broke the pen.'

23. *Saleem   ao   tha   pen   math   kʈo.*
    Saleem.ACC and   you.ACC   pen.NOM.3SG   break.3SG   do.PST.3SG
    'Saleem and you broke the pen.'

24. *Haghə   ao   Saleem   pen   math   kʈo.*
    he.ACC   and   Saleem.ACC   pen.NOM.3SG   break.3SG   do.PST.3SG
    'He and Saleem broke the pen.'

25. *Saleem   ao   haghə   pen   math   kʈo.*
    Saleem.ACC and   he.ACC   pen.NOM.3SG   break.3SG   do.PST.3SG
    'Saleem and he broke the pen.'

In the examples above, relating to the past tense, we see neither the first conjunct nor the second conjunct nor does a combination of the two agreeing with the verb. Rather, the object agrees with the verb. Thus, the examples relating to the past tense are not going to explain to us the agreement pattern between the verb and the conjunct subject and we will follow the information obtained from the present tense examples in the previous section.

Now, we will derive a typical minimalist derivation for a past tense conjoined subject construction and see how Case is assigned in these constructions, as it is the focus of our discussion. In addition, due to the ergative-absolutive Case pattern in the past tense, we would make use of the Voice functional category (Masood, 2014).

26. *Ma   ao   Saleem   pen   math   kʈo.*
    I.ACC   and   Saleem.ACC   pen.NOM.3SG break.3SG   do.PST.3SG
    'I and Saleem broke the pen.'

Derivation for the above example is shown in the Figure below:

Figure 2: Complete derivation for *ma ao Saleem pen math kʈo (Past tense)*

This derivation is somewhat different from the derivation for the present tense, as in the past tense nominative Case is assigned to the internal argument and accusative Case is assigned to the external argument. Relevant literature (Kratzer, 1996; Collins, 2005; Roberts, 2010, n.d.; Holmberg, 2007) attributes this to the inability of *v* to assign Case to the relevant nominal. We, therefore, introduce Voice in such situations (see Masood (2014) and Masood and Rahman (2013) for detailed discussion). Also, in the above example, we have the light verb complex

(V_1V_2), consisting of the main verb V_1 *math* and the light verb V_2 *kᶅo/kᶅol* (for a detailed treatment of Pashto light verb constructions, see Masood (2014).

This derivation will follow the familiar steps of merge of the verb *math* with the DP *pen*, to form VP. A light verb *v kᶅo/kᶅol* having [uInfl] and lacking [uϕ] features merges with *v'* to form *v*P. Thus, *v* in Pashto past tense construction is defective (Chomsky, 2001), in terms of [uϕ] features, hence lacking the ability to assign accusative Case. The conjoined subject *1ˢᵗ person singular pronoun ao Saleem* merges with *v'* to form *v*P. As *v* here is unable to assign Case — either to the external or the internal argument due to the lack of ϕ-features, as they are withheld by Voice in this case — Voice merges with the *v*P through the Hierarchy of Projection Principle to form VoiceP. An agree relation establishes between Voice and the external argument, acting as a syntactic unit, in terms of ϕ-features, resulting in the valuation of the ϕ-features of Voice and in return accusative Case is assigned to the external argument.

Another agree relation establishes between the internal argument *pen* acting as a goal, and T, acting as a probe, in terms of ϕ-features. Because of the agree relation the phi-features of T are valued as 3SGM while nominative Case is assigned to the internal argument *pen*. The phi-features of T do not get visible on T; rather, as has been the case with other constructions as well, they get visible on either V or both *v* and V. In this case, the ϕ-features of T along with tense get visible on both V and *v*. As a result, the light verb complex gets the form *math kᶅo*. The rest of the processes such as movement of the external argument/ EPP, satisfaction of different uninterpretable features, addition of C[Decl] etc. remain the same as we had discussed for the present tense.

Now, we take up the issue that the Case, which the object nominal in Pashto past tense conjoined subject constructions receives, is nominative. The example, we discussed earlier had a noun as its object DP, therefore, we were empirically unable to substantiate the view that the Case is nominative, not accusative. We will now give examples of *ao* conjoined subject past tense sentences which have pronouns used in the subject and object positions, to substantiate our view.

Third Person Pronouns

27. *Ma   ao   Saleem   hagha   pasawəlo.*
    I.ACC   and   Saleem.ACC   he.distant.NOM.3SG   wake.3SGM
    'I and Saleem were waking him.'

28. *Ma   ao   Saleem   hagha   pasawəla.*
    I.ACC   and   Saleem.ACC   she.distant.NOM.3SG wake.3SGF
    'I and Saleem were waking her.'

29. *Tha*   *ao*   *Saleem*   *hagoi*   *pasawəl.*
you.ACC   and   Saleem.ACC   they.distant.NOM.3PL   wake.3PL
'You and Saleem were waking them.'

30. *Tha*   *ao*   *Saleem*   *day*   *pasawəlo.*
you.ACCa   nd   Saleem.ACC   he.near.NOM.3SGM   wake.3SGM
'You and Saleem were waking him.'

31. *Haghə*   *ao*   *Saleem*   *da*   *pasawəla.*
he.ACC   and   Saleem.ACC   she.near.NOM.3SGF   wake.3SGF
'He and Saleem were waking her.'

32. *Haghə*   *ao*   *Saleem*   *doi*   *pasawəl.*
he.ACC   and   Saleem.ACC   they.near.NOM.3PL   wake.3PLM
He and Saleem were waking them (men).'

33. *Haghə*   *ao*   *Saleem*   *doi*   *pasawəlay.*
he.ACC   and   Saleem.ACC   they.near.NOM.3PL   wake.3PLF
'He and Saleem were waking them (women).'

2nd Person Pronoun

34. *Ma*   *ao*   *Saleem*   *thə*   *pasawəlay.*
 I.ACC   and   Saleem.ACC   you.NOM .2SG   wake.2SG
'I and Saleem were waking you.'

35. *Haghə*   *ao*   *Saleem*   *thaso*   *pasawəlai.*
he.ACC   and   Saleem.ACC   You.NOM.2PL   wake.2PL
'He and Saleem were waking you.'

1st Person Pronouns

36. *Saleem*   *ao*   *tha*   *zə*   *pasawəlum.*
Saleem.ACC   and   you.ACC   I.NOM.1SG   wake.1SG
'Saleem and you were waking me.'

37. *Ma*   *ao*   *Saleem*   *thə*   *pasawəlay.*
I.ACC   and   Saleem.ACC   you.NOM.2SG   wake.2SG
'I and Saleem were waking you.'

38. *Saleem*   *ao*   *haghə*   *moong*   *pasawəlo.*
Saleem.ACC   and   he.ACC   we.NOM.1PL   wake.1PL
'Saleem and he were waking us.'

39. *Moong*   *ao*   *Saleem*   *thaso*   *pasawəlai.*
we.ACC   and   Saleem.ACC   you.NOM.2PL   wake.3PL
'We and Saleem were waking you.'

Based on the discussion and examples above, we can make a paradigm of the conjoined/double subject and object positions along with the morphological cases they exhibit on the pronouns:

Joint Effect Conjoined Subjects	Subject's Case Form	Object's Case Form
3rd Person Plural (distant)	Accusative	Nominative
3rd Person Plural (near)	Accusative	Nominative
2nd Person Plural	Accusative	Nominative
1st Person Plural	Accusative	Nominative

The paradigm and the examples above convey a few conclusions. First, the conjoined subject in the past tense bears accusative Case on both the conjoined nominals. Second, the internal argument in the past tense carries nominative Case. Third, the verb agrees with the internal argument in terms of different phi-features. Thus, these results substantiate and give empirical weightage to the hypotheses that we have adopted for Pashto language in the arena of Case. These hypotheses are that nominative Case is assigned as a result of φ-features agreement between T and the relevant nominal, and accusative Case is assigned as a result of φ-features agreement between υ or Voice and the relevant nominal, and the sub-hypothesis that, morphologically, in Pashto only the agreement for nominative Case between T and the relevant nominal is visible.

6. Case Assignment in Future Tense *Ao* Conjoined Subject Constructions

For the future tense, the behaviour of the conjunct subjects joined through the conjunction *ao* is the same as that for the present and past tense constructions, namely, that they jointly behave like one syntactic unit, without the individual parts asserting themselves.

40. *Zə*   *ao*   *Saleem*   *ba*   *pen*   *mathawo.*
     I.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM   will   pen.ACC   break.1PL
     'I and Saleem will break the pen/ I and Saleem will be breaking the pen.'

Note that both the translations are acceptable depending on the sense that we take of the sentence. However, for ease and economy in derivation we will adopt the former meaning throughout.

41. *Saleem*   *ao*   *Zə*   *ba*   *pen*   *mathawo.*
     Saleem.NOM   and   I.NOM   will   pen.ACC   break.1PL
   'Saleem and I will break the pen.'

42. *Thə*   *ao*   *Saleem*   *ba*   *pen*   *mathawai.*
    you.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM   will   pen.ACC   break.2PL
    'You and Saleem will break the pen'.

43. *Saleem*   *ao*   *thə*   *ba*   *pen*   *mathawai.*
    Saleem.NOM   and   you.NOM   will   pen.ACC   break.2PL
    'Saleem and you will break the pen.'

44. *Hagha*   *ao*   *Saleem*   *ba*   *pen*   *mathawi.*
    he.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM   will   pen.ACC   break.3PL
    'He and Saleem will break the pen.'

45. *Saleem*   *ao*   *hagha*   *ba*   *pen*   *mathawi.*
    Saleem.NOM   and   he.NOM   will   pen.ACC   break.3PL
    'Saleem and he will break the pen.'

These examples again follow the pattern that we have observed for the present and past tense *ao* conjoined subjects, namely, that the subject acts as a syntactic unit despite having two or more parts, and that in the present tense the verb shows agreement with the joint effect of the two conjoined subjects. Thus, in the first pair of examples, i.e. 40 and 41, the conjoined subjects behave like the 1st person plural pronoun in terms of agreement with the verb. In the second pair of examples, i.e. 42 and 43, the conjoined subjects behave like the 2nd person plural pronoun and the conjoined subjects, in the third pair of examples, i.e. 44 and 45, behave like 3rd person plural pronoun in terms of agreement with the verb.

Now, we make a derivation for a future tense sentence, reproduced as example no. 46, below and see how Case is assigned in it to the external argument, i.e. conjoined double subject, and the internal argument.

46. *Zə*   *ao*   *Saleem*   *ba*   *pen*   *mathawo.*
    I.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM   will   pen.ACC   break.1PL
    'I and Saleem will break the pen.'

Thus, the derivation for the future tense is the same except that the Pashto modal clitic *ba* adjoins *v*P, resulting in an extended *v*P. The rest of the processes and valuation/ checking of uninterpretable features remain the same as we have discussed for the present tense. As for our purposes assignment of Case is the most important aspect, therefore, let us see how Case assignment takes place here. An agree relation establishes between *v*, a probe, and the DP *pen* in complement to V position, a goal. As a result of this agree relation the [uϕ] of *v* are valued as 3rd person singular male, while in return, accusative Case is assigned to the DP. However, because of the peculiar nature of Pashto language, this agreement does not get visible.

Figure 3: Derivation for *zə ao Saleem ba pen mathawo (future tense)*

Another agree relation establishes between the conjoined subject *1ˢᵗ PSG ao Saleem*, a goal, and T, a probe, in terms of φ-features. The conjoined subject behaves as a syntactic whole and it shows the phi-features of 1ˢᵗ person plural pronoun. Thus, the [uφ] of T are valued as 1ˢᵗ person plural, and nominative Case is assigned to the conjoined subject, so that both the parts show nominative Case. Because of the nominative Case, the conjoined subject takes the spell-out or morphological form of *zə ao Saleem*. This agreement on T does not get visible on T, as has been the case with other Pashto constructions as well; rather, it gets visible on V.

The example, we discussed, had a noun as its object DP, therefore, we were empirically unable to substantiate the view that the Case is accusative, not nominative. We will now give examples of conjoined subject future tense sentences, which have pronouns used either in the subject or in the object positions, to substantiate our view.

3ʳᵈ Person Pronouns

47. Zə   ao   Saleem   ba   hagha   takhnawo.
I.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM   will   he.distant.NOM   tickle.1PL
'I and Saleem will beat/ will be beating him.'
(Here we use the indefinite aspect for convenience).

48. *Thə   ao   Saleem   ba   hagoi   takhnawai.*
    you.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM will   they.distant.ACC   tickle.2PL
    'You and Saleem will beat them.'

49. *Hagha   ao   Saleem   ba   day   takhnawi.*
    he.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM will   he.near.ACC   tickle.3
    'He and Saleem will beat him.'

50. *Da   ao   Saleem   ba   doi   takhnawi.*
    she.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM will   they.near.ACC   tickle.3
    'She and Saleem will tickle them.'

51. *Doi   ao   Saleem   ba   hagha   takhnawi.*
    they.near.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM   will   he.ACC   tickle.3
    'They and Saleem will tickle him.'

2nd Person Pronouns

52. *Zə   ao   Saleem   ba   tha   takhnawo.*
    I.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM will   you.ACC   tickle.1PL
    'I and Saleem will tickle you.'

53. *Hagha   ao   Saleem   ba   thaso   takhnawi.*
    he.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM will   you.ACC   tickle.3
    'He and Saleem will beat you.'

1st Person Pronouns

54. *Thə   ao   Saleem   ba   ma   takhnawai.*
    you.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM will   I.ACC   tickle.2PL
    'You and Saleem will tickle me.'

55. *Thaso   ao   Saleem   ba   moong   takhnawai.*
    you.NOM   and   Saleem.NOM will   we.ACC   tickle.2PL
    'You and Saleem will tickle us.'

Based on the discussion and examples above, we can make a paradigm for the conjoined/ double subject and object positions along with the morphological cases they exhibit.

Joint Effect of Conjoined Subjects	Subject's Case Form	Object's Case Form
3rd Person Plural (distant)	Nominative	Accusative
3rd Person Plural (near)	Nominative	Accusative
2nd Person Plural	Nominative	Accusative
1st Person Plural	Nominative	Accusative

The examples above and the paradigm once again show that the conjoined subjects in the future tense also behave like a single subject and the verb shows agreement with the joint syntactic and semantic effect of the two conjoined subjects. They also substantiate the hypothesis that ϕ-features agreement between T and the relevant nominal results in nominative Case, while ϕ-features agreement between υ or Voice and the relevant nominal results in accusative Case.

7. Conclusion

In this paper, we analysed the assignment of structural Case in Pashto *ao* conjoined subject constructions. We observed that whereas in other languages, in majority of cases, the verb agrees with either the first conjunct or the last conjunct of the conjoined subject, in Pashto, on the other hand, the verb did not agree with either of the two. Rather, the verb agreed with the joint syntactic and semantic equivalent of the *ao* 'and' conjoined subject. To deal with the situation, we propounded the idea that the *ao* conjoined subject behave as a syntactic whole, thus having one [uCase] feature, and moving to the spec TP as a single unit. Thus, our proposed derivation was able to deal with the *ao* conjoined subject constructions, in the three tenses, effectively.

For structural Case assignment in Pashto *ao* conjoined subject constructions, we proposed that ϕ-features agreement between the functional head T and a nominal results in assigning nominative Case to that nominal, while ϕ-features agreement between the functional head υ or Voice and a nominal results in assigning accusative Case to that nominal. For the present tense *ao* conjoined subject constructions, we saw that the subjects bore nominative Cases while the objects bore accusative Cases. In the past tense, we saw that the conjoined subjects bore accusative Cases while the objects carried nominative Cases. In the future tense constructions, we observed that the conjoined subjects had nominative Cases while the objects had accusative Cases. Thus, these patterns not only substantiated the above stated hypotheses, but also explained the nature of split-ergativity in Pashto, which was nothing but the failure of υ to assign accusative Case in the past tense.

There was an issue, which could prove a profitable arena for future research, but was avoid due to the intensive nature of the project at hand. This issue related to the agreement patterns of Pashto conjoined subject constructions. This could prove an interesting topic, if studied in the light of Marušič, Navins, and Saksida (2007), Bošković (2009, 2010), and Benmamoun et al. (2010). They have tried to present minimalist accounts of conjunct agreements in different languages. Thus, the conjoined subjects agreements in Pashto could lead a long way in paving the way for a cross-linguistic account of conjoined subjects agreement.

Notes

[1] Normally, a capital 'C' is used in spelling for syntactic (abstract/structural) Case, while a small 'c' is used in spelling for semantic cases, morphological cases, and cases in general.

[2] In the first conjunct agreement, the first conjunct of the two preverbal/postverbal conjoined conjuncts agrees with the verb.

[3] In the second or last conjunct agreement, the second or the last conjunct of the two preverbal/postverbal conjoined conjuncts agrees with the verb.

[4] Among Pashto grammarians, there are two schools of thought on the nature of the base form of the verb. Raverty (1855) and most of the traditional grammarians after him believe that 'məsdər' which can be roughly translated as 'infinitive' form, is the base form of the verb in Pashto. This form of verb is characterized by the morphological marking of 'ل' at the end of the word. This is similar to the English alphabet 'L' in its phonetic realization. However, Tegey and Robson (1996) came with the idea that 'infinitive' is not the base form of the verb, rather different verbs have different base forms, having different endings. So following the majority of grammarians our verb will have the base form *lekəl*, while following Tegey and Robson(1996) our verb will have the base form *leek.* On a personal note, we think that the formulation of Tegey and Robson (1996) may have some sophistication but the formulation of the rest of the grammarians has the advantage that it is very easy to learn. To avoid any controversy and to give a comprehensive picture, we have given both forms of the verb.

[5] Hierarchy of Projection Principle is an innovation on the part of Adger (2004). This is what he says about Hierarchy of Projection:

In order to keep the relation between little v and VP conceptually distinct from selection, we will just assume that there is a special Hierarchy of Projections, such that whenever we have a little v, it always has a VP complement. In an intuitive sense, little vP is an extension of the projection of VP, in that it is still verbal, but it adds further semantic information. We will state the Hierarchy of Projections as follows:

(112) v > V

If the Hierarchy of Projection is not met, then the structure will be ruled out. This means, for example, that the following structure is not generated by the system:

(113

$$
\begin{array}{c}
\text{VP} \\
\diagup \quad \diagdown \\
\text{NP} \qquad \text{V} \\
\diagup \quad \diagdown \\
\text{V} \qquad \upsilon\text{P} \\
\diagup \quad \diagdown \\
\upsilon \qquad \text{NP}
\end{array}
$$

VP

NP   V

V υP

υ NP   (Adger, 2004:135)

Later on, he completes his hierarchy of projection and gives it the following order:

"Hierarchy of Projection:
Clausal: C > T > (Neg) > (Perf) > (Prog) > (Pass) > υ > V
Nominal: D > (Poss) > n > N" (p. 333).

The items enclosed in parentheses show that they are optional.

References

Adger, D. (2004). *Core syntax: A minimalist approach*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Al-Balushi, R. A. (2011). *Case in standard Arabic: The untraveled paths* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Toronto, Canada). Retrieved from http://www.tspace.library.utoronto.ca/ .../Al-Balushi_Rashid_A_201106_PhD

Alexiadou, A., & Anagnostopoulou, E. (2006). From hierarchies to features: Person splits and direct-inverse alternations. In C. Boeckx (Ed.), *Agreement systems* (pp. 41-62). Amsterdam, Netherlands: John Benjamins.

Aoun, J., Elabbas, B., & Sportiche, D. (1994). Agreement, word order, and conjunction in some varieties of Arabic. *Linguistic Inquiry, 25*, 195-220.

Arad, M. (1998). *VP-structure and the syntax-lexicon interface* (Doctoral dissertation). University College London, London, UK. Distributed by MIT Working Papers in Linguistics.

Aygen, N. G. (2002). *Finiteness, Case and clausal architecture* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Harvard University, Cambridge, MS.

Baker, M. C. (2008). *The syntax of agreement and concord*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Baker, M. C. (Forthcoming). On agreement and its relationship to Case: Some generative ideas and results. To appear in L. Rizzi (Ed.), special issue of *Lingua*.

Baker, M. C., & Vinokurova, N. (2010). Two modalities of case assignment: Case in Sakha. *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, 28*(3), 593-642.

Bejar, S. (2003). *Phi-syntax: A theory of agreement* (Doctoral dissertation, University of Toronto, Canada). Retrieved from http://www.ai.mit.edu/projects/dm/**bejar**-thesis.pdf

Benmamoun, E., Bhatia, A., & Polinsky, M. (2010). Closest conjunct agreement in head-final languages. In J.V. Craenenbroeck & J. Rooryck (Eds.), *Linguistic variation yearbook 9* (pp. 67-88). Amsterdam, Netherlands: John Benjamins.

Bobaljik, D. J., & Branigan, P. (2006). Eccentric agreement and multiple Case checking. In A. Johns, D. Massam, & J. Ndayiragije (Eds.), *Ergativity: Emerging issues* (pp. 47-77). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer.

Bošković, Z. (2009). Unifying first and last conjunct agreement. *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, 27*(3), 455-496.

Bošković, Z. (2010). Conjunct-sensitive agreement: Serbo-Croatian vs Russian. In G. Zybatow, P. Dudchuk, S. Minor, & E. Pshehotskaya (Eds.), *Formal studies in Slavic linguistics: Proceedings of formal description of Slavic languages 7.5* (pp. 31-47). Frankfurt am Main, Germany: Peter Lang.

Carstens, V. (2001). Multiple agreement and case Deletion: Against φ-(In)completeness. *Syntax, 4*(3), 147-163.

Chomsky, N. (2000). Minimalist inquiries: The framework. In R. Martin, D. Michaels, & J. Uriagereka (Eds.), *Step by step: Essays on minimalist syntax in honor of Howard Lasnik* (pp. 89–156). Cambridge, MS: MIT Press.

Chomsky, N. (2001). Derivation by phase. In M. Kenstowicz (Ed.), *Ken Hale: A life in language* (pp. 1-52). Cambridge, MS: MIT Press.

Chomsky, N. (2005). *On phases*. Cambridge, MS: MIT Press.

Chomsky, N. (2006). *Approaching UG from below*. Cambridge, MS: MIT Press.

Collins, C. (2005). A smuggling approach to the passive in English. *Syntax, 8*(2), 81–120.

Holmberg, A. (2007, August). *Ergativity and clitics in the Iranian languages in a minimalist perspective*. Paper presented at Second International Conference on Iranian Linguistics Asien und Afrika Institut, University of Hamburg, Germany.

Itkonen, T. (1976). Eraan Sijamuodon Ongelmia. *Opusculae Instituti Linguae Fennicae: Universitas Helsinglensis 53*, 173-217.

Kiparsky, P. (1998). Partitive Case and aspect. In M. Butt & W. Geuder (Eds.), *The projection of arguments* (pp. 265-308). Stanford, CF: CSLI.

Kratzer, A. (1996). Severing the external argument from its verb. In J. Rooryck & L. Zaring (Eds.), *Phrase structure and the lexicons* (pp. 109–138). Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer.

Kratzer, A. (2004). Telicity and the meaning of objective Case. In J. Gueron & J. Lacarme (Eds.), *The syntax of time* (pp. 389-424). Cambridge, MS: MIT Press.

Legate, J. A. (2008). Morphological and abstract Case. *Linguistic Inquiry, 39*(1), 55-101.

Marušič, F., Navins, A., & Saksida, A. (2007). Last-conjunct agreement in Slovenian. *FASL, 15*, 210-227.

Masood, T. (2014). *Structural case licensing in Pashto: A minimalist perspective.* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Peshawar, Pakistan.

Masood, T. & Rahman, M. (2013). Structural Case assignment in Pashto unaccusatives. *Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 21*(1) 29-50.

Pesetsky, D., & Torrego, E. (2001). T-to-C movement: Causes and consequences. In M. Kenstowicz (Ed.), *Ken Hale: A life in language* (pp. 355-426). Cambridge, MS: MIT Press.

Ramchand, G. (1997). *Aspect and predication: The semantics of argument structure*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.

Raverty, H. G. (1855). *A grammar of Pukhto, Pushto, or language of the Afghans*. Peshawar, Pakistan: De Chapzai.

Richardson, K. (2007). *Case and aspect in Slavic*. Oxford, UK. Oxford University Press.

Ritter, E., & Wiltschko, M. (2009). Varieties of infl: Tense, location, and person. In J. v. Craenenbroeck & H. v. Riemsdijk (Eds.), *Alternatives to cartography*. Berlin, Germany: Mouton de Gruyter.

Roberts, I. (2010). *Agreement and head movement: Clitics, incorporation, and defective goals*. Cambridge, MS: MIT Press.

Roberts, I. (n.d.). FOFC and the realization of argument structure. Retrieved January 15, 2013, from http//: www.*ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/001504/current.pdf*

Scньtze, C. (1997). *INFL in child and adult language: Agreement, Case, and licensing* (Doctoral dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). Retrieved from http://www.academia.edu/.../INFL_In_Child_and_Adult_Language_Agreemen...

Svenonius, P. (2001). Case and event structure. In N. Zhang (Ed.), *ZAS Papers in Linguistics 26*, 197-217.

Svenonius, P. (2002). Icelandic Case and the structure of events. *Journal of Comparative Germanic Linguistics, 5*(1-3), 197-225.

Tanaka, T. (2005). C, T, and case/agreement: A unified analysis of finite and non-finite clauses. *Journal of Slavic Linguistics,* 1(), 91-105.

Tegey, H., & Robson, B. (1996). *A reference grammar of Pashto*. Washington, DC: Center for Applied Linguistics.

Torrego, E. (1998). *The dependencies of objects*. Cambridge, MS: MIT Press.

Conversation Analysis: Speech Acts in Ibsen's *A Doll's House*

Rubina Rahman, Hina Gul

Department of English & Applied Linguistics, University of Peshawar, Pakistan

_____

Abstract

Conservation analysis has become the focus of investigative interest in recent years among discourse analysts. There is shift towards the investigation of characters in literature through their conversation seen as speech acts. The main goal of this paper is to analyse the use of the locutionary and illocutionary meanings in an extract from Ibsen's *A Doll's House in* order to investigate its impact on the characters' actions and reactions. An examination has been made of the interplay between the direct and indirect speech acts which steer the plot to its inevitable conclusion. Using these speech acts as tool an analysis has been made of the imperative final conversation between Nora and Helmer, which not only forces Helmer to reconsider his attitude but also changes the course of literature written about women in the 19th century.

Keywords: Speech Acts, Conversation Analysis, Illocutionary Acts, Ibsen

_____

Introduction

Austin developed the speech act theory from the basic notion that language is used to do things. For a long time, philosophers believed that the task of a "statement" was only to describe some state of affairs or assess facts, either truly or falsely. They also believed that unless a sentence could be verified (i.e. tested for its truth or falsity) it was, strictly speaking, meaningless. This general notion was the crux of Logical Positivism. It was in this same period, when the Logical Positivism was pervasive in the philosophical circles that Austin propounded his Theory of Speech Act in a set of lectures published in *How to*

Do Things with Words (1962). He rejected the view of language that would consider truth conditions as central to language understanding. "The term speech act does not refer simply to the act of speaking, but to the whole communicative situation, including the context of the utterance…the concern is not so much whether or not an utterance is grammatically correct, but whether or not the speaker achieves her communicative purpose…" (Black; 2006:17).

Austin (1962) proposes that in producing an utterance a speaker performs three acts simultaneously: a locutionary, an illocutionary, and a perlocutionary act. The locutionary act refers to a certain sentence of a language with a definite "sense and reference" (the literal meaning or propositional content). The illocutionary act is the act performed in uttering a sentence in a context. It is the contextual meaning or implicative force of an utterance. Illocutionary acts are the actual statements with performative verbs. According to Levinson the illocutionary act is concerned with "…the making of a statement, offer, promise etc. in uttering a sentence, by the virtue of the conventional *force* associated with it…" (1983:236). Finally, the perlocutionary act is the cause of change or the creation of an effect in the mind of the hearer as a result of producing an utterance which Austin describes as "securing uptake".

Conversation analysis (CA) has taken up the theory of speech acts to decipher the interplay of language and the action within a conversation. "In CA, speech acts are viewed as actions constituted in and through interaction and understood as such by the participants of the interaction" (Lloret, 2001:60). The case for this extension has been argued as "Speech acts are not isolated moves in communication: they appear in more global units of communication, defined as conversation or discourses" (Moeschiler, 2002:240).

Narrative and dramatic literature is peopled with characters that engage in conversation most of the time as the text world unfolds. "If there is one feature that is the hallmark of literature . . . it is the use of *characters*. Literary works tell us about the lives, words, and actions of these individuals…we are not only told about what characters say and do, but actually hear them speak" (Sandler, 2012: 1).

This paper takes an in-depth look into Nora and Helmer's last conversation, after which Nora leaves her home for good in *A Doll's House* by Henrik Ibsen. Using the speech act theory as described in *How to Do Things with Words* by Austin (1962) and *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language* (1969) by Searle as an investigative tool we will analyse the crucial conversation between the two characters especially Nora's utterances where she uses direct speech acts, and what she reserves by using indirect speech acts. We will also

examine the importance of illocutionary speech acts and relate it to Helmer's helpless position at the end of the story. We will try to prove that the responsibility of the play's drastic end lies in Helmer's prejudice as reflected through the dichotomy in his words. Why is it so, and how does Ibsen convey this to his readers? In short, the two main queries to be answered here are; how does the last scene build up linguistically and what speech acts are being used to create the effect successfully?

Method

The primary source in this paper is *A Doll's House* by Henrik Ibsen (1966). Each separate speech act in Act III will be analysed to determine how direct or indirect speech acts, as well as, illocutionary speech acts are used by Ibsen in the play. In addition, the characters' interpretation, response and reaction to each other by the means of these speech acts will be investigated. The interplay of words between Nora and Helmer will be closely observed for understanding the effect of the speech acts on their actions and reactions.

Ibsen's *A Doll's House* is one of the most well-known plays of the modern times; it very effectively drives home the fact that interpretation of what one hears is vital to one's choice of action. The direct and above all the indirect speech acts in the characters' speech determine their selected course of action

A Brief Summary of *A Doll's House*

Nora Helmer is apparently happily married to Torvald Helmer, a lawyer who is about to take over the post of director of the Joint Stock Bank. They have three small children. Nora has a secret to keep, however. Early in their marriage Torvald became seriously ill, and the doctors advised a stay in a more southerly climate. Nora had to get hold of the money for the journey in secrecy and so borrowed it from Krogstad, a lawyer who had been a fellow-student of Torvald`s. As security for the loan she forged her dying father`s signature. Ever since then she has saved some of the housekeeping money in order to pay back the loan with interest, and she has taken on small jobs to earn some money herself. When the play opens, an old friend of Nora`s, Mrs. Linde, has arrived in town to look for work, and Nora sees to it that Torvald gives her a post at the bank. But this means that Krogstad is dismissed from his post at the bank, and in desperation he goes to Nora and threatens to tell Torvald about the loan and the forgery unless he is allowed to keep his post. Nora is in despair but at the same time convinced that in his love for her, Torvald will sacrifice himself and take full responsibility for what she has done, if he learns the truth. Nora considers asking Dr. Rank, an old friend of the family, for the

money, but when he declares his love for her, she finds it impossible to ask him. Torvald finds out what has happened, and reacts with rage and revulsion, without any sign of being willing to accept responsibility for the forgery. Mrs. Linde, who was in love with Krogstad in the past, gets him to change his mind and withdraw his threats. But Nora has begun to understand that her marriage is not what she thought it was, and in the course of a dramatic conversation with Torvald she decides that her most important and only task is to go out into the world on her own to "bring herself up", and she leaves her husband and children. (McFarlane, 1961)

Analysis of *A Doll's House*, Act III

In the analysis the scene has been divided into smaller parts, which will be examined separately. To make it easier for the reader to follow, the lines are given before the analysis comes. All the lines in this analysis are taken from Act 1, scene III, page.66-72, of *A Doll's House*, published in 1966 by Airmont Publications. The analysis starts where Helmer receives Krogstad's second letter in which he assures him that their secret will not be revealed and ends where Nora finally leaves her home.

NORA: I have fought a hard fight these three days.

HELMER: And suffered agonies, and seen no way out but—. No, we won't call any of the horrors to mind. We will only shout with joy, and keep saying, "It's all over! It's all over!" Listen to me, Nora. You don't seem to realize that it is all over. What is this?—such a cold, set face! My poor little Nora, I quite understand; you don't feel as if you could believe that I have forgiven you. But it is true, Nora, I swear it; I have forgiven you everything. I know that what you did, you did out of love for me. (Ibsen, 1966: 65-66)

The response given by Helmer performs the assertive role of speech. Nora chooses the pronoun 'I' to describe her agony in suffering alone for keeping the secret of Krogstad's letter. Helmer in response tries to hide his guilt by using 'we', as if he felt the pain which Nora went through. Again he stresses that she did not seem to realize what he had been through following the assertive role of language. The illocutionary meaning of Helmer's speech is to convince Nora that his act of forgiveness covers up the gravity of his previous speech. But unexpectedly the perlocutionary effect of the speech is quite the opposite of Helmer's expectations. Finally, he ends the dialogue with an expressive where he condescendingly refers to her sacrifice and his apparent acknowledgement of the sacrifice.

NORA: That is true.

HELMER: You have loved me as a wife ought to love her husband. Only you had not sufficient knowledge to judge of the means you used. But do you suppose you are any the less dear to me, because you don't understand how to act on your own responsibility? No, no; only lean on me; I will advise you and direct you. I should not be a man if this womanly helplessness did not just give you a double attractiveness in my eyes. You must not think any more about the hard things I said in my first moment of consternation, when I thought everything was going to overwhelm me. I have forgiven you, Nora; I swear to you I have forgiven you. (Ibsen, 1966:66)

The "that is true" of Nora is a sarcastic remark which Helmer miscomprehends. At the same time, it is a remark of Nora's repulsion of her own naivety in serving Helmer selflessly and blindly. Helmer uses a directive in choosing the words "ought to" when he should have been more 'expressive' in accepting his early tirade. He further carries on in indirect speech by telling her to lean on him, and puts all the responsibility of what she did on her alone. He is the centre of the speech he is delivering and easily condones what was completely unbearable. The illocutionary meaning of the dialogues above shows Helmer's attempt at winning back his wife, who has finally seen his real man behind the mask of self-complacency. He carefully avoids the word aggression or blind-fold abuse and calls his violent behaviour a 'moment of consternation.' The immediate perlocutionary effect of the dialogue is that Nora goes to change her dress in order to take charge of her new life.

NORA: Thank you for your forgiveness. [She goes out through the door to the right.]

HELMER: No, don't go —. [Looks in.] What are you doing in there?

NORA: [from within].Taking off my fancy dress.

HELMER: [standing at the open door]. Yes, do. Try and calm yourself, and make your mind easy again, my frightened little singing-bird. Be at rest, and feel secure; I have broad wings to shelter you under. [Walks up and down by the door.] How warm and cosy our home is, Nora. Here is shelter for you; here I will protect you like a hunted dove that I have saved from a hawk's claws; I will bring peace to your poor beating heart. It will come, little by little, Nora, believe me. Tomorrow morning you will look upon it all quite differently; soon everything will be just as it was before. Very soon

you won't need me to assure you that I have forgiven you; you will yourself feel the certainty that I have done so. Can you suppose I should ever think of such a thing as repudiating you, or even reproaching you? You have no idea what a true man's heart is like, Nora. There is something so indescribably sweet and satisfying, to a man, in the knowledge that he has forgiven his wife—forgiven her freely, and with all his heart. It seems as if that had made her, as it were, doubly his own; he has given her a new life, so to speak; and she has in a way become both wife and child to him. So you shall be for me after this, my little scared, helpless darling. Have no anxiety about anything, Nora; only be frank and open with me, and I will serve as will and conscience both to you—. What is this? Not gone to bed? Have you changed your things? (Ibsen, 1966: 66)

The expression of gratitude in the dialogue is in indirect speech act which Nora chooses in order to escape Helmer's outright lies. But her leaving the room shows she did not mean it. Referring to the 'fancy dress' is also an indirect speech act which she uses to assert her refusal to act as an 'actor' anymore. The many commissives that Helmer use play the role of directives as he indirectly suggests to Nora not to think of his reproachful attitude and rather think of his generosity in forgiving her. He also promises her to provide her with a safe home where she would not need to fear anyone. He uses many declaratives which are indeed quite opposed to his earlier behavior. Instead of using any direct speech in admitting his aggressive behavior he, implicitly, tries to manipulate with Nora's mind. At the end, when he sees Nora in a different dress he uses an interrogative only to show his surprise at her lack of response to his speech and her noncompliance with his wishes. The perlocutionary result of Helmer's speech does not go in accordance to his wishes as his words imply one thing but his intentions are the opposite.

NORA: [in everyday dress]. Yes, Torvald, I have changed my things now.

HELMER: But what for?—so late as this.

NORA: I shall not sleep to-night.

HELMER: But, my dear Nora—

NORA: [looking at her watch]. It is not so very late. Sit down here, Torvald. You and I have much to say to one another. [She sits down at one side of the table.]

HELMER: Nora—what is this?—this cold, set face?

NORA: Sit down. It will take some time; I have a lot to talk over with you.

HELMER: [sits down at the opposite side of the table]. You alarm me, Nora!—
         and I don't understand you. (Ibsen, 1966: 66-67)

Though Helmer could see Nora in a plain everyday dress, he expresses his concern at Nora's changed attire. Nora simply affirms to his surprised query but she indirectly suggests to Helmer that it is not too late to for any step that she might take after changing her dress or after deciding not to do what he always wished. She uses assertive speech when she says they need to talk but the effect of the words is that of a directive as never before had Nora insisted on anything so firmly. Helmer tries to intimidate her when he refers to her cold face, but Nora keeps her cool and unlike Helmer, she uses a direct speech in order to have one last conversation with him. Helmer's alarm at Nora's behavior is shown in the expressive dialogue he utters which for the first time shows his concern at the seriousness of the situation at hand.

NORA: No, that is just it. You don't understand me, and I have never
          understood you either—before to-night. No, you mustn't interrupt
          me. You must simply listen to what I say. Torvald, this is a settling
          of accounts.

HELMER: What do you mean by that?

NORA: [after a short silence]. Isn't there one thing that strikes you as
          strange in our sitting here like this?

HELMER: What is that?

NORA: We have been married now eight years. Does it not occur to you
          that this is the first time we two, you and I, husband and wife, have
          had a serious conversation? (Ibsen, 1966: 67)

Nora in reply to Helmer simply agrees with him and further asserts that they never understood each other. She also for the first time uses a directive in stopping him to interrupt her as she is up to settle her account with Helmer. Again Helmer demands an explanation and it is Nora who is in charge of the conversation and takes it further by being 'expressive' in not having a single serious conversation in the eight years of their marriage. The interrogation at the end of the dialogue is more of a complaint than a question that needs a reply in the affirmative. In contrast to Helmer, Nora is ore clear in her speech and no more is there any discrepancy between what she says and what she does.

HELMER: What do you mean by serious?

NORA: In all these eight years—longer than that—from the very beginning of our acquaintance, we have never exchanged a word on any serious subject.

HELMER: Was it likely that I would be continually and for ever telling you about worries that you could not help me to bear?

NORA: I am not speaking about business matters. I say that we have never sat down in earnest together to try and get at the bottom of anything.

HELMER: But, dearest Nora, would it have been any good to you?

NORA: That is just it; you have never understood me. I have been greatly wronged, Torvald—first by papa and then by you.

HELMER: What! By us two—by us two, who have loved you better than anyone else in the world?

NORA: [shaking her head]. You have never loved me. You have only thought it pleasant to be in love with me.

HELMER: Nora, what do I hear you saying? (Ibsen, 1966: 67)

The dialogues above are examples of expressives by Nora. She complains to him that they never had a serious conversation ever in the life that they spent together. Though, he uses interrogative in order to justify his case, he is actually, indirectly, suggesting to Nora, it would not have been of any use to her being a part of any serious conversation. Nora, by this time, has gained the courage to choose to use direct speech and complains openly of how Helmer and her father had in the guise of love wronged her most. She even asserts that his love was only a fancy to keep him entertained with. Helmer in the last dialogue finds it hard to believe and though he quite understands what she says, he shows his ignorance of the words she speaks. A little later in the scene we find Nora who takes a decision to educate herself and find her own way in life.

NORA: Indeed, you were perfectly right. I am not fit for the task. There is another task I must undertake first. I must try and educate myself— you are not the man to help me in that. I must do that for myself. And that is why I am going to leave you now.

HELMER: [springing up]. What do you say?

NORA: I must stand quite alone, if I am to understand myself and everything about me. It is for that reason that I cannot remain with you any longer.

HELMER: Nora, Nora!

NORA: I am going away from here now, at once. I am sure Christine will take me in for the night—

HELMER: You are out of your mind! I won't allow it! I forbid you!

NORA: It is no use forbidding me anything any longer. I will take with me what belongs to myself. I will take nothing from you, either now or later.

HELMER: What sort of madness is this!

NORA: To-morrow I shall go home — I mean, to my old home. It will be easiest for me to find something to do there.

HELMER: You blind, foolish woman!

NORA: I must try and get some sense, Torvald.

HELMER: To desert your home, your husband and your children! And you don't consider what people will say!

NORA: I cannot consider that at all. I only know that it is necessary for me. (Ibsen, 1966: 68-69)

The dialogues above show a different Nora, whose most utterances are in direct speech and straight declaratives and assertives. She takes the decision of no more living a life of passive subservience in which she only had to take directives from Helmer. Helmer uses traditional tools of subjugating Nora by threatening her about society and religion, but only to save his own social position. But Nora once and for all decides to direct her life in the way she deems best.

HELMER: It's shocking. This is how you would neglect your most sacred duties.

NORA: What do you consider my most sacred duties?

HELMER: Do I need to tell you that? Are they not your duties to your husband and your children?

NORA: I have other duties just as sacred.

HELMER: That you have not. What duties could those be?

NORA.   Duties to myself.

HELMER: Before all else, you are a wife and a mother.

NORA: I don't believe that any longer. I believe that before all else I am a reasonable human being, just as you are—or, at all events, that I must try and become one. I know quite well, Torvald, that most people would think you right, and that views of that kind are to be found in books; but I can no longer content myself with what most people say, or with what is found in books. I must think over things for myself and get to understand them.

HELMER: Can you not understand your place in your own home? Have you not a reliable guide in such matters as that?—have you no religion?

NORA: I am afraid, Torvald, I do not exactly know what religion is.

HELMER: What are you saying?

NORA: I know nothing but what the clergyman said, when I went to be confirmed. He told us that religion was this, and that, and the other. When I am away from all this, and am alone, I will look into that matter too. I will see if what the clergyman said is true, or at all events if it is true for me. (Ibsen, 1966: 69)

The final few dialogues show Nora's use of declaratives and assertives as representation of her newly realized self. Helmer turns more towards commissives when he threatens Nora in the name of religion and sacred duty. Apparently, he uses directives in questioning her about religion and her sacred duties but they actually play the role of commissives to force Nora into staying at her home. Helmer's locutionary utterances and illocutionary meanings have a wide gap between them. But in contrast to Nora's pleadings and expressives used at the beginning of their final conversation, she prefers to uses more declaratives and assertive. She puts into question religion which she blindly follows. She declares her will in questioning all that she had believed in till that time. It can be said that the perlocutionary effect of Helmer's words was quite the opposite of what he expected. No more can he use his speech in sabotaging his wife who is no more a care taker of his and his children.

A little later in the act Helmer continues to convince Nora to take her words back and says:

HELMER: And can you tell me what I have done to forfeit your love?

NORA: Yes, indeed I can. It was to-night, when the wonderful thing did not happen; then I saw you were not the man I had thought you were.

HELMER: Explain yourself better. I don't understand you.

NORA: I have waited so patiently for eight years; for, goodness knows, I knew very well that wonderful things don't happen every day. Then this horrible misfortune came upon me; and then I felt quite certain that the wonderful thing was going to happen at last. When Krogstad's letter was lying out there, never for a moment did I imagine that you would consent to accept this man's conditions. I was so absolutely certain that you would say to him: Publish the thing to the whole world. And when that was done—

HELMER: Yes, what then?—when I had exposed my wife to shame and disgrace?

NORA: When that was done, I was so absolutely certain, you would come forward and take everything upon yourself, and say: I am the guilty one.

HELMER: Nora—!

NORA: You mean that I would never have accepted such a sacrifice on your part? No, of course not. But what would my assurances have been worth against yours? That was the wonderful thing which I hoped for and feared; and it was to prevent that, that I wanted to kill myself.

HELMER: I would gladly work night and day for you, Nora—bear sorrow and want for your sake. But no man would sacrifice his honour for the one he loves.

NORA: It is a thing hundreds of thousands of women have done.

HELMER: Oh, you think and talk like a heedless child.

NORA: Maybe. But you neither think nor talk like the man I could bind myself to. As soon as your fear was over—and it was not fear for what threatened me, but for what might happen to you—when the whole thing was past, as far as you were concerned it was exactly as if nothing at all had happened. Exactly as before, I was your little skylark, your doll, which you would in future treat with doubly gentle care, because it was so brittle and fragile. [Getting up] Torvald—it was then it dawned upon me that for eight years I had been living here with a strange man, and had borne him three

children—. Oh, I can't bear to think of it! I could tear myself into little bits!

HELMER: Nora, Nora, not now! Wait till to-morrow. (Ibsen, 1966:70-71)

The dialogues above show Nora's complain and report on what so drastically changed her outlook on life. When Helmer tries to baffle her with his questions, Nora clearly reveals to him all that she would never think of discussing before. He often uses directives in order to threaten or warn her but Nora carries on with her complain and her disappointment with Helmer at a time when she most needed him. Her speech forces him to assert him position and state that he could not sacrifice his honor for her sake. Later, we see Helmer's utterances are only to evade reality and put things back in the way he wanted to but Nora's speech and its perlocutionary effect is more forceful in finally making Helmer realize the meanness of his character. When Nora expresses her disgust at the thought of bearing him three children and living with a complete stranger, Helmer switches his commissive mode of speech to expressive in begging and pleading her to stay and not to leave him alone.

NORA: [putting on her cloak]. I cannot spend the night in a strange man's room.

HELMER: But can't we live here like brother and sister—?

NORA: [putting on her hat]. You know very well that would not last long. [Puts the shawl round her.] Good-bye, Torvald. I won't see the little ones. I know they are in better hands than mine. As I am now, I can be of no use to them.

HELMER: But some day, Nora—some day?

NORA: How can I tell? I have no idea what is going to become of me.

HELMER: But you are my wife, whatever becomes of you.

NORA: Listen, Torvald. I have heard that when a wife deserts her husband's house, as I am doing now, he is legally freed from all obligations towards her. In any case, I set you free from all your obligations. You are not to feel yourself bound in the slightest way, any more than I shall. There must be perfect freedom on both sides. See, here is your ring back. Give me mine.

HELMER: That too?

NORA: That too.

HELMER: Here it is.

NORA: That's right. Now it is all over. I have put the keys here. The maids know all about everything in the house—better than I do. To-morrow, after I have left her, Christine will come here and pack up my own things that I brought with me from home. I will have them sent after me. (Ibsen, 1966: 71-72)

This part of conversation is almost the penultimate point of Helmer and Nora's relationship. The expressive and commissives in the form of apologies and vows that Helmer offers only fall on deaf ears. The illocutionary implications of his speech throughout are based on bad faith. Maybe that is the reason that the perlocution of the speech brings on completely contrasting results. Nora leaves her children and tells Helmer that they are in better hands as he had declared her incapable of taking care of them. She also returns his ring as a result of his words that were enough to shatter her world. Finally, Nora directs Helmer with regards to her things at home, she asks him that she would have her things sent after her, in order to show she was not going to leave home empty handed. The shift in the use of directives and expressive for the use of declaratives and assertive shows the shift of power from Helmer to Nora. At the same time the perlocutionary effect of Nora's dialogues become stronger as compared to Helmer's.

HELMER: All over! All over!—Nora, shall you never think of me again?

NORA: I know I shall often think of you and the children and this house.

HELMER: May I write to you, Nora?

NORA: No—never. You must not do that.

HELMER: But at least let me send you—

NORA: Nothing—nothing—

HELMER: Let me help you if you are in want.

NORA: No. I can receive nothing from a stranger.

HELMER: Nora—can I never be anything more than a stranger to you?

NORA: [taking her bag]. Ah, Torvald, the most wonderful thing of all would have to happen.

HELMER: Tell me what that would be!

NORA: Both you and I would have to be so changed that—. Oh, Torvald, I don't believe any longer in wonderful things happening.

HELMER: But I will believe in it. Tell me? So changed that—?

NORA: That our life together would be a real wedlock. Good-bye. [She goes out through the hall.]

HELMER: [sinks down on a chair at the door and buries his face in his hands]. Nora! Nora! [Looks round, and rises.] Empty. She is gone. [A hope flashes across his mind.] The most wonderful thing of all—?

[The sound of a door shutting is heard from below.] (Ibsen, 1966:72)

The final action shows the complete shift of control from Helmer to Nora. The expressive pleadings and threatening finally fail to convince Nora to change her decision about her life. Her final act is the strongest of the perlocutionary acts which took place in the play. It not only shook Helmer's life but it made a mark throughout history for the determination of a woman who takes charge of her life. Helmer's *'All over! All over!'* reflects the helplessness which Nora felt at the beginning of the third act of the play. The interrogatives in the dialogues above show Helmer's genuine concern at Nora's leaving as opposed to his sarcasm a little while earlier. Nora recognizes the importance of language that was used throughout her life in order to manipulate and control her life. She does not hide her feelings for once in the final conversation that she has at her home. She is not afraid to express her feelings, either directly or indirectly. Perhaps Nora's long time silence was the very reason that kept the relation between the two so claustrophobic but the moment she sees the doom in their relationship, she does not fail to recognize that her freedom of speech and expression was and is verily *the most wonderful thing* she had been looking for all her life.

Discussion

The analysis of the text shows the shift that takes place in the power and control of the situations in the play. The locutionary words and their illocutionary meanings often do not correspond with one another. As a result, the perlocutionary effect of the utterances also varies. At the beginning of the conversation we see Helmer more in control as he accuses Nora of being involved in a fraudulent activity. He makes her feel guilty for what she had done. He uses more assertives in his dialogues as he believes whatever he says, he can justify it. Nora, on the other hand, is more defensive, apologetic and uses more expressives in her dialogues. Helmer uses directives in order to be

sarcastic with Nora and suggestive of how she should be dependent on Helmer for anything she does in her life. He also takes commissives as his option to threaten Nora to take back her decision of leaving home. At the same time, we find that Helmer's speech is driven by his selfishness and that is why he says one thing but means quite the other. That must be the reason that the effect of Helmer's speech fall on deaf ears and they remain as unconvincing as they were at the beginning. Nora, on the other hand, is more stable in her use of language. She adopts more assertive tone in order to make herself clear to her husband. She prefers to talk in a language which is not fashioned to evade the matter at hand but to make clear for her the path she intends to move on. We also rarely find any discrepancy between the locutionary and illocutionary meanings of Nora's utterances. It can also be noted that the perlocutionary power of Nora's speech is stronger than Helmer's as it makes Helmer ponder over his helplessness without Nora. It is this precise power which changes Helmer's commanding and accusing tone to a pleading and apologizing one. Nora's departure at the end speaks more loudly about her relationship with Helmer and she requires no more words to explain her belief in miracles, because she herself performs the most wonderful thing of all, that she was searching for all her life.

It can be concluded from the analysis that the motivation of the speakers decides whether they use direct or indirect speech. The various speech acts provide the speakers an opportunity to obliquely communicate multiple meanings without actually stating them. They help not only to camouflage the speakers' intentions but are also used to reinforce the perlocutionary effects on the hearer. In order to understand fully appreciate and comprehend drama it is very important to understand not only the literary and figurative language and images used but equally important is the deciphering of the speech acts as they reveal more about the characters than what can be discerned on the surface.

References

Austin, J.L. (1962) *How to Do Things with Words*. Oxford: Clarendon

Black, E. (2006) *Pragmatic Stylistics.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press

Ibsen, H. (1966) *Four Major Plays*. New York: Airmont Publishing Company

Levinson, S.C. (1981) 'The essential inadequacies of speech act models of dialogue' in Herman,P., Sbisa,M. & Verschueren.S. (eds.) *Possibilities and Limitations of Pragmatics* (Studies in Language Companion Series). pp. 473-492 Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins

Levinson,S.C. (1983) *Pragmatics.* Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics. Cambridge: CUP

Lloret-Gonzólez, M. (2001) 'Conversation analysis and speech act performance' in Martinez-Flor, A. and Uso;Juan, E. (eds.) *Speech Act Performance: Theoretical, Empirical and Methodological Issues* Amsterdam / Philadelphia: John Benjamin Publishing Company.

McFarlane, J. W. (Ed. & Trans.). (1961). *The Oxford Ibsen Volume V.* London: OUP.

Moeschler, J. (2002) 'Speech act theory and the analysis of conversations in Vanderveken, D. and Kubo, S. (eds.) *Essays in Speech Act Theory.* Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company

Oishi, E. (2006) 'Austin's Speech Act Theory and the Speech Situation' *Esercizi Filosofici,* pp. 1-14

Sandler, S. (2012). *Language as literature: Characters in everyday spoken discourse.* Paper delivered at the 14th international IADA conference, Turku, Finland, April 2-4 2012

Searle, J. R. (1969) *Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.* London: CUP

Searle, J. R. (1999). *Mind, Language, and Society: Philosophy in the Real World.* Phoenix: Guernsey Press Co.

An Exercise in Literary Stylistics/Cognitive Poetics:
"Humanity i love you" by *e.e.* cummings

Humera Rahman[*], Mujib Rahman

Department of English & Applied Linguistics, University of Peshawar, Pakistan

---

Abstract

Literature, poetry in particular, has always intrigued readers, especially those who have an interest in delving deeper into it with a view to appreciating and interpreting it, such as literary critics, linguists, literary stylists, and more recently, cognitive linguists. The literary critic looks at it from an aesthetic point of view whereas the literary stylist and the cognitive linguist from the linguistic point of view with the latter adding a cognitive dimension to their interpretation. The most prevalent approach to studying poetry in Pakistan is the literary criticism approach. Very few would study literature through linguistics. Intrigued by both literary stylistics and cognitive linguistics, we studied some very obscure poems through these two approaches and discovered that they indeed were helpful in illuminating some of the hitherto obfuscated areas of those poems. In this essay, we present an application of literary stylistics and cognitive poetics to a poem by *e. e.* cummings, "Humanity I love you."

Keywords: Literary stylistics; cognitive poetics; *e.e.* cummings; humanity I love you.

1.0   Introduction

Literature is no longer the darling of literary critics; linguists, literary stylists, cognitive scientists have all shown a profound interest in the language of literature. Short (1996:1) defines literary stylistics as "an approach to the analysis of (literary) texts using *linguistic* description." As such, literary stylistics is the study and

---

[*] MS (Applied Linguistics) Scholar (2008-2010)

description of the choices of linguistic expression that are characteristic of literary works. Referring to literature as "the uses of language in its most prestigious form," Stockwell (2009:26) argues that cognitive poetics as a discipline takes a holistic approach towards works of literature. However, he prudently cautions against believing that cognitive poetics has 'predictive power,' that it can offer interpretations (Stockwell, 2002:7). In his view, a "cognitive poetic analysis offers a raised awareness of certain [linguistic] patterns that might have been subconscious or not even noticed at all" (2002:7). Finally, Stockwell (2002) proposes that the analysis of literary works must try to bring "the dynamic and readerly aspects of texts" together, making the reader "an inherent part of the analytical theory" (p. 136).

For our analysis, we have chosen a poem by e.e. cummings, for he has a unique style of writing poetry. Most of his poems are difficult to understand and, therefore, often misunderstood. His poetry is marked by three unique features. First, the pronoun "i" is always used in the lower case. This may be interpreted as showing humility or an effacement of the "self" — all other pronouns, in sentence medial positions, are written in lower case; so what is so special about the first person singular? However, when he uses capitalisation, he means to emphasize certain concepts; such as, "Humanity i love you." Second is the absence of punctuation altogether, which sometimes vexes the reader. Third, Cummings uses a very unusual syntax, seemingly "incorrect," in order to elucidate the meanings of his poems. His poetry, therefore, is rich with features that have been the darling objects of literary stylistics, and now those of cognitive poetics; namely, deviation and foregrounding or *figure* and *ground* (Stockwell, 2002).

In this brief essay, we shall try to show, in the words of Short (1996:27), that "detailed and systematic stylistic analysis can be seen as an aid to our understanding and appreciation of the text under discussion as well as providing a rational language-based account *to support interpretation and giving insights into the processes by which we interpret when we read*" (emphasis added). Thus, Short (1996) and Stockwell (2002) seem to concur that literary stylistics and cognitive poetics do not interpret literature *per se*, but aid readers in their interpretation. Our analysis of the poem seems to confirm Toolan's (2010:203) assertion that poets can show us "how language works . . . what language can do" and that linguists can learn from poets about "our language and language-making potential."

2.0   Literary Stylistics

Stylistics or literary stylistics is a twentieth century phenomenon, particularly of the 1960s.   Since the term 'stylistics' derives from 'style' (associated with literary

criticism) and 'istics' (from linguistics), stylistics is at the interface of the two disciplines (Widdowson, 1984). Stylistic features are basically features of language, so style in one sense is synonymous with language, the manner of expression in writing (and speaking): for example, we can speak of the 'language' of *Paradise Lost*, which implies that the language is in some way distinctive or significant for the design or theme of the poem. Style may also refer to the collective set of linguistic features peculiar to, or characteristic of an author. Hence, in literary criticism, we encounter such phrases as Miltonic style, or Shakespearean style. Literary Stylistics is, thus, concerned with discovering linguistic features peculiar to, or characteristic of an author as a whole or in an individual work. Vis-a-vis poetry, literary stylisticians focus on one paramount feature of poetry to achieve this goal: **foregrounding**.

Introduced by Garvin (1964), *foregrounding* is a popular term in stylistics, which means "the throwing into relief, or the highlighting, of a linguistic sign against the background of expected norms of language use or against what is taken for granted in order to surprise or shock the reader with a fresh awareness."

Foregrounding is achieved by a variety of means, which are grouped under two main headings: **deviation** and **repetition**; or **paradigmatic** and **syntagmatic** foregrounding respectively (Leech, 1965). Deviations are violations of linguistic norms, grammatical or semantic. For example, unusual metaphors or similes come at once to the attention of the reader and hence are foregrounded. Repetition is also a kind of deviation, for it violates the normal rules of usage by over-frequency. Repetitive patterns (of sound or syntax) are superimposed on the normal background and so strike the reader's attention as unusual. Alliteration, assonance, consonance, parallelism and many other figures of speech involving repetition of lexical items and sounds are thus commonly used to achieve foregrounding.

Poets use language creatively by transcending the limitations of ordinary language, which takes it beyond the scope of linguistics (Leech, 2008: 26). However, Leech further argues that "meaning in literature cannot be studied without reference to the observable patterns of language" (p. 26) — which is a linguist's object of study.

A caution is warranted, though: the goal of literary stylistics is not simply to describe the formal features of texts *per se*, but to show their functional significance for the interpretation of literary texts; or to relate literary effects to linguistic 'causes' where these are considered to be relevant. According to Toolan:

> If I try to sum up what poets show and tell linguists it would be that language can always be adapted and refashioned, to meet and to articulate or construe new demands, new circumstances. No arena of

human activity so eloquently demonstrates the indeterminacy and impermanence of language, the potential specificity or uniqueness or newness of the meanings it enables, than literary art. (Toolan, 2010:201)

Let us now turn to a discussion of cognitive poetics and see how could it be useful to the study of literary texts.

3.0   Cognitive Poetics

While literary stylistics focuses its attention entirely on the workings of the text alone, cognitive poetics tries to understand the workings of the reader's mind by focusing on how the same text is cognitively perceived, processed and understood. According to Langacker (1998:1), cognitive linguistics looks at linguistic structure "in terms of more basic systems and abilities (e.g. perception, attention, categorization) from which it cannot be dissociated." Similarly, in his book, *The Poetics of Mind*, Gibbs, Jr. (1994) writes at length about human cognition, language, thought, and poetic thinking:

> human cognition is fundamentally shaped by various poetic or figurative processes. Metaphor, metonymy, irony, and other tropes are not linguistic distractions of literal mental thought but constitute basic schemes by which people conceptualize their experience and the external world. Since every mental construct reflects an adaptation of the mind to the world, the language that expresses these constructs attests to the continuous process of poetic thinking. (p. 1)

This is eloquently put. Our cognitive development kicked off as soon as we opened our eyes in this world. We began to perceive and experience the external world, conceptualising every experience cognitively through the medium of language, both figurative and non-figurative. When we encounter language, the reverse happens: we return to the same cognitive processes that were triggered off by our experiences of the external world in the first place. Doing cognitive poetics, as such, is based on "our experience of the world and the way we perceive and conceptualise it" (Ungerer & Schmid, 1996:x).

Since "metaphor is primarily an issue of conceptualisation" (Hiraga, 2005;25), metaphors in spoken, written and poetic discourse may be better interpreted and understood through a cognitive approach, metaphor being 'a cognitive process in which one set of concepts is understood in terms of another' (Deane, 1995:628 – as cited by Hiraga, 2005:26). Metaphors are cognitive "mappings across conceptual domains" (Lakoff, 1993:245). This happens because "the particular

content of a metaphor can be said to constitute an interpretation of reality in terms of mental icons that literally allows us to *see* what is being talked about" (Danesi, 1995:266, original emphasis).

Freeman (2005) provides a non-exhaustive list of questions that cognitive poetics may try to address:

- What elements of literary discourse are common to human reasoning in general and what distinguishes the literary from the non-literary?
- What can literary creativity tell us about mind/brain processes and their emotional affects?
- What are the mechanisms that enable creativity to occur and to be recognized and understood?
- What can a cognitive study of literature contribute to the question of what cognitive strategies are universal and what culturally bound? (p. 3)

Hence, cognitive poetics "aims more to supplement than to supplant the current approaches and methodologies" (Richardson & Steen, 2002:2).

3.0   Approach and Material

3.1   Approach

Although a number of approaches to stylistic analysis are available (Leech, 1969; Widdowson, 1974; Cluysennar, 1976; Short, 1996, etc.), I will follow Short's approach (1996), being the latest, for the analysis of the chosen poem along with a cognitive commentary wherever applicable.

Short (1996) focuses on three areas of poetic discourse: a) foregrounding, b) style variation in texts, and c) sound, meaning and effect. Foregrounding is achieved through deviation and parallelism. Short lists seven types of deviations: i) discoursal, ii) semantic iii) lexical, iv) grammatical, v) morphological, vi) phonological/graphological, and vii) Internal & external deviation.

It is not probable that one will find all of these features in a single poem; however, I shall attempt to present, explain, and discuss whatever features I should be able to discover in the poem.

3.2   Material: The Text of the Poem

As mentioned in the introduction, I have selected "Humanity i love you" by e.e. cummings as the poem for analysis. In this poem, cummings illustrates the faults of

humanity through a combination of structural changes, figurative language, and ironic visual imagery. The poem is interesting in the sense that it begins with the words "Humanity i love you" which statement is then repeated two more times after regular intervals before it ends with the statement "Humanity / i hate you."

Humanity i love you

<u>Humanity i love you</u>
because you would rather <u>black the boots of</u>
<u>success</u> than enquire whose <u>soul dangles from his</u>
<u>watch-chain</u> which would be embarrassing for both

parties and because you   5
unflinchingly applaud all
songs containing the words country home and
mother when sung at <u>the old howard</u>

Humanity i love you because
when <u>you're hard up</u> you <u>pawn your</u>   10
<u>intelligence</u> to buy a drink and <u>when</u>
<u>you're flush</u> pride keeps

you from the pawn shops and
because you are continually <u>committing</u>
<u>nuisances</u> but more   15
especially in your own house

Humanity i love you because you
are perpetually <u>putting the secret of</u>
<u>life in your pants</u> and forgetting
it's there and sitting down   20

on it
and because you are
forever making poems in <u>the lap</u>
<u>of death</u> Humanity

<u>i hate you</u>   25

The **_Old Howard_** Theatre was a famous burlesque house located in Boston, Massachusetts, USA's erstwhile Scollay Square.

flush: well-off, in the money.

Quite cynical in nature, this poem describes cummings' disgust with classes in society and, obviously, humanity in general (due to his experience with war?). Cummings uses material metaphors to stress the selfishness of humanity. Watching blatant disregard for the downtrodden can cause one to repudiate humanity and despise it. In reality, what *e.e.* cummings is trying to say is "Humanity / i hate you."

4.0   Analysis and Discussion

The poem is straightforward as far as syntax is concerned. There are no glaring examples of syntactic deviations. When read aloud, one feels a flow that is characteristic of spontaneous speech. One may also note the abundant use of the conjunctions, 'and' (used seven times) and 'because' (used six times), which is again a feature of extemporaneous speech. Following is a phrase by phrase/clause by clause analysis of the poem.

"Humanity i love you"

The poem begins with a pronouncement, reiterating the title of the poem. We know that *e.e.* cummings usually uses lower case letters throughout; as such, "Humanity" with a capital beginning is unusual and must be significant. It is also *deviant* from the norms of cummings' own style. The first person pronoun is in lower case as usual putting it in contrast with "Humanity" thus *foregrounding* "Humanity." Personified and apostrophised, 'Humanity' in sentence initial position due to inversion stands out as the 'figure' against the 'ground'.

"because you would rather black the boots of / success"

"*Black the boots of/success*" refers to the shoe polishing trade in the streets of the United States. Cummings may be cynically referring to the way it is done: the person getting his shoes polished keeps the shoes on while the person (usually a boy) polishing his shoes sits on the ground in his feet. The word, "black" seems to have double *entendre* since these boys/persons are commonly black. "Success" is used as a personified **metonymy** for successful people, the elite class. A phrase in English, '*to lick the boots of*' means to be servile, obsequious, flattering towards someone. One declares one's love usually bending on one knee and offering a rose while looking up at the beloved. Is the speaker doing the same here? But what if he said that 'dear I love you because you are so ugly?'

than enquire whose <u>soul dangles from his</u>
<u>watch-chain</u> which would be embarrassing for both
parties

"To dangle" has two meanings: to hang freely and to display as an enticement. The souls of the unsuccessful/downtrodden dangle from the watch-chains of the successful; perhaps, trying to invite the attention of humanity to its precarious condition. Why watch-chain? Watches display time, but here the souls of the distressed are displayed. It may also mean that time has forsaken these people forever. Just as the hands of a watch tick continuously without any apparent change, these downtrodden continue with their struggle without being recognised by the 'Humanity'. In Cummings' times, men had pocket watches with chains that kept them secured by hooking them to the coat buttons. Hence, 'dangles from his watch-chain' is a **neologism**.

Embarrassing for which *both* parties — *Humanity* and *the suffering soul* or *Humanity* and *success* whose boots it is polishing — licking?

Cummings seems to be distancing himself from the Humanity that he is describing as cruel, senseless, selfish — in short, as a monster (cf. "pity this monster, manunkind / not").

and because you
unflinchingly applaud all
<u>songs containing the words country home and</u>
<u>mother</u> when sung at <u>the old howard</u>

Country, home, mother are words that indicate patriotism — *homeland*, *motherland*? But "when sung at the old howard" — and not at other places or otherwise? The **Old Howard** Theatre was a famous burlesque house located in Boston, Massachusetts, USA's erstwhile Scollay Square. Hence, it indicates Humanity's love for rhetoric and ostentation, pomp and show — again characteristics of the successful. Spelled in lower case, the poet seems to ridicule *the old howard.*

Humanity i love you because
when <u>you're hard up</u> you <u>pawn your</u>
<u>intelligence</u> to buy a drink

When *hard up* (for money), Humanity can stoop so low as to mortgage its intelligence for frivolous things, such as a drink, but it does not use its intelligence

to ameliorate the lot of the suffering souls. '*Hard up*' is informal. '*Pawn your intelligence*' is fresh and original, and arrests the attention of the reader at once. The phrase is thus **foregrounded**.

            and <u>when</u>
<u>you're flush</u> pride keeps

you from the pawn shops

When flush (well off in terms of money), Humanity puffs with pride and keeps away from the same pawnshops. It seems to be a comment on the hypocrisy of Humanity. '*Flush*' is also informal. Note that the two lexical items dealing with money are both *informal*.

                and
because you are continually <u>committing</u>
<u>nuisances</u> but more
especially in your own house

The poet accuses Humanity of "*committing nuisances*" which may mean perpetrating acts that are obnoxious or injurious to people at large. What may "*but more/ especially in your own house*" mean? Humanity is doing so within its own ranks. Probably, it means that Humanity (the haves) is causing injury to humanity (the have-nots) itself! We write humanity with small 'h', here, to refer to the have-nots.

Humanity i love you because you
are perpetually <u>putting the secret of</u>
<u>life in your pants</u> and forgetting
it's there and sitting down

<u>on it</u>

"*putting the secret of life in your pants*" — why pants, why not pocket? Is it a disguised allusion to procreation, organ of reproduction? And then forgetting it and sitting down on it; stifling the very life that Humanity is supposed to nurture? The very clause is striking which results in foregrounding the meaning. Placing 'on it' in a separate line not only helps foreground it but also creates a visual effect of someone in a sitting position.

and because you are
forever making poems in <u>the lap</u>
<u>of death</u>

Rather than valuing life (previous stanza), Humanity is producing "*poems in the lap of death*" — poems of death, in praise of death to be sung at the old howard. Humanity is bringing death to humanity by supporting whatever causes death. It may also mean that whatever Humanity is doing, it goes in the service of death.

. . .   *Humanity*

i hate you

Finally, the poet declares what he intended from the very beginning — "Humanity / i hate you" and we learn that "Humanity i love you" was an ironic declaration. One graphological deviation is the division of the clause into two lines: 'Humanity' in one line and 'i hate you' in a separate last line with some space between the two that creates a dramatic pause, known in rhetoric as *aposiopesis* (Gk. 'becoming silent'). It shows the speaker standing at a distance from 'Humanity', pausing, as if recalling what he just said, evaluating it, maybe regaining his breath, and then declaring 'i hate you.'

When we reach the end of the poem, we notice that the poem is *deviant* in a very interesting way. It is deviant in the sense that the arguments are a complete turn over with respect to the title — what the reader expects does not happen; rather the opposite happens. The speaker, so to speak, utters 'Humanity', stands up, steps back and declares, 'I hate you' leaving the erstwhile beloved in utter shock (?).

Cummings also uses **parallelism** throughout to effect foregrounding. We have already noticed that the conjunction '*because*' is used six times. Let us see how the argument is structures:

Humanity i love you because . . . . and because . . . .

Humanity i love you because . . . . and because . . . .

Humanity i love you because . . . . . and because . . . .

We can replace the word 'love' with 'hate', which is what Cummings intended from the very beginning. The speaker is someone who stands at a distance from 'Humanity,' or from the society, mocking and denouncing the hypocrisy and pretensions of its members; a 'Humanity' that is bent upon destroying 'humanity'. Humanity, head down, is too busy in blacking the boots of the haves to notice the souls of the have-nots dangling from the watch-chains just above its head. To me,

it appears a love/hate relationship, rather than just hatred for Humanity: love for 'humanity' (the lesser one) and hatred for 'Humanity' (the elite one).

The central idea of the poem is that 'Humanity' is hypocritical and indifferent to life unless it serves some purpose to it. It seems to be a comment upon the behaviour of the world powers how they treat the suffering 'humanity.' They ignore the suffering lot unless and until it serves their purpose in some way. For example, they intervened in East Timor ten years ago, but have been ignoring the plight of the Kashmiri people and the Palestinians for more than half a century. Cummings became disillusioned with humanity late in his career due to his war experiences. His later poems are almost all misanthropic in nature, describing the indifference of the haves to the sufferings of the have-nots. His poems should act as a wake-up call to mankind — 'manunkind' to be correct — to change its behaviour and help those in need unselfishly. If 'Humanity' is to survive, it needs to raise its head and reach up to rescue the dangling souls of the 'lesser' humanity.

5.0   Conclusion

The purpose of this exercise was to see what role Literary Stylistics and Cognitive Poetics could play in our understanding of a poem. It is obvious that both approaches were helpful in bringing to light some obscure aspects of the poem. Even if we did not know anything about e. e. cummings and his style, we still would have reached the same conclusion: 'Humanity' is hateful because it kills its own kind, the 'lesser' humanity.

Our analysis of the poem also leads us to concur with Toolan (2010:189) that "poets continually show linguists about language, things of which linguists themselves can easily lose sight: especially our power through language to rethink everything and anything." In short, "Poets, by their non-conventional use of metaphors, lead their readers beyond the bounds of ordinary modes of thought" (Hiraga, 2005:26), which aspects literary stylistics and cognitive poetics try to foreground.

References

Cluysennar, A. (1976). *Introduction to Literary Stylistics*. London: Batsford

Danesi, Marcel (1995) The Iconicity of Metaphor. In *Syntactic Iconicity and Linguistic Freezes: the Human Dimension*, ed. Marge E. Landsberg, 26583. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.

Deane, P. (1995) Metaphor of Center and Periphery in Yeats The Second Coming . *Journal of Pragmatics*, 24(6): 62742.

Freeman, M.H. (2005). Poetry as power: The dynamics of Cognitive Poetics as a scientific and literary paradigm (pp. 1-23). In Harri Veivo, Bo Pettersson, and Merja Polvinen, (eds.) *Cognition and Literary Interpretation in Practice*. Helsinki: Helsinki University Press.

Garvin, P.L. (1964). *A Prague School Reader on Aesthetics, Literary Structure and Style*. Washington: Georgetown University Press

Gibbs, Jr. R.W. (1994). *The Poetics of Mind: Figurative thought, language and understanding*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hiraga, M.K. (2005). *Metaphors and Iconicity: A Cognitive Approach to Analysing Texts*. New York: Plagrave MacMillan

Langacker, R.W. (1998) Conceptualization, Symbolization, and Grammar. In *The New Psychology of Language: Cognitive and Functional Approaches to Language Structure*, ed. Michael Tomasello, 139. Mahwah, NJ and London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Lakoff, G. (1993) The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor. In Andrew Ortony (Ed.), *Metaphor and Thought*, 20251. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Leech, G. N. (1969). *A Linguistic Guide to English Poetry*. London: Longman

Leech, G.N. (2008). *Language in Literature: Style and Foregrounding*. London: Harlow, Pearson/Longman Education.

Richardson, A. and Steen, F. F. (2002). Literature and the Cognitive Revolution: An Introduction. *Poetics Today*, 23(1): 1-8.

Short, M. (1996). *Exploring the Language of Poems, Plays and Prose*. Essex: Addison Wesley Longman.

Stockwell, P. (2002). *Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction*. London: Routledge.

Stockwell, P. (2009). The cognitive poetics of literary resonance. *Language and Cognition*, 1/1, 25-44. DOI 10.1515/LANGCOG.2009.002.

Toolan, M. (2010). What do poets show and tell linguists? *Acta Linguistica Hafniensia: International Journal of Linguistics*, 42/S1, 189-204.

Ungerer, F. and Schmid, H-J. (1996) *An Introduction to Cognitive Linguistics*. London, New York: Longman.

Widdowson, H.G. (1974). Stylistics. In J.P.B. Allen and S.P. Corder (eds.). *The Edinburgh Course in Applied Linguistics, Volume III: Techniques in Applied Linguistics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (202-31).

The Shamming Self: The Mariner's Persona in
The Rime of the Ancient Mariner

Syed Zahid Ali Shah[a], Nasir Jamal Khattak[b]

[a] Department of English, Islamia College (Chartered University), Peshawar, Pakistan
[b] Department of English & Applied Linguistics, University of Peshawar, Pakistan

_____

Abstract

This paper focuses on the psychic apparatus of Persona in Coleridge's *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner* which Jung calls "only a mask of the collective psyche." The Mariner's journey in the familiar social surrounding, the "kirk" and the "light-house", are images which symbolize ordinary social set up. Initially, the journey is a plain sailing as the Mariner and his peers are unconsciously conscious of a set of values that are ordinarily taken for granted. In the land of the "mist and snow" (symbolic of the unconscious), however, they come face to face with a situation that defies the normal parameters of their habitual social character. A temporary social acceptance (the Mariner's surrender to the alternative judgments of his peers) is bargained at a very high price. The modern man's claustrophobic isolation and with it the loss of identity are dilemmas resulting from one-sided consciousness. Man's vital faculties (like those of the Mariner) suffer deathblows when they are wilfully strangulated in unnatural pursuits of meaningless recognitions. Our examination of the Mariner's traumatic woes will yield extensive correspondences with contemporary social and civilizational debacles.

Keywords: S.T. Coleridge, *The Rime of the Ancient Mariner*, Persona, Jung, Analytical Psychology

_____

Introduction

Man's one-sidedness in worldly affairs, high intellectualism, and incessant factualism deprive him of perennial innocence and crude spontaneity. A temporary social acceptance (the Mariner's surrender to the alternative judgments of his peers) is bargained at a very high price. A most essential half of the Self is alienated creating psychic vacuums of imbalances. Modern man's claustrophobic isolation and with it the loss of identity are dilemmas resulting from one-sided consciousness. The retrieval of psychic wholeness and with it the totality of the Self are subject to a transformed and reformed Ego-self instituted with the greater struggle of self-realization and self-examination. Man's vital faculties (like those of the Mariner) suffer deathblows when they are wilfully strangulated in unnatural pursuits of meaningless recognitions. Our examination of the Mariner's traumatic woes will yield extensive correspondences with contemporary social and civilizational debacles.

This paper focuses on that aspect of the Mariner in "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner"[1] which Jung calls the "Persona." The Mariner begins his journey in the familiar social surrounding; the "kirk" and the "light-house" are images which symbolize ordinary social set up. Initially, the journey is a plain sailing as the Mariner and his peers are unconsciously conscious of a set of values that are ordinarily taken for granted. In the land of "mist and snow" (symbolic of the unconscious), however, they come face to face with a situation that defies the normal parameters of their habitual social character. In the aftermath of the crime, the killing of the albatross, the Mariner confronts his "shadow" which is the sum total of all those inherent realities he has suppressed in fear of their social incompatibility. From here his journey of self-analysis begins that leads him to the dark abyss of his unconscious.

The Shamming Self: The Mariner's Persona

> It [the persona] is, as its name implies, only a mask of the collective psyche, a mask that *feigns individuality,* making others and oneself believe that one is individual, whereas one is simply acting a role through which the collective psyche speaks (*Two Essays on Analytical Psychology,* 105).

The greatest damage caused to the balance of the psychic equilibrium is largely due to the individual's shamming (false pretentions) occasioned by social demands. Inherent realities are held back in the unconscious for the sake of the puniest expectations. In the face of an over-emphatic ego-consciousness natural

urges and desires are suppressed due to their incompatibility in the social and moral scales. This creates a psychic deadlock in which the natural interflow of psychic components (conscious and unconscious) is disrupted. The ego tunes to a single dimension of consciousness dictated by the mass psyche in which state of the mind little room is left for the aboriginal wisdom flowing from the unconscious. This leaves the individual subject dry of soul and hard rationalist who surrenders his soul to the prevailing social encomium. Individual life becomes, then, a hollow shamming of puppetry in which the strings are pulled by the disembodied "others."

John Clay essentially describes the persona in these words:

> 'Persona' refers to the mask people wear to front the world. It derives from the name of the device used by actors in Greek theatre. . . Jungians see the persona as a universal usage, as something of an archetype, applicable to most cultures, a social archetype really, facilitating exchange and relationships, dictated partly by the demands of society, partly by one's fiction of oneself. It only becomes pathological if people begin to identify too closely with their persona, their front to the world (286).

Persona is the face of social acceptability; it is humans' inherent ability to adapt to the environment around them and become social ideals. In this adaptation the individual sacrifices something of the "Self." The natural and biological desires, which a social, political, religious or any other environment does not allow, remain undeveloped, underdeveloped or violently suppressed. The socially undesirable or unacceptable "self" is pushed into the background and becomes what Jung calls the "shadow." The more developed the persona, the bigger the shadow. This creates a kind of split, a divide in the personality: one, what we are in our social environment; two, what we are when we are by ourselves. Neumann points to this issue in the following words:

> The ego ideal comprises the culture-conditioned will to be different from what one really is, i.e., a conscious and unconscious rejection and repression of the self, which leads both to the sham personality, or persona, and to the splitting-off of the shadow (161).

This kind of single-dimensional consciousness creates a rigidity in which the capacity to respond to the inner and outer worlds almost diminishes to the lowest ebb. The ego closes itself off to any overtures of diffusiveness either

from within the self or from without the external world. The initial setting off of the Mariner is symbolically a thrusting forth into the outer world and repudiation of an inner intimate world. This kind of repudiation leaves behind a psychic void which results into the collapse of the total self:

> The bold independence of the voyager was for Coleridge only one step from an outrageous self-sufficiency which will wantonly destroy the ties of affection. The albatross is killed, and then the penalty must be paid in remorse, dejection, and the sense of being a worthless social outcast (Harding 64).

Neumann calls this self-isolation of the ego, with a certain pride of exclusivity, as "egoistic" and "egocentric (160)." This misguided conviction is shown in the *Rime* through the shooting of the Albatross: an act of assertiveness of the individual will which results in a long drawn psychic isolation accompanied by the drying up of fecundating imagination:

> All in a hot and copper sky,
> The bloody Sun, at noon,
> Right up above the mast did stand,
> No bigger than the moon (111-14).[2]

This is a tragic picture of the outward successful man of today. The Mariner universalizes his condition of isolation, desertion and stalemated vision by appealing to those states of mind in which "expressions are baffled" and the experiencing subject is reduced to pathological repetitions (Harding 56). The Mariner's condition is due to the loss of his spiritual numinosity in a one-sided ego-consciousness. J. B. Beer equates this loss with the diminishing Shechinah which nearly touches upon Wordsworth's philosophy of pantheism (59). His symbolic rendering of the loss and regaining of the Shechinah are closely related to the Jungian dynamics of conscious/unconscious dyad. Psychologically, this could be a severance from the fecundating influences of the unconscious and an inclination towards its obverse, i.e., consciousness; that man becomes over-emphatically rational leaving little possibility for a faith in the transcendental realities of experiences. This rupturing pushes man to the precipice of an impending fall where the delicate balance is maintained through the wisdom of the archetypes.[3] Similarly the Shechinah is the light of wisdom vouchsafed by the deity and is shed in the dark abyss created by man out of his own doings. The falling apart of man and woman, psychologically speaking, is the disjunction of anima and animus.[4] When one predominates, the other

becomes venomous and vengeful. The unification moment, when all absurdities are removed, is the one in which God (the consummated Self) reaches to the utmost elation. Beer's whole argument can also be summarized in the contexts of the "Wandering Jew" and the curse of "Cain." The persona is wandering dry of soul because of his betraying the archetypal "Other" for a puny gain which could be nothing else but social applause. Similarly Cain's killing Abel[5] is like slaughtering the innocent albatross that is the indispensable "other" suppressed on grounds of social incompatibilities.

In his isolation, the Mariner's absence of referential relatedness is the first stage in the revelatory process of selfhood. His inner and outer states of experience are shockingly chaotic; there is no clarity of vision through which the Mariner may see his referential relatedness. With a rigid ego, the whole world around appears repulsive and rotting (Lines: 123-126). His failing faculties are replaced by the phantoms of those unrealities of the 'not-I.' A release from such spiritual/psychic inaction is associated, as Haven puts it, with an internal and external symbolic re-animation described by Coleridge as recognition in the external objects of nature "a symbolical language for something within me that already and forever exists, than observing anything new" (Halmi, et al 608). This kind of movement from a constricted mode of being to an openness of fluidity within a moment of "progressive/regressive"[6] animation alternatively constitutes the conscious/ unconscious dynamics associated with the moment's painful self-realization. This changed angle of realization, in which the regressive movement provides a moment of deep contemplation, includes all those intentionally or unintentionally forgotten bits that were essential parts of the total picture. Hitherto unaccustomed to the language and insensitive to the modes of nature the Mariner cannot connect the two regimens of outer and inner universes that are each other's replica. Recognizing in the outer universe a familiar language, the concept of the "other" instantly acquires a meaningful significance expressed in an internal diffusion and liberation. The movement of the moon (Lines: 264-267) proves that moment of initiation in which both perceptive and conceptive dualities are replaced by progressive consciousness.

The significance and meaning of things change after acquiring a higher consciousness than the one of ordinary import. The Mariner's initial apprehension of the world around and his interaction with it are uneventful as he is driven along a normal course of action by the social norms that submerge his individuality. With a progressive development of the Ego, a new individuality comes into effect when the Mariner is confronted by the shadow element of his psyche. This is the killing of the 'Albatross' (symbolically meaning many things

ranging from human innocence to Jesus Christ, from political/religious victimization to international hegemonic bullying). In any context the negative implications of the act shatters the hitherto complacent ego to an arousal of reassessing a life history of unconditional surrenders.

The persona also mediates between the Ego and the outside world—a relationship in which the Ego sees itself comfortably settled in a world of its own preferences and choices. The painful moment of self-realization requires dissolution of the false masking of self-complacency which the Ego resists to maintain the status quo. To Clay persona is a 'pathological' over-assertion (286) that results into a stasis from an imposition of a man-made law upon the law of nature (consciousness suppressing the unconscious) and that obstructs the natural flow of life-forces. Consequently anything flowing out of the perennial wisdom of collective unconscious is arrested in immobility either in an impotency to keep pace with the ever exuberant manifestations of the unconscious (its "Archetypal" contents), or with the intention to create a personal history of identity from which the "other" is excluded under fearful misapprehensions. The Mariner's too much inclination towards ratiocination and intellectualism, symbolized by the heat and light of the equatorial regions, deprive him of the roots of "historical family" that lie deep down in the unconscious: "Inner peace and contentment depend in large measure upon whether or not the historical family which is inherent in the individual can be harmonized with the ephemeral conditions of the present".[7] In other words, the accumulated wisdom of man's racial history can be of immense dispensation once it is consciously realized.

Kabitoglou's seeing the Mariner's journey as "a fall from myth to history (208)" can be conveniently interpreted into the paradigm of conscious-unconscious severing from each other resulting tragically into man's loss of his roots of identity. Growing along the line of intellectual maturity is, in this dialogic, a journeying away from the sources of innocent beliefs and power of a faith in the mysteries of creation. The nobler and higher qualities of creative imagination, that are still the beacon lights of our ancient identity, have been overshadowed by a growing preoccupation with nihilistic pursuits. In the confused mess of random progress, man is standing at the cross roads of a bleak future suffering backlashes at the hands of his own extraordinary achievements. His associative niche of comforting oneness has become a lair of deadly weaponry, cunningly destructive. The Mariner's act of killing the bird is a perceptive crime in which a different orientation takes place. Things are not accepted in their own validity and right but manipulated under disguises ignoble

by any standard of decency. This is how the corrupting agency of mind maneuvers right things for the wrong reasons; the fault with perceptive misapprehension is largely conditioned by the projective[8] faculty of the mind. Seeing the external realities of the world in a one-sided[9] polarized ego-reflection may not give a true picture of that reality as it is tainted by that one-sidedness. Heir to this legacy of confused standards of evaluative perceptions, modern man is caught in the turbulent vortex of his own "undoings." In the vaster contexts of nations, cultures, ideologies, religions, and dogmas this vision of self-assertion and disregard of others' rights have created an atmosphere of unprecedented terror and misgivings in which both the aggressor and the aggressed are horror-stricken. Individually and collectively we are pursued by the ghost-like apparitions of our unacknowledged and unrealized psychic histories. The Mariner testifies to the fact in these words:

> Like one that on a lonesome road
> Doth walk in fear and dread,
> And having once turned round walks on,
> And turns no more his head;
> Because he knows, a frightful fiend
> Doth close behind him tread (446-51).

We humans ironically prize our flimsy achievements as the crowning of our endeavours. Our entire energies are consumed in pursuits scarcely legible to a human understanding. Walking victorious, like a Tsar or Fuhrer, over the dead bodies of others may satisfy the deadly whims of the perpetrator, but an ultimate facing up of the conscience exacts a terrible price. This is how the Mariner is led to the temptation of an inflated supremacy in juxtaposition to the hierarchy of lower creation. It is the first temptation that leads on further into the unending series of sinful commissions. Each step is a distancing away from the associative selflessness into isolated selfishness. This creates a destabilizing polarity in the otherwise calm ambivalence of opposites maintained in a miraculous golden mean (Woodring 379). It is neither in the "land of ice and snow," (the hazy, cold world of the unconscious) nor in the scorching sun of the equator (the ego of an overemphasized consciousness) that man can find redemption and peace; it is in the golden mean of "my own countree" where redemption is administered to the impoverished, overvalued ego and is enfolded in the "goodly company." It is only the intentionally overlooked incidents of life that dog us ferociously when we happen to be with ourselves and in ourselves. Shutting down in the dark abysses of our unconscious, the eternal figure of our eternal humanness may result in a devastating backlash of vengeful wrath. A realistic approach to life and its

essentials, though, may encounter stern resistances from an unrealistic idealism; a first step towards the hitherto untrodden frontiers of being may shed light on those hidden truths that are the cornerstones of our existence. Man's diminishing courage in facing his inadequacies has plunged him into the darkest meaninglessness of life. As such Raimonda Modiano describes the world of the *Rime* as a continued series of "violence" in which a single act of aggression leads on to unlimited proportions (213).

Caught in the mesh of a single faceted persona, all of us have our dark sides. The following stanzas from the *Rime* are a testimony to the fact:

> Day after day, day after day,
> We stuck, nor breath nor motion;
> As idle as a painted ship
> Upon a painted ocean. . . .
>
> The very deep did rot; O Christ!
> That ever this should be!
> Yea, slimy things did crawl with legs
> Upon the slimy sea (115-18, 123-26).

In the over-assertion of consciousness man becomes hostage to a socially conditioned acceptability. Thenceforth he is required to follow a pre-judgmental course of behavior silencing the voice of his natural "other". Instead of due recognition of others' right to life and its opportunities an oppressive culture is instituted for self-assertion. For Kabitoglou the ruthlessness of such a culture can be seen in its faith in a power play of eliminating the "other" as contender rather than coexisting in a positive, constructive, competitive atmosphere (209). An unreasonable acceptance of the prevailing social and cultural values could be momentarily instrumental in the so-called successes of life but may prove devastating on personal and collective levels. It may take away from us the natural attributes of humanness and leave us desensitized to the natural voice of our inner self. In slaughtering the albatross indiscriminately, the Mariner, instead of feeling guilty, surrenders to the judgmental verdicts of his companions (his immediate society and culture). They put their faith in appearances that confront them in alternative changes of their situations. Destroying the bird in an act of unreasonable violence is equivalent to destroying the natural instinctive faculties that, as intuitions, come to the rescue of man caught in the cross purposes of his worldliness.

The deafening echoes of inner hollowness and the defiled "inner-scapes" of our being are reflected in the poem with all the horrors and terrors. It is only a moment of realization that can instantly plunge us into a world similar to that of the Mariner. The shattering of "being" in consequence of shutting eyes to those other essential parts of the whole has been pictured by J. McGraw in the following words: "One may feel anchorless and adrift in the boundless expanse of the galaxy of disjointed being(s). Things seem out of place; they are without connection and continuity, and one feels the precariousness, fragility, and contingency of human existence" (321). In moments of extreme crises, man's discerning faculties get benumbed. Nothing seems plausible and a blind faith in fate is reposed. Being ignorant or unconscious of the prodigious drama of unacknowledged "selves" that is being played at the backstage of the unconscious, the Mariner appeals to God and Jesus for redemption but does not take heart to fathom the depth of his own evil selves. He cries hysterically:

> Alone, alone, all, all alone,
> Alone on a wide wide sea!
> And never a saint took pity on
> My soul in agony.
> The many, men so beautiful!
> And they all did lie:
> And a thousand thousand slimy things
> Lived on; And so did I (232-38).

But the Mariner's loneliness is not of ordinary nature. He feels lonely because he is bereft of his essential "others"; by his own compromises; by selling his "self" to the evil of "social other." By and large we see the same tragedy happen to modern man when he estranges himself from himself. Though the albatross guides the ship out of the fog and cold of a single dimensional unconsciousness, its slaughtering and the subsequent approval-disapproval dynamics of the mariners expose them to the sterility of habitual causality. Becoming conscious of things is not bad in itself; it is the corruption of consciousness that undermines and distorts the beauty of life.

It is not each time God or the Messiah to come to the rescue of man. Man himself is to rise to the occasion and transform his destiny. This can only be achieved through a facing up of all the "others" that are held back on certain compromises or lack of courage:

> We have no imagination for evil, but evil *has us in its grip*. Some do
> not want to know this, and others are identified with evil. That is the
> psychological situation in the world today: some call themselves
> Christians and imagine they can trample the so-called evil under foot
> by merely willing to; others have succumbed to it and no longer see
> the good (*Memoirs* 331).

When collective will is superimposed upon the individual (as in the Mariner's
case), a coercive value system takes possession of the individual will denying
him/her the degree of personal freedom. This may result in the individual's
rebellion against the imposing culture or society which is manifested in social and
political upheavals of the world. But the most dangerous aspect of the social-
individual paradigm is the individual's willingness to sacrifice his/her ideals to the
social expectation of becoming a social icon. This kind of self-imposition starts a
self-suppressive regime requiring the individual to silence down his inner voice.
The price of compromise is too high but the individual remains oblivious to it as
beguiled by the social recognition. Fordham argues as under:

> Christian civilization has proved hollow to a terrifying degree: it is all
> veneer, but the inner man has remained untouched and therefore
> unchanged. His soul is out of key with his external beliefs; in his soul the
> Christian has not kept pace with external developments. . . . the inner
> correspondence with the outer God-image is undeveloped for lack of
> psychological culture and has therefore got stuck in heathenism (np).

This pictures forth a fractured universe of corporeal predominance and spiritual
aridity. Life's spiritual insufficiencies are occasioned by our narrow visions of
the totality of creatureliness. The mechanisms applied by the highly pragmatic
man of today to rectify such lapses (according to his own standard of values)
are ironically bereaving him of his aboriginal resourcefulness. The way back to
this knowledge and wisdom is through intuitions and revelations rather than
scientific analyses and argumentations. A stalemated self, caught in the heat of
oppressive ratiocination, can have only a vision of life devoid of all its fine
sensibilities, emotional enthusiasm, and virgin beauties.

The Mariner's crime is an act of deadly assertion in which the flowing moments
of life are squeezed to the narrow channels of self-preservation and safety
within a social or religious set-up. Such a tragic failure of apprehension has
turned an otherwise beautiful world into infernal fires. In the rampage towards

higher securities, indiscriminate atrocities are inflicted upon those that are wrongfully implicated as threats to the so-called peace syndromes.

In creating a favourable persona of sociability, man tries to intentionally overlook those facets of the Self that are ugly and uninviting by his and society's standards. Kabitolgue assembles these in the "I-slimy" paradigm, that though loathsome may contain "germs of new life" (220). Accepting one's reality in toto is the acceptance of all those ugly and uninviting shades of personality that our Ego relentlessly refuses to accept. The ambivalent co-existence of good and bad, virtue and vice, light and darkness etc. are essentially the concomitants of humanness as one is the obverse of the other. Our pretentions of piety, purity, and perfectibility create a widening gulf of what we are and what we pretend to be. The great dilemma of the Mariner in his stasis is surrendering his will to cultural and social cannons that exclude the "other" in personal and collective anthems. His isolation in the sea and on board the ship is the result of intentionally ignoring something that inherently belongs to him.

The Mariner's symbolic Journey should have been of free and bountiful attitudes. Tragically enough instead of enlarging his vision he is stuck into an immobility of spirit. He not only fails to measure the depth and dimensions of his own worth and value but of everything that surrounds and influences his life. What makes life beautiful and bearable is its quality of flexibility in crises of understanding and accommodating all those factors that defy ordinary perceptions. In moments of utter desperation, the only rescue for the Mariner and his sailors is the albatross that is subsequently obliterated through inflated supremacy; though it should have been accommodated in its own right and privilege. This act of brutality can be seen into the paradigm of creating a powerful persona that elicits from the weaker a gesture of recognition in the spree of suppression and repression. The heart's inability to expand and quicken in acts of love and sympathy leads to the sorry states of our present human predicaments. Unconsciously we remain stuck and fixated in the vicious web of our personal interests and allow no room for others to enjoy their fair share of opportunities.

The moment of confession is arrived at only when further posing and imposing appear mentally exploding. To blurt out the now oppressive inner hollowness and futility, a dialogue with the self or the 'other' is initiated. The purpose is to disburden the inner accumulated dirt in the form of all those repressions and suppressions that were done in the name of civility or social docility. The spell of immobility is broken only when mind and with it vision open up to the

beauties and prospects of the outside world; when a sense of belonging is established with all the creatures of the heaven and the earth; when rights and wrongs are decided not arbitrarily but with the view to the individual situations. The Mariner's release is accomplished only when he establishes creaturely affinity with everything around him regardless of appearance, "worth-full-ness" or worthlessness (Beer 73).

In the final analysis, humans cannot remain psychically stable in the single dimension of consciousness. They need a counter-balancing repository that would provide them with the opportunity of perceptual and conceptual rectification. This is accomplished by integrating the "not-Is" of the unconscious contents that are regenerative to psychic wholeness. This sailing through the unconscious is a dream-like journey resembling the mystical/religious experience. The journeying subject comes across realities that are outside the domains of a work-a-day reality. Becoming conscious of the unconscious orients the individual in two oppositional states: either he becomes capable of identifying himself in relations to other things around him, setting boundaries of the Self-Other interaction; or lapses into an over-estimation of his intellectual potentials that partake of living death.

Notes

1   Hereinafter referred to as *Rime.*
2   *Coleridges Poetry & Prose*, eds. Nicholas Halmi, Paul Magnuson, and Raimonda Modiano (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004). Hereinafter referred to as Halmi et al with relevant page number (s) (in case of prose) & line number (s) (in case of poetry).
3   Stevens writes about the archetypes in these words:
    As the basis of all the usual phenomena of life, the archetypes transcend culture, race and time. Thus, in Jung's view (as opposed to Plato's) the mental events we experience are determined not merely by our personal history, but by the collective history of the species as a whole (biologically encoded in the collective unconscious), reaching back into the primordial mists of evolutionary time (45).
4   Jung explains the two terms in these words:
    Since anima is an archetype that is found in men (mans feminine aspect), it is reasonable to suppose that an equivalent archetype must be present in women (animus that is the male aspect of a woman); for just as the man is compensated by a feminine element, so woman is compensated by a masculine one (*Aion*151).
5   See R. A. Foakes, *Coleridge, Violence and 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner'*, Romanticism; 2001, Vol. 7, Issue 1.
6   Progression is the progressive flowing of the libido towards an external attitude in the environment, while regression is the flowing in of that psychic energy inwardly when a stasis occurs. Attitudes change from time to time and this requires an adjustment of the libido; in progression the libido is directed towards an attitude in hand but the change in attitude directs that energy in the opposite direction. The alterations of the energic phenomenon of the psyche (i. e. the libido) work in combining of the opposites (On *the Nature of the Psyche*, 32).
7   See C.G. Jung, *Memories, Dreams, Reflections*, p. 237. Hereinafter referred to as *Memoirs* with relevant page number (s).
8   Projection can be understood in the analyst/analysand analysis and is mostly done by the latter. It is an unconscious psychic activity in which personal complexes are seen in the other. For further details see *On the Nature of the Psyche*, pp. 53-54.
9   See *On the Nature of the Psyche*, 130.

References

Barnes, Hazel E. (1945). *Neo-Platonism and Analytical Psychology. The Philosophical Review.* Vol. 54. No. 6, 558-577.

Beer, J. B. (1959). *Coleridge the Visionary.* London: Chatto & Windus

Clay, John. (1999). *Robert Boyle: A Jungian Perspective. The British Journal for the History of Science,* 32/3, 285-298.

Foakes, R. A. (2001). "*Coleridge, Violence and 'The Rime of the Ancient Mariner'.*" *Romanticism,* 7.1

Fordham, Frieda. (2004). *An Introduction to Jung's Psychology,* 1966. http://www.cgjungpage.org - CG Jung Page Powered by Mambo Open Source. Generated: 26 September, 2004, 12:29, last accessed on 16-10-2010.

Halmi, Nicholas, Paul Magnuson, Raimonda Modiano.(Eds.) (2004). *Coleridge's Poetry & Prose.* London: W.W. Norton & Company

Harding, D.W. "1967). The Theme of 'The Ancient Mariner'", Coleridge*: A Collection of Critical Essays.* Ed. Kathleen Coburn. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall

Haven, Richard. 1969). *Patterns of Consciousness: An essay on Coleridge.* Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press

Jung, C.G. (1959). *Aion: Researches into the phenomenology of the Self.* Trans. R. F. G. Hull, Bollingen Series XX, New York: Pantheon Books

Jung, C.G. (1989).. *Memories, Dreams, Reflections.* Ed. Aniela Jaffe. Trans. Richard & Clara Winston. New York: Vintage Books

Jung, C.G. (1973). *On the Nature of the Psyche.* Trans. R. F. C. Hull. Bollingen Series. Princeton: Princeton University Press

Kabitoglou. E. Douka. (1990). *Plato and the English Romantics: Dialogoi.* London: Routledge

Neumann, Erich. (1959). *Art and the Creative Unconscious.* Four Essays. Trans. Ralph Manheim. Bollingen Series LXI, Pantheon Books

Stevens, Anthony. (2002). *Archetype Revisited: An Updated Natural History of the Self.* London: Routledge,

Warren, Robert Penn. (1958). *A Poem of Pure Imagination: an Experiment in Reading.* Selected Essays. New York: OUP, 1958.

Velutha: The Abject[1]

Shazia Ghulam Mohammad[a], Atteq ur Rahman[b]

[a] College of Home Economics, University of Peshawar, Pakistan
[b] Department of English, Islamia College (Chartered University) , Peshawar, Pakistan

_____

Abstract

Arundhati Roy situates the story of _The God of Small Things_ in Ayemenem — a village in Kerala, in the south-west of India. It is a case study of Velutha, the untouchable whose very name smacks of loathing and nausea one feels at the mention of it let alone sight of him. By focusing on the cross-cultural caste system, Arundhati Roy takes up an issue of social, cultural and universal significance. It apparently deals with the identity of Velutha, a paravan, which is at stake. He is the one who is expected not to leave any footprints on the earth and any image in the mirror. His identity is an issue and at issue because social, cultural and "Love Laws" (33) [2] do not favour him or acknowledge his right to be. A closer analysis of the novel directs the reader's mind to a series of underlying 'lacks' or voids at the core of formation of his subjectivity. The society constitutes a body from which Velutha is excluded as an undesirable or unhygienic element; he is objectified to which he retaliates. He seeks unconscious identification with the system from which he is expelled. .If Velutha is neither a subject nor an object then what is he? Who is he? This study provides a valid ground that Velutha does not qualify for both. Velutha's dilemma can be better understood if he is placed on the borderline of subject-object distinction[3]. This study takes him as a specimen for analysis and examines his borderline position from the viewpoint of Julia Kristeva's concept of abjection. A psychoanalytical framework facilitates the reader to determine his position.

Keywords: Untouchable; Velutha; Ammu; Abject; Lack; God; Identity; Subjectivity; Subject; Object

_____

Introduction

The God of Small Things encapsulates the story of insignificant people whose destinies are also determined by an insignificant God as is evident from the title. The story is unfolded in bits and pieces through the memory of an innocent child, Rahel, to whose eyes the world appears to be a magnified version of her small world. In order to tell it from a child's perspective, Arundhati Roy zooms in the lens of her artistic sensibility to focus on petty and inconsequential events but certainly crucial in the lives of the characters as they determine their future course of action. The significance of choosing Rahel to tell the story through flashbacks and flashforwards is how 'Big Man, the Laltain' hushes 'Small Man, the Mombatti' (88). The narrative runs like a mathematical formula in which Arundhati Roy defines things by referring to them as number one and number two. The thing number one is that the Big God does not have concern with petty issues, though they are detrimental to the life of petty people and the thing number two is that the Small God, convinced of his insignificance, is hushed by the Big God who 'howls like a hot wind' (19). The Small God is Velutha's God who is 'resilient and 'indifferent' (19). There is a perpetual reinforcement of a sense of contrast between 'Big Man and Small Man' (88) ;'Big dreams' and 'Small dreams' (89) ; 'Big Things' and 'Small Things' (142) to justify the theme of the book.

The story revolves around Ammu, a widow; her twin children, Rahel and Estha, Velutha and Sophie Mol who is Rahel's and Estha's English cousin. Being twins, they assume that they are inseparable and have one identity of being 'we'. Ammu and a twin pair transgress the boundaries of culture by associating themselves with Velutha — the untouchable. Velutha is no insignificant being in the scheme of the novel, though he occupies a very insignificant place in the social set up. He lives in a 'laterite hut downriver' (78) that sets him apart from the people of superior social ranks. Everything about Velutha or his hut is a reinforcement of his being insignificant in social strata. His blackness is emphasized by his name 'Velutha' which ironically means 'White' in Malayalam (73). He is the son of Vellya Paapen, the untouchable, who detects the untamed instinct in his son long before it surfaces in his actions. It is the 'unwarranted assurance' and 'lack of hesitation' (76) in his manners which alarms him. It is the same instinct which 'stirs' something in Ammu 'when she listens to radio songs' (44).

From borderline existence to non-existence

Velutha exists on the borderline of non-existence. He works for Anglophile family whose social status makes them look down upon Velutha as a paravan. Their social superiority and prestige are reinforced by the factory they own and the blue Plymouth with 'Angry coloured' (197) factory's name, "Paradise Pickles and

Preserves" (1), inscribed on it in red colour. The family's decaying sense of superiority is asserted by Baby Kochama who keeps reminding other family members of their being the privileged ones while a blue Plymouth is parked outside the house as a symbol of superiority. This Anglophile family is eager to retain the superiority which is actually slipping away gradually. They adhere to those old laws and customs which, no longer, seem to work and are inadequate to keep the crumbling system intact. Roy focuses on 'the increasing chasm between rich and poor that splits the world' and precipitates 'the establishment of westernised, allegedly 'cosmopolitan' Third World elites inside the ex-colonies themselves (Schoene 127). The novel 'suggests prejudice against untouchables' as 'Velthua's story is like that of any number of people discriminated against in the U.S. culture. He represents the outsider in general' (169).

A thorough analysis of his character is undertaken to address the question of his identity; his position and the role he plays in the novel. Not only does his name indicate his loathsomeness but his repulsion is further emphasized by frequent references to 'A lucky leaf, that made the monsoons come on time. A brown leaf on a black back. An autumn leaf at night' (73). It is a stigma he is born with, and it cannot be erased by any means until he himself is erased by the system. It is the scarlet letter which he has to bear until his last breath. It is something unalterable so Roy refers to it not once but repeatedly on page 73, 174, 191, 294 and 311. There is an element of inevitability and fatality associated with the autumn leaf which is Velutha's birth mark. As he is loathsome, he lives at a place away from those who are prestigious from worldly view point.

Velutha's existence is a source of discomfort and resentment because he does not have any identity other than being 'the untouchable'. How can the untouchable think of touching the touchable? Ammu, Rahel and Estha are the ones who bring about destruction by letting themselves transgress the boundaries. They are 'the worst transgressors' (31) who do not care a fig for laws 'that make grandmothers grandmothers, uncles uncles, mothers mothers, cousins cousins, jam jam and jelly jelly' (31). Velutha carries the seeds of revolt in his constitution which dissociate him from his own community but are not potent enough to make him a member of the Touchables with whom he mixes up. He violates 'the Love Laws' which determine 'who should be loved and how. And how much'! (31).

Velutha's very first appearance rings a bell of menace and threat to the established system. He is a non-existent entity who does not have any subjective identity but he lacks the proper requisite of being an object as he tries to violate the established social norms by being defensive. He disrupts the harmony of the entire social set up. The moment he falls in love with Ammu, chaos sets in though, initially, he stops

himself from getting close to her. He brings fruit for her and hands them over without touching the palm of her hand. He tries to hate her by reminding himself of her superior class. The role of red colour cannot be overlooked: from the outset Velutha is being associated with red colour. While commenting on the colour play in *The God of Small Things,* Sadaf associates red colour with the psychological inclination of characters; for example, "Ammu, Rahel & Estha, Velutha, and Comrade Pillai represent rebellion and change, with "red flags" (64; 65; 71; 79; 80; 81; 205) as their predominant insignia" (73+). Velutha's revolt against the system can be detected in the colour of his nail paint which is red. There are frequent allusions to red colour and the role it plays in Velutha's life. He paints his nails with red cutex that Ammu discards, which signifies the element of passion, warmth, revolt and fatality inherent in his blood — the blood which eventually spills from his mouth. This element surfaces when any external stimulus triggers it. "The red in Tess is a precursory symbol of Tess's final sacrifice at the altar of the gods. So is Velutha's blood symbolic of his sacrifice at the blue altar of the Ayemenem Police Station." (Sadaf, 73+). Initially, Rahel is shown crushing red ants crawling on the yellow stones and, later, the family and social laws crush Velutha like an insignificant ant. It is a manifestation of the deep rooted hatred which they have for the Untouchables. This red colour gives us a clue that there is something menacingly unpleasant about him. The first indication of his revolt is his presence among the Marxists waving red flags. Chacko, Baby Kochama, Ammu and twins go to airport to receive Chacko's Ex-wife, Margaret and his daughter, Sophie Mol, Rahel's and Estha's cousin. Their blue Plymouth gets stuck in the procession of rebels carrying red flags. Among them, Rahel recognizes Velutha who waves a red flag and stands close enough to blue Plymouth to be recognized. When she points out that she has seen a man like Velutha, Estha tries to guard him saying that he had seen Velutha busy with something at home when they left. Rahel's 'yellow rimmed red plastic sunglasses' (37) turns the world red once she puts them on. Velutha cooks 'red fish curry' for Rahel and Estha; hence this red colour ties them to their 'beloved Velutha' (71). Red is the colour that ties these four characters in a string. Velutha's revolt against social, cultural and love laws becomes more pronounced as he starts his journey from being an object — devoid of any identity — to subject with fundamental right to exist, live and love. Unfortunately, he neither becomes subject nor object.

Roy refers frequently to the series of 'holes in the universe' (82) to emphasize the 'Lack'[4] that Velutha and Ammu contain in their beings — the deficiency that triggers a movement towards fulfilment irrespective of the outcomes. As lack forms the basis on which identity or subjectivity is constituted so the existence of a series of holes in *The God of Small Things* becomes significant when 'holes' in Ammu's and Velutha's life are analysed. Ammu's and Velutha's existence in similar circumstances and controlled environment make them soulmates — the environment which does not

give them breathing space. Both bear the stigma that isolates them and cuts them off from a common lot. Ammu has a cross stitch mark on her cheek which signifies pressure and confinement. This sense of confinement extends to 'cross stitch darkness' (219) and 'cross stitch roses' (219) of Ammu's afternoon dream. The reflection of 'blue cross stitch' (217) pattern on Ammu's cheek through the window and 'a brown autumn leaf' is an indication of their being the victims of suppression. Velutha is the one who actually represents the 'lack' in his being. This lack seems to be at work in Velutha's and Ammu's affair. They exist on the auxiliary or peripheral position and can fill up the voids that each of them have. They cross their set boundaries to fill in the lack each of them has. They step out in the wilderness where they are lost and ultimately doomed. Ammu is labelled as a widow and Velutha as a paravan — the untouchable. Ammu does not have a husband and Velutha does not have an identity. Both strive to get what they don't have. To exist or not to exist is comparatively easy rather than existing on the borderline of non-existence.

Among all family members, it is only Ammu who has some unknown affinity with Velutha and feels a strange pull towards him when he shows up whereas in others, he evokes a terrible repulsion. At the outset we are alarmed when the author describes her as 'An unmixable mix' who has 'the infinite tenderness of motherhood and the reckless rage of a suicide bomber'. This 'something in her' gives her an edge over others and 'eventually led her to love by night the man her children loved by day" (44). Ammu has the same element which Velutha has; there is 'something restless and untamed about her' (44) — both of them are rebels. Rahel and Estha are the first ones who sense things before they actually happen or assume any visible shape. Surprisingly, twins and Ammu do not seem to realize what they are up to! Velutha himself does not realize as to what might happen to him as a consequence of this transgression. At one point when Ammu scolds them, Rahel suggests that Ammu should marry 'Orangedrink Lemondrink Man' (101), who abuses Estha, oblivious to the effect of words on Ammu — ignorant of the potential danger inherent in these words. Later, Velutha will replace 'Orangedrink Lemondrink Man' whom she should marry. This step will make people love Ammu less because she hurts them. Expecting such an unexpected daring step of touching the touchable from Velutha comes as a shock rather than surprise.

Velutha is neither a subject in his own right nor a passive object. He is non definable abject who cannot be identified with certainty in a cultural sense. His situation is worse than Ammu because in his effort to transgress social boundary, he quits his zone and society refuses to integrate him in the new zone. By establishing an illicit relationship with Ammu, Velutha steps out of his assigned slot in a chain of being. He assumes a defensible position against the social assault and crosses a dividing line between subject and object. Despite his exclusion from social body, he permeates the

walls of a clearly defined social set up by loving Ammu. He disrupts not only environmental laws but natural laws too. Thus it is he who has to pay the price and restore the harmony. Being an abject, he must be expelled from the system. He must be eliminated and driven out of the domain which is not his. Velutha is a contagion that Ammu catches — a contagion which everybody other than Ammu avoids. He is an undesirable element which cannot be harmonized or synthesized with perfect ease for he contaminates the clean body; hence proving himself to be a part of the domain from where he has been expelled.

There exists a fatal attraction which forces Ammu, Rahel and Estha to assimilate him again in their being. Anything that has been expelled from a body must have been formerly a part of it before expulsion. Velutha is not born free but with a birth mark or stigma of being a paravan. He is not free to choose a woman from a superior caste. In his passive revolt, he proves himself to be distinct from those with whom he is classified. He lacks the characteristic of being an active chooser. Similarly, he lacks the timidity of being the chosen victim; hence he exists somewhere between the two — on the fringes of subject and object. Velutha is the abject: "The abject is everything that the human body excretes in order to live, all that might endanger our lives should we touch or ingest it; it is the things we must not do in order to be proper subjects in our societies." (Fox 35+).The feeling he arouses among people is of disgust and repulsion. His presence stirs an air of discomfort: Baby Kochama particularly abhors him and alludes to it by mentioning that the untouchables have typical smell that nobody can stand while Mammachi pretends to be humane and neutral in her attitude towards him. Roy evokes the air of repugnance and indescribable unpleasantness by frequent references to 'sicksweet' smell 'like old roses on a breeze' (6). Mammachi employs him at home for general maintenance and allows him to work on the factory premises by paying him the amount less than what the Touchables get for the same piece of work or labour to calm them down. He serves them in multiple capacities due to his 'natural skills' (76). Ammu feels attracted to him when she looks at his ribs, raised like ridges — 'burnished chocolate ridges' — from under the skin. An autumn leaf of brown muddy shade does not annoy her which is hardly distinguishable from his black skin. For her it is something desirable; it mesmerizes her whereas for others it is the reminder of his being an outcaste or downcast — a reassertion of social laws sanctioned by divine laws. Before Velutha came in Ammu's life, she always considered herself an unfortunate being — one who had lost the only chance of being happy by marrying 'the wrong man' (38).

Velutha is on the borderline of subjectivity because he is a component of both worlds — worlds that exist on either side of Meenachil river. His I-ness violates borders, and his unconscious encroaches upon the consciousness which is why he has an affinity

with Ammu. He is the excluded other, yet he is a part of both worlds. The first requisite to establish identity is to severe connection with the body that produces it. An abject poses a threat to the system that has produced it. Velutha has the germ to reject the very system of which he is the product. Kelly Oliver, a philosopher who has written extensively on Kristeva, writes: "The not-yet-subject with its not-yet, or no-longer, object maintains 'itself' as the abject (McAfee, 48). Ammu and Velutha are from two different worlds and there exists a gulf between them which cannot be bridged. The idea is reinforced geographically as river that flows in Ayemenem separates the two worlds — Ammu's and Velutha's worlds. The two extremes of the river can run parallel but can never meet. Either Ammu has to wade through it to become a part of his insignificant world or Velutha has to transgress boundaries to invade her being. The earth or heaven does not contain a place for them to be taken as members of the same community. The community would love to have a Velutha 'shaped hole in the universe' (82) rather than letting him have the privilege of being acknowledged anything other than what he is — The God of Loss (217). He has to pay the price of stepping into forbidden territory. He is the one who invades Ammu's being and makes her conscious of her existence wherever he touches her. In the love scene, Velutha realizes that he may lose everything he has by touching Ammu, who feels herself coming into being though "for each tremor of pleasure they would pay with an equal measure of pain" (335). The entire nocturnal scene bears witness to their desire for each other which propels them to sail through unknown storms before landing on the destined shore — an inevitable death. Before death embraces them and puts her claws on their agitating existence, they fill in each other's lack and relish fulfilment by assimilating the undesirable elements. Hounds of conventions chase them to death.

Conclusion

Velutha is an undesirable character of the story who has to be eliminated physically to restore the former harmony. His journey is from being the abject to non-existent entity or a lump of clay. The path that he chooses does not take him anywhere. Stepping out of his insignificant world to become a part of Ammu's world is a sure step to self-annihilation. Being the untouchable, he is not acknowledged socially; this negation leads to his ultimate physical obliteration. He is the other, who despite expulsion could not become a subject in his own right because he does not renounce his connection with the system and repeatedly seeks assimilation into a system by his love for Ammu. His unconscious propels him to encroach upon consciousness (society); hence causing the breakdown of the established system. His ambiguous placement between two worlds blurs the boundaries. Being unable to be an architect of his destiny, he loses control over his life. His small God is unable to protect him amidst his misfortunes; he is hushed. Thus, he sinks into oblivion by the God of big things.

Notes

[1] Abjection is a concept taken from Julia Kristevas , a French philosopher of 1980s and 1990s, works to signify anything that is non definable due to its ambiguous state. It exists on the bordeline of self and not self. Kristeva relates it to those entities which cause nausea, loathing, disgust and repulsion e.g food, filth or waste. It is neither a subject nor an object but it has only one characteristic of an object that of being opposed to I. It is a non object on the edges of primal repression. According to Judith Butler, it can be termed as the excluded OTHER that conventionality creates. Abjects are created through the constitution of viable subjects and through the corollary constitution of a domain of unviable (un) subjects neither named nor prohibited within the economy of the law. For further detail consult Jeremy Hawthorns *A Glossary of Contemporary Literary Theory* .p.1 (listed). Linked primordially to the body excretions, abject is something rejected from which one does not part, a horror that violates identity, system, order. For further detail consult Michael Andr Bernsteins *Bitter Carnival: Ressentiment and the Abject Hero.*p. 29 (listed)

[2] Arundhati Roy, *The God of Small Things* (New Delhi: IndiaInk, 1997) p. 33. All subsequent references are to the text of this edition and are incorporated parenthetically into the text of the paper by page numbers unless stated otherwise.

[3] Melanie Klein (1882-1960) is a pioneering psychoanalyst who developed work on melancholia and identified the loss of object as something internal even before the subject-object distinction occurs. The lost object is an internal not external and the subject immerses himself in grief to make up for that loss and the subject seeks identification with that. For further detail consult Noelle McAfees *Julia Kristeva* p. 60 (listed)

[4] Nick Mansfield refers to Lacanian Lack that is vital to the constitution of subjectivity and subject always tries to fill in that lack by perpetual identification with the object of desire and subsequent alienation. For further detail consult *Subjectivity: Theories of the Self from Freud to Haraway.* P.45 (listed)

References

Brians, P. (2003). *Modern South Asian Literature in English.* Westport, CT: Green wood Press.

Fox, L. C. (2002). A Martryrology of the Abject: Witnessing and Trauma in Arundhati Roys the God of Small Things . *ARIEL l* 33: 3-4 (July-Oct 2002) 35+ http://www.questia.com/read/1G1-136653943/a-martyrology-of-the-abject-witnessing-and-trauma. date accessed 10.05.2014

McAfee, N. (2004). *Julia Kristeva.* New York: Routledge.

Mansfield, N. (2000). *Subjectivity: Theories of the Self from Freud to Haraway.*St. Leonards, N.S.W: Allen and Unwin.

Roy, A. (1997). *The God of Small Things.* New Delhi: IndiaInk

Sadaf, S. (2008). Colour Play in Arundhati Roys the God of Small Things . *ARIEL* 39: 3 (July 2008) 73+

Schoene, B. (2009). *The Cosmopolitan Novel.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press